l'Alfa Vince!

When I was visiting the Alfa Romeo headquarters at Arese in the early eighties, meetings were often disrupted by the noise and general disruption caused by workforce demonstrations which spilled out of the factory premises and into the office complex.  At that time, the place was a hotbed of political strife.  Often, I found myself lamenting the fact that considerable energy could be found for such activities, while apathy and a lack of dedication underlay so much of the poor quality that characterised the products these same people were helping stagger along the production lines.  But this was nothing new – Alfa Romeo had long been ‘state owned’ and able to function aloof from the commercial/economic principles that ensure that most companies manage their employees such that good order is maintained and a profitable operation enabled.

Fig.1. Political daubs on the Autodelta yard walls. Courtesy Robert Little

In the wake of WWI, Italy could not escape the Europe-wide economic crisis that saw crippling currency devaluations and raging inflation.  Things came to a head for Alfa Romeo in 1921 when its majority shareholder, Banco Nazionale di Sconto, collapsed.  It was however saved by absorption into a state institution, ‘IRI,’ which had been created by the Italian government.  Under this ‘ownership’ Alfa Romeo prospered through the twenties, thirties and forties, achieving success both in commercial car-building and motor sport terms .  However, in 1948, a new – though still basically state-governed – regime was introduced, leaving the company under direction from an organisation named Finmeccanica.  Resentment by the Alfa Romeo management of this arrangement ebbed and flowed over time, the main point of contention being Finmeccanica’s ability to interfere with production and the models programme strategies.  Almost as unwelcome was intrusion into the selection/appointment of senior leadership personnel.  Notwithstanding this latter point, the appointment of Giuseppe Luraghi as Alfa Romeo’s CEO in December 1960 was positive in that he championed the development of the Giulia models and the return to motor sport participation, including the establishment of Autodelta.  Also, he oversaw the move from Portello to Arese and the planning for the Alfasud project.  But within Finmeccanica and the government’s Economic Planning function, an arch economically conservative/anti-motor sport culture was maintained.  Consequently, as the seventies got underway, Luraghi was put under considerable pressure.  He was urged to abandon a plan to upgrade the Arese factory, to stop spending on motor sport and to abolish Autodelta.  The political climate featured a strong hard left element whereby the northern industrial area was represented as being a centre of capitalist greed which prospered at the expense of other regions – especially the South.  To address this, a plan was promoted to move a large proportion of vehicle production from Arese to a new site in Avellino, not so far from the new Alfasud plant at Pomigliano d'Arco.  All of this left Carlo Chiti, Autodelta itself, and the 33 programme in a notably insecure situation.

 

However, on-track, things were to prove a little more favourable for the team. The 12 cylinder 33 would start the 1974 World Championship quest with a 1-2-3 at Monza, though the rest of the season would be dominated by Matra.  Autodelta responded early on by deciding to dedicate most of the season to development of the car for an all-out championship onslaught in 1975, all the more attractive since there would be little Group 5 competition, (Matra having withdrawn), and  Porsche being focused on the GT category. 

Fig.2. T-33/TT/12 of Merzario/Andretti winning 1974 Monza 1000 kms. Courtesy Luciano Pasonni

Late 1971 had seen the introduction of the T-33/TT/3.  The TT designation stemmed from the chassis being constructed as a ‘'Telaio Tubolare,’ a development away from the monocoque format T-33/3 which had begun testing in winter 1968-69.  In parallel, Chiti designed and began the building of a new 3 litre 180° V12, intended for both sportscar and Formula 1 use.  To carry this engine, a tubular chassis based on the T-33/TT/3’s was built, and the resulting car began testing as 1973 dawned.  It should have been sooner, but various delays were experienced, much of the trouble being attributable to the political milieu and Luraghi’s and Autodelta’s consequent uncertain situation.

Fig.3. T-33/TT/3 #010. Courtesy Supercar Nostalgia/William I’Anson Ltd

Fig.4. 33 3.0 180° V12 engine. Courtesy of Robert Little

‘Uncertainty’ soon gave way to deterioration.  Chiti had enjoyed considerable autonomy in Luraghi’s regime.  He believed that a free rein was essential to him if he was to design/develop engines and chassis which he considered were beyond the understanding of administrators, finance people and even the production car engineers.  But as the Spring arrived and testing opportunities arose, Chiti sensed that his Luraghi-bestowed ‘protection’ was diminishing, while the negative communications originating from Finmeccanica demanding reduced costs/better results grew in frequency and intensity.  Nevertheless, when Chiti was able to stand trackside and just concentrate on how the new car was going, he could feel more sanguine.  Rolf Stommelen was able in March to break the track record at Paul Ricard and the following month the same feat was achieved at Monza in practice for the 1000 kms.  Unaccountably – though ‘officially’ ascribed to problems with parts suppliers – no TT/12s were run in the race.  Eventually, the new car’s race debut occurred at the Targa Florio, the historic race in its final full bloodied iteration.  With Stommelen and de Adamich aboard, the TT/12 was satisfyingly fast, taking a clear lead, and looking certain to be a winner at its first attempt, until . . . de Adamich was hit by a Lancia Fulvia and suffered retirement-enforcing suspension damage.

Fig.5. T-33/TT/12 at Balocco, Facetti at the wheel. Courtesy Alfa Romeo Auto Storico

Despite the signs that the TT/12 could be a really successful car, it was at this point that further pressure was exerted on Luraghi not only in regard to the main production organisation but also in the form of a challenge to the continuance of works motor sport involvement.  This situation seemed to affect the programme of race entries for the remainder of the season – just a single car at Zeltweg and non-entry for Watkins Glen and Kyalami.  But behind the scenes, engine development involving the cylinder heads enabled a useful power increase, proven by on-track performance in early winter testing at Vallelunga in the hands of newly-recruited driver Arturo Merzario.

 

By January 1974, Luraghi had finally had enough and he resigned.  The question of who should replace him as CEO immediately became a matter more conditioned by political bias than by the leadership, technical and commercial qualifications of the candidates.  With disagreement between the Christian Democrat and the Socialist factions unresolved, this important decision was fudged, a temporary incumbent being appointed.  This was Ermanno Guani, considered by many to be simply a puppet under the direction of IRI/Finmeccanica.  (Under Guani, a new Managing Director, Adolfo Bardini was appointed).  But at least there was no sudden termination of the racing programme or severe sanctions applied to Autodelta’s budgets/headcount.  Accordingly, testing for the new season began in February.  At this point there was some optimism resulting from Ferrari’s withdrawal, leaving Matra as the only serious opposition to Alfa Romeo’s quest for a World Championship.  After seeing some encouraging pace from Merzario at Monza, Autodelta sent two TT/12s to France for the Le Mans test in March.  The cars topped the timesheets, with Merzario 4.5 seconds quicker that the third placed, fastest, of the Matra MS670Bs.  Things got even better at the Monza 1000 kms, where the TT/12s were 1-2-3, led home by the car driven by Merzario and Mario Andretti.  Chiti was quoted as saying, ‘This was the greatest victory of my career.’  He was all the more disappointed – and bewildered – by the instruction from Bardini that no cars be sent to the next Championship round, at Spa.  Though participation was allowed for the following race, at the Nurburgring, the Monza magic had somehow been misplaced and only a second place could be achieved, leaving Matra by now well ahead in terms of championship points.  But though a determined effort could perhaps have allowed Alfa Romeo to close the gap and vie for the Championship, its own management decreed the opposite stance by instructing Autodelta to withdraw the Le Mans entries.  Thus, with the French team maintaining good performances and points scores in the remaining races, Matra-Simca finished the season as the champion constructor for the second successive year.  It then promptly announced that it would not contest a 1975 campaign.  At Arese the management was of like mind.  Costs were the dominant consideration and few of the senior figures believed in the positive link between motor sport participation and incremental sales, let alone the intrinsic spiritual value of the activity for a marque renowned for its sporting history.

Fig.6. At Monza prior to the 1-2-3 triumph, April 1974.  Chiti stands next to the car’s right hand side,

 with drivers, Brambilla, de Adamich, Zeccoli, Stommelen and Merzario behind it. Courtesy Alfa Romeo Auto Storico

Except . . . that autumn Guani was displaced by Gaetano Cortesi, an IRI-favoured executive.  As he settled into the CEO role at Alfa Romeo over the winter, signals began to emerge from his office which suggested that at least in 1975 there would be a racing programme for Autodelta to run.  Early in the New Year this became more likely when an agreement was reached with Willi Kauhsen to become involved in running the cars.  Most importantly for Cortesi in supporting his efforts to promote a less costs-obsessed culture in Arese, the German would bring with him a sizeable sponsorship budget which he had secured through associations formed in his previous role as a high profile works driver and entrant of factory-supported Porsches.  His expertise and experience went beyond endurance racing with his involvement in the 917 Can-Am and Interserie campaigns.

Fig.7. Chiti with Gaetano Cortesi. Courtesy Alfa Romeo Auto Storico

On paper the Championship prospects for Alfa Romeo in early 1975 were better than they had been for several years.  With Matra and Ferrari out of the way, the competition was relatively less intimidating.  Alpine Renault and Ligier both intended to run, but with cars less capable than the well-developed 12 cylinder MS670s of the compatriot Matra marque.  True, Porsche also had an updated, turbocharged 908 ready for action, but the 908/3 had performed poorly in 1974 and the new 2142 cc engine did not confer on the car a top speed capability equal to that enjoyed by the TT/12 and Alpine A442.  On the other hand, a substantial development programme enabled Autodelta to improve the TT/12’s chassis – especially the brakes and by the accommodation of wider tyres. And, making use of the Kauhsen sponsorship, the driver team was consolidated, with contracts for Merzario and Derek Bell; further agreements for some events were also made with Jacky Ickx, Jacques Laffite, Jochen Mass,  Mario Andretti, Henri Pescarolo and Nino Vaccarella.  The cars began the campaign with a red livery dominated by the team name initials in a white, huge size font, WKRT, on the front and on the rear wing. 

The promise was looking likely to be fulfilled when Merzario took pole position at the opening Championship round at Mugello.  However, brake problems delayed the car and allowed an Alpine victory, the Alfas finishing 2^nd and 3^rd.  Although that in itself was not a bad outcome, the post race atmosphere was clouded as a result of Merzario and Kauhsen not getting on.  Indeed, Willi’s involvement at this point was not especially positive since Chiti too harboured some resentment, feeling his ultimate authority was being challenged by the German.  Much of the problem stemmed from Kauhsen’s view that Merzario was ‘trouble’ and would not be in the team if he had his way.  But, when the next race – at Dijon – resulted in a morale-boosting Alfa win thanks to a very strong performance by Arturo, harmony began to set in. 

But, as confidence that this would be the Championship year grew at Autodelta, a new competitor emerged – the Gulf GR7 – and immediately proved itself by recording the fastest time in testing for the next round at Monza.  In the race itself, Merzario put in another robust performance, defeating the 908/3 pairing of Reinhold Jost/Mario Casoni and Larrousse/Jabouille’s Alpine; the Mass/Schenken Gulf suffered transmission problems and was classified in a lowly 20^th place.  At Spa, the TT/12s were 1^st and 2^nd, driven by Bell/Pescorolo and Merzario/Ickx, respectively.  Another 1-2 followed at the Coppa Florio, Enna, Merzario/Mass being first across the line this time. The Gelo Racing Team-entered Mirage came back into play at the Nurburgring, running not far behind, but Merzario/Laffite still managed to take the victory from Howden Ganley/Schenken with a margin of 40 seconds.  It was Bell/Pescorolo’s turn to win at Zeltweg, with Merzario/Vittorio Brambilla second.  The season concluded at Watkins Glen with a repeat win for Bell/Pescorolo, Merzario/Andretti in second. 

The success that 1975 proved to be stemmed from several factors.  The involvement of Kauhsen was certainly important, though the value of his sponsorship was more in terms of its existence providing a means of countering the economic hawks within IRI and Alfa Romeo, it being implied that much of the spending burden had been transferred out of house.  Perhaps there were some clever presentations of figures by the pro-racing/Autodelta players since, in reality the WKRT contribution amounted to only 35% of the World Championship budget.  Any illusory enhanced portrayal of the arrangement would no doubt have been supported and facilitated by Gaetano Cortesi.  Indeed, the new Alfa Romeo boss’s favourable disposition did much to ensure that Autodelta, Chiti in particular, enjoyed a period of reduced top-echelon management pressure, enabling it to function better in engineering terms as a developer of the car.  And the developments introduced during the season were largely successful.  As mentioned above, chassis/brakes improvements enhanced the TT/12’s competitiveness, as did an upping of engine power output to 500 bhp, (a 6% increase over the original rating).  Numerous detail changes were made to the bodywork of the T-33/TT/12, helping both airflows to the engine and brakes and the car’s aerodynamic efficiency both in drag reduction and downforce generating terms.  And, although he didn’t quite make a significant mark in Formula One, Arturo Merzario’s contribution to the Alfa Romeo Championship win is perhaps underrated.  Highly respected by hard task master, Carlo Abarth, ‘Little Art’ gained a lot of specific expertise at the beginning of his career in a test driver role at Corso Marche.  At Autodelta he remained always ready to put in test mileage and was able to give good, constructive feedback which was a positively enabling factor in the development process.  This attribute was probably as important for the success of the campaign as his four race victories.  Commercial developments also were important in sustaining the Championship campaign.  In May the cars appeared at Spa with a new livery for the Campari drinks maker, reflecting a useful sponsorship addition to the racing budget.  The following month, appropriately at the Nurburgring, the name of the sausage manufacturer, Redlefsen, was writ large on the 33s.

Fig.8. 1975: Top left, Jacky Ickx at Spa; right: Jochen Mass at the Nurburgring; bottom: Zeltweg.

 Courtesy Alfa Romeo Auto Storico

One week after the Watkins Glen victory, the now-non Championship Targa Florio, run two months later than had been the custom when the event was in its pomp, provided a further and concluding celebratory victory for the T-33/TT/12.  Merzario was paired with Targa specialist-supreme, Nino Vaccarella, and they had no difficulty in winning the race by the large margin of 19 minutes from a Chevron B26.

Fig.9. 1975 Targa Florio podium; Left to right: Merzario, Vaccarella, Chiti. 

Courtesy Alfa Romeo Auto Storico

As the summer gave way to autumn, the focus passed from the 33 to the utilisation of the 12 cylinder engine in a new partnership with Motor Racing Developments, (Bernie Ecclestone’s Brabham Formula One team).  The BT45 chassis designed by MRD’s Gordon Murray was ready for track testing by Carlos Reutemann in mid-October.  Thus, Alfa Romeo became involved in Grand Prix racing again for the first time since the (second) Championship-winning year of 1951.  This would give rise to a further two new engines – a V12 and a turbocharged V8 – before ending in 1988, with little success achieved, when the V8 was dropped after 3 seasons’ use by the Osella team.

Fig.10. One-off TT12 coupe – with V8 engine – for the Tour of Italy, 1975. Courtesy Alfa Romeo Auto Storico

Without any clear conviction, Alfa Romeo did decide to develop a version of the 33 for the newly-redefined Group 6 introduced in 1976.  On paper this appeared to be specified in stark contradiction to the principles that had made the TT/12 so dominant in 1975: the tubular chassis was to be replaced with a monocoque and the 3.0 litre capacity/natural aspiration, (which helped ensure good reliability) of the engine was due to be replaced by a 2140 cc version with twin turbocharged induction.  The race debut of the car, originally referred to as 33TS12, subsequently, SC12, was delayed, in a manner precursory to the saga of the Formula 1 890T engine in 1982-3, by difficulties over the sourcing of the turbocharger units.  Eventually, some appearances were made, and there were interludes of encouraging pace, but 1976 was really a blank year for Alfa Romeo in terms of sports cars racing.  1977 was certainly different, even if the scale of the success attained was limited.  Using the normally aspirated SC12, the team won all 8 rounds of The World Sportscar Championship.  This, however, was open only to Group 6 cars and was not the FIA’s premier competition for such machinery – that distinction being reserved for The World Championship for Makes, won in dominant fashion by Porsche with its phenomenal 936 model.  The turbocharged car ran in the hands of Merzario at the end of the season in Austria, but was outpaced there by Brambilla’s atmo SC12.  Perhaps just to ensure that the turbo SC12 would never emulate the glories racked up by the 3.0 version, the FIA announced that Group 6 was to be abolished as from 1978.

Fig.11. 1977 Alfa 33 SC12. Courtesy of Wouter Melissen

So, Alfa Romeo’s foremost motor sport role in the New Year was as the ongoing engine supplier to the Brabham team.  But this arrangement was about to change too because Brabham needed a narrower unit to enable the construction of a new chassis which could exploit the fast-developing principles of ground effects.  In response, Chiti had a 60° V12 design under way in October.  Behind the scenes, Chiti had also been at work for some time on the design of a chassis to be powered initially by his 180° V12 cylinder engine and with which to race in Formula 1 as an Alfa Romeo.  The car was ready to begin testing by mid-year and there was hope that it could make its race debut at Monza in September.  That proved to be over ambitious, and it was not until May 1979 that it was seen at a Grand Prix.  Regrettably, what happened over the following six seasons was never anywhere near as uplifting as what had been achieved with the T-33/TT/12.

Andrea - What If? Part 2

After two years in Formula 3, it was important for Andrea to sustain momentum in his career by moving up to Formula 2 full time.  This he was able to achieve with the help of his Marlboro sponsorship and positive discussions with Ron Dennis.  Ron had founded his team, Project 4, in 1976, and it had run Chico Serra in 1979.  It had greater experience in F2 and put a lot of focus on this category for 1980, fielding March 802-BMWs for Andrea and Serra in the European series.  The first race of the new season was at Thruxton, in April, and Andrea outpaced Serra to finish third. The championship was comprised of 12 races, of which Andrea was entered in all but one.  He won the penultimate round in August at Misano, and ranked fifth in the championship.  That he did not appear at the final round and perhaps improve his position to fourth was due to the highly significant opportunity then afforded to him through the Marlboro connection.  1980 had been a fraught year for Alfa Romeo’s Autodelta team, headed by Carlo Chiti.  The flat 12 177 had proved uncompetitive and had been entered only intermittently.  The replacement, 179, with V-form engine, had been subject to reliability problems.  Off the circuit, there were concerns that the powerful unions in the Factory should not be alienated by any perceived lack of commitment to number two driver, Bruno Giacomelli.  The new driver, Patrick Depailler, brought in to spearhead the team’s endeavours, though brimming with confidence and ability, was found to be struggling as he had not fully recovered from a hang-gliding accident.  Then, just as he appeared to be finding his form, he was killed in a testing accident at Hockenheim.  At this point, Marlboro, naturally concerned to ensure return from its investment, (with substantial sponsorship payments to the team), overruled Chiti, who was inclined to recall the veteran Vittorio Brambilla. The tobacco manufacturer insisted on the vacant driver’s seat being taken by ‘their’ Andrea de Cesaris – the expectation being that by dint of his youth, much in contrast with Brambilla, he would be the more likely front runner.

In March 802 at Thruxton, 1980

Thus, Andrea was in Montreal in late September for round 13 of the Formula 1 World Championship.  Given his relative lack of experience, Andrea needed all the track time he could get.  So, the prevailing weather for the opening practice session was particularly unwelcome in the Alfa Romeo pit – it was raining cats and dogs, deterring even some of the most long-served of drivers from venturing out onto the circuit. Conditions did improve later, (and on the following day), but for a debutant they remained decidedly ‘tricky.’  It was therefore all the more to Andrea’s credit that he qualified in eighth, in front of some of F1’s then-established front line contenders, including Patrese, Prost, Villeneuve and Arnoux.  It was an encouraging situation for the team, as Bruno was fourth, half a second quicker than Andrea. But hardly had the race got underway than a big accident occurred, bringing out the red flag.  The restart was delayed for an hour – another very challenging and nerve jangling circumstance for a young driver in his very first Grand Prix.  However, Andrea handled the race resumption without difficulty and appeared to have settled well, only for engine trouble to intervene on lap 8, necessitating his retirement.  The sense of anti-climax and frustration experienced by Andrea in Montreal can only be imagined. Meanwhile, Giacomelli – who was never bestowed with a shunt-referencing nickname – crashed out when he misjudged an attempted overtake of Didier Pironi.

At Circuit Île Notre-Dame, Montreal for the Canadian Grand Prix, 1980

The final round of the championship, the U.S. Grand Prix, was run at Watkins Glen on 5^th October.  The turn of speed shown by the Alfa 179s in Canada was maintained at the Glen, with Giacomelli taking pole and Andrea tenth.  On the race’s opening lap Andrea was pushed onto the grass, losing several places.  Reacting to this, Andrea was probably trying too hard when his 179 struck Derek Daly’s Tyrrell and sustained retirement-inducing damage on the third lap.  So, Andrea’s brief encounter with the Grand Prix scene ended in disappointment, though promise for future success was shown by the speed he had been able to show in both practice/qualifying and the races.  With the future in mind, it is germane at this point to say that several writers have observed that Ron Dennis came to be averse to running Italians in his cars, usually adding that this stemmed from his experience with Andrea in 1981.  His adoption of Andrea for the new season was probably not wholehearted from the outset.  With the merger of his Project 4 team with McLaren being a risky enterprise, pragmatic Ron needed to be especially closely compliant with the sponsor’s wishes, and Marlboro was keen to see Andrea in an M29. 

Speaking in 2012, Andrea reflected: 

I don’t think Ron ever treated me fairly. I had the old car, (M29), and very little testing - just 20 laps at Silverstone before my first Grand Prix with them.  Crazy.  I had connections with Marlboro at a time when Ron Dennis wanted the company to continue its sponsorship.  He was taking over from Teddy Mayer, and McLaren had been performing badly under Teddy. Ron needed good sponsorship, because he was building the first carbon-fibre chassis with John Barnard. So yes, he gave me a chance because I was important to Marlboro and Marlboro was important to him. I’d driven for Ron in F2, so he knew I could be quick. 

Ron and Andrea avoiding eye contact!

Andrea was teamed at McLaren with the Belfast-born John Watson, who had first driven a Formula 1 car in 1973. Broadly, in terms of experience, John was ten years ahead of Andrea.  This was evidenced by their comparative qualifying performances – John’s average being ninth, whereas Andrea’s was fifteenth, but it is notable that John was provided with the new MP4 from the 3^rd race, Andrea having to wait until the 6^th for the innovative and potentially far superior John Barnard-designed model.  As for the races, Andrea’s best result was sixth place in San Marino.  Any hope of a good championship placing was undermined by the numerous DNFs – 9 – but of these, only 3 can be attributed unequivocally to fault on Andrea’s part.  On the other hand, Watson made a mistake and had a colossal accident at Monza, the common wisdom being that his life was preserved only by the immense strength of the revolutionary carbon fibre monocoque construction of the MP4.

Andrea, #8, and team-mate Watson, #7, take to the grass at the Brazil Grand Prix, 1981

Further analysis of available data and contemporary reports shows that specific own-fault accidents/beaching spins by Andrea amounted to 10 in practice/qualifying/racing in the season’s 15 Grands Prix.  I would not dispute the previously quoted figure of 19+ since some reports refer to ‘multiple’ incidents/spins/offs, etc.  But for added insight, another driver’s 1981 is worth considering and comparing with that of Andrea’s.  Like many others, I greatly enjoyed seeing Gilles Villeneuve’s exploits on track in Ferraris which were often not exactly au-point chassis/handling-wise.  His chutzpah will remain in the collective memory for as long as the sport is ongoing.  However, in 1981 he too did a fair amount of spinning and shunting, just like Andrea, Gilles’s ‘score’ being 13.  An enthusiastic advocate for the man in the Ferrari #27 was Denis Jenkinson, the Continental Correspondent of Motor Sport magazine.  Conversely, that he formed a dim view of Andrea’s qualities from an early date is evidenced by the prejudicial comments/turns of phrase that frequently featured in his articles, e.g. (Argentina) – ‘Andrea de Cesaris spent most of his time spinning his older McLaren M29F.’  (Holland) ‘Andrea de Cesaris  . . . who had continuously crashed their (McLaren’s) cars throughout the season.’  (Italy) ‘de Cesaris, the Italian with the funny eyes actually keeping his car on the track this time.’  Contrast this approach to how Jenkinson generally wrote in admiration and affection about Giles Villeneuve. 

Fortunately, Marlboro had financially supported both the McLaren and Alfa Romeo Formula One campaigns in 1981 and was happy enough to continue this aspect of its marketing strategy for 1982.  With Nikki Lauda eager to join McLaren for the new season, Marlboro was once again instrumental in facilitating a move for Andrea back to Alfa Romeo where a seat had become vacant as a consequence of Mario Andretti’s retirement from Grand Prix racing.  So, Andrea returned to a team that he considered genuinely supportive, and once again was alongside Bruno Giacomelli.  They got on well, and among many complimentary things Bruno said about Andrea was that he was ‘very correct and honest,’ and that he was ‘not too proud to say when he was wrong.’  Their friendship was tested several times in 1982, notably at the Austrian Grand Prix when their cars collided at the start of the race, but the conciliatory nature of both men enabled them to resolve disputes relatively quickly and amicably – something many teammates struggle to achieve, given that if the man in the same machine as yourself is quicker, you can’t blame your car - he is your most direct competitor, the yardstick against which you must measure your own performance.

Andrea and Bruno at the presentation of the Alfa 182

The 1982 season was a controversial one.  It began with a drivers’ strike, ostensibly over new ‘superlicence’ stipulations proposed by FISA – a reflection of the continuing dispute between the ‘manufacturer’ teams, aligned with the FISA governing body and the ‘garagistas,’ members of FOCA, such as Williams, McLaren and Brabham.  The conflict by 1982 had much to do with the FOCA teams feeling at a disadvantage against the turbo-engined cars of the manufacturers.  A work-around, enabling their cars to run out on the circuit at reduced weight, compounded the situation and when ruled ‘illegal’ by FISA, led to a boycott of the San Marino Grand Prix by most of the FOCA members.  Meanwhile safety re-emerged as a major concern in the wake of the death at Zolder of the much-loved Gilles Villeneuve, (and of novice, Riccardo Paletti, in Canada).  Moreover, to confirm the season’s peculiarity, the Championship went to Keke Rosberg, despite his haul of wins being just one. 

Early in the year Alfa Romeo could be hopeful – an improved V12 car, the 182, had been developed and was ready for introduction at the second race, in Brazil.  At the same time, work was progressing on a new V8 turbo engine.  But at round 1, the 179s of Andrea and Bruno were not competitive, finishing thirteenth and eleventh respectively.  Andrea figured much more prominently in Brazil in the new car but was forced to retire when the undertray was dislodged.  Then came Long Beach.  A memorable event as Andrea snatched pole position – at that point the youngest ever driver to start at the head of a Grand Prix – and initially led the race in authoritative style.  Eventually outfoxed by the vastly more experienced Nikki Lauda, Andrea maintained second place for a while until he was distracted by deteriorating brakes and a supposed rear suspension failure, and lost control.  The damage sustained was sufficient to dictate Andrea’s retirement.

Pole position in the 182 for the U.S.West Grand Prix at Long Beach, April 1982

Andrea’s season was largely undermined by the 182’s unreliability.  Though his average qualifying position was eighth and at tracks to which the car was suited, he could race in the top 6, he failed to finish in 10 of the 16 events, of which 4 could be considered the result of own-fault accidents.  This would compare with several other drivers’ records – Rene Arnoux’s ‘score’ for example being 3 - once again giving the lie to the lazy ‘deCrasheris’ slur. 

Part 3 (next post) covers Andrea's 1983 season and presents the arguments for his potential as a World Champion