The One and Only - Part 2

 

Nevertheless, the team had not forgotten the vision that informed the earliest days of the project – a car primarily for race participation, fast and nimble enough to compete in Groups 4 and 5 and to score victories over the cars from the Zuffenhausen works of a formidable rival. So some refocus as regards the chassis/body was required. First and foremost, this sought lighter weight and reduced mass. Consequently, Lamborghini was instructed to make the body in GRP and mount it on a tubular spaceframe chassis, allowing the car’s unladen weight to be around 1,300 Kg in road trim and little more than 1,000 Kg as prepared for the track. The new format also embodied reduced dimensions for both the wheelbase and overall length in the interests of better handling characteristics. Recognising the value of drawing on very specific expertise and to achieve best possible speed in the project’s development and subsequent vehicle build process, a supplier nexus was determined – body component panels from the company, Trasformazione Italiana Resina, located 50 km west of Sant’Agata at Reggio Emilia; chassis from Modena-based Marchesi & C.; chassis/body assembly at Italdesign.

Chassis frame made by Machesi.  Courtesy MenudeiMotori

Complying with the updated specification, Lamborghini initially made good progress, producing a prototype in little more than 6 months.  It was shown to the BMW Board in early May ’77 and well received.  The evaluation was enhanced by the availability for viewing of cars considered likely to be ‘the opposition,’ De Tomaso Pantera, Maserati Merak and, inevitably, a turbocharged 911.  Hearing that the BMW people perceived ‘their’ car to be superior to these competitors, the Lamborghini team could be justified in feeling pleased with its efforts.  However, back inside the Sant’Agata factory, the mood was much less upbeat since the company’s financial fitness had been continuing to deteriorate.  Cashflow was especially poor and this militated against steady, revenue earning production.  So, though there was customer demand for the Countach and Jarama models, sales rates were constricted and income lost.  With the receipts from BMW channelled to product development, Rossetti and Leimer sought to boost revenue by contracting to build an off-road vehicle for American maker, Mobility Technology International, which had been commissioned to supply it to the U.S. Military.  From the outset of the project however, there was trouble – named the Cheetah, rights to the design were contested by Ford and this led to a litigation.  Consequently, by the time the vehicle was ready for debut in ’77, Lamborghini’s confidence in the project as a ‘lifesaver’ had already been eroded.  Though no surprise, BMW’s decision to cancel its contract with Lamborghini in April ‘78 for a second time was a further major blow.  Efforts to sell Automobili Lamborghini as a going concern were unsuccessful and by legal compulsion the business was declared bankrupt in August ’78, one month after a prototype M1 had been shown to the press in Munich at the Olympic Park  Also announced at this time, at Hockenheim, was BMW’s intention to institute a ‘Procar’ racing series in ’79.  A follow-up announcement was made in October ’78 outlining plans for the supply of Group 4 specification M1s to private entrants, it having been established that such cars would be allowed to run in German national events.  Preparation of these cars was to be entrusted to Ron Dennis’s junior formulae team, Project Four, and to Osella Engineering, inheritor of the Abarth works operation after the Fiat takeover in ’71.

’78 M1 prototype.  Courtesy Hans Lehmann

At the point of the Lamborghini contract lapse, seven pre-production M1s were under construction. Not enough had yet been learnt with these to enable the formulation of a revised series production plan/timeframe. The project was under huge pressure given the Group 4/5 racing aspirations and related homologation requirements. This would all come to nothing if 400 units could not be manufactured. Thus, the BMW M team needed to, and did, act swiftly and effectively. Firstly, influence was brought to bear such that a number of Lamborghini employees collaborated to found a new business, ItalEngineering. Its purpose was to improve/maintain relationships and working practices between the various specialist businesses already involved in the project. A key executive of ItalEngineering was Marco Raimondi whose primary responsibility was liaison/co-ordination over the wide range of technical aspects.

Left - Marco Raimondi (ItalEngineering) with (right) Dott Franco Baraldini (Lamborghini)

In addition to the design/styling work already undertaken by Italdesign, Giugiaro’s company was delegated to paint/finish the tubular chassis frames. The body panels, glass and interior trim was then assembled on the chassis frame and the completed shell painted. The wiring loom was subsequently fitted prior to the partially complete vehicle passing into the care of Karosserie Baur at Stuttgart. At Baur the remainder of the mechanical, electrical and trim equipment was installed. This stage was found to be problematic as Baur reported that because of dimensional inconsistencies and resultant fit issues, it needed substantially more time than had been agreed in order to complete its work. Thus a further delay occurred and the cost of production was further escalated. However, on completion, the cars were shipped to Munich for testing/final inspection at the factory. Despite the issues at Baur, the race car preparation programme was implemented in time for the ’79 season. But, though it had originally envisaged participation in Group 5, (Special Production cars), BMW feared a lack of competitiveness against other makers now deploying turbocharged cars. Consequently, the M1 became destined to race in the less prestigious Group 4, (Special Grand Touring cars), category.

Body panels being fitted to the chassis frame.  Courtesy 2020 BMW M1 Club e.V.

Its development supervised by Rosche, a /1, Group 4-compliant version of the M88 engine was soon running and proving effective. With a 470 bhp output, it was considerably more powerful than the standard M1 unit. As regards the chassis, suspension, steering and brake components were replaced with race-specification items, while the removal of non-essential items allowed a reduction of the kerb weight down to 1,020 Kg. Wheel widths were increased front and rear, and accommodating arch extensions applied to the bodywork. The aerodynamics were improved by the addition of a large rear wing and front spoiler. By contractual agreement, all the cars were equipped with Goodyear tyres. Eventually, 54 Group 4 M1s were built.

Three months on from the press presentation, a public launch was effected at the Paris Motor Show. Just two months beyond that, in January ’79, the first deliveries were being made to customers. By then the reality of the car’s gestation troubles and the complexity of its revised manufacturing process were reflected in the asking price – around DM 110,000. That made for a car very much more expensive than competing products such as Porsche’s 911 Turbo. Unsurprisingly, customer demand was below expectations and it quickly became necessary to discreetly offer discounts and incentives such as ‘free’ options.

Paris Motor Show, October ’78.  Courtesy Gilbert Uzan

The racing strand of the M1 project continued to progress more positively. A car in race specification emerged in December ’78. During testing, the top speed capability was found to be 193 mph with 0-60 mph achievable in just over 4 seconds. The development work went well enough to allow for a Group 4 race debut in the hands of Marc Surer at the DRM Nürburgring Eifelrennen in late April ’79. Classified 9th overall and first in class in the Rennsport Trophae (Division 1) race, it was a largely successful first showing, though Surer’s progress had been hampered by engine trouble in the latter stages.

Procar chassis# 4301063, winner Nurburgring, April ’79.  Courtesy Wolfgang Clemens

Both road and race versions counted towards the homologation target of 400 units, though, as mentioned above, it had been seen in ‘78 that the quota would not be achievable in time for the ’79 season. Neerpasch had thought around this problem and come up with the idea of a racing format not constricted by the sport’s governing body’s (FIA) regulations. Making use of their existing good rapport from the F3 engine supply programme, Neerpasch engaged Max Mosely’s interest in the creation of a GT series to be run as support races to Formula 1 Grand Prix events. Mosely in turn enlisted Bernie Ecclestone as an advocate, enabling rapid progress on the scheme’s implementation. With support from the F1 constructors, a Procar Association was set up and agreement reached for races to be run at the European Grands Prix. It was envisaged that each race would be contested by 20 cars, 5 to be entered by the BMW factory and the remaining 15 by a variety of teams, including Project Four Racing, Osella, Schnitzer Motorsport, Eggenberger Racing, GS Tuning, Tom Walkinshaw Racing, Team Konrad and Ecurie Arvor. With this number of cars, it was decided to entrust some preparation also to BS Fabrications, a Luton-based business familiar to Ecclestone and through which he promoted Nelson Piquet’s driving career. Sales to the teams were based on the price of a Procar being $60,000.

The competition format encompassed a two day event on the Friday and Saturday of each Grand Prix – practice on the Friday, race on the Saturday. The BMW factory team on each occasion would comprise the 5 drivers fastest in Formula 1 practice and, irrespective of Procar practice times, they would be assigned the first five grid slots. Series points/prize sums were awarded as below:

The series rounds for ’79 were to be held at the following Grands Prix:

The series championship would be taken by the highest points scorer over the 8 rounds, a M1 being their principal reward for the feat, with other BMW models to be gifted to the other five drivers finishing in the first six places in the season-end standings table. 

The teams entering cars in the series were: BMW Motorsport, Project Four Racing, Franz Konrad Racing, Osella Squadra Corse, Schutz Racing, Eggenberger Motorsport, BMW Italia, Alimpo Sport, GS Team, Manfred Cassani, BMW Schweiz, Brun Motorsport, Heidigger Racing Team, Ecurie Automobile Arvor, Memphis Team International, Team Krebs, Team Winkelhock, Toleman Group Motorsport and Tom Walkinshaw Racing.

Over the eight events in the ’79 season, a total of 29 drivers took part – Toine Hezemans did seven, Stuck, Regazzoni and Helmut Kelleners, six, Niki Lauda, five. De Angelis, Fittipaldi. Beltoise, Mass, Konrad, Brun, Reutemann, Cheever, Needell, Jarier, Hotz and ‘Winter’ each did just one. Winners were: Belgium, de Angelis; Monaco, Lauda; France, Piquet; UK, Lauda; Germany, Lauda; Austria, Laffite; Netherlands, Stuck; Italy, Stuck. The top three in the Championship’s closing standings were, 1st Lauda, (78 points); 2nd Stuck (73 points); 3rd Regazzoni (61 points). Both Lauda and Stuck were presented with a M1 road car, Regazzoni and Hottinger with BMW 528s, and Hezemans and Piquet with BMW 323is.

Procar race, Hockenheim, July ’79.  Courtesy 2020 BMW M1 Club e.V

The season had seen some hard racing with consequent spats and shunts, raising the profile and perceived entertainment value of the series.  With some instances of lesser-known drivers, (notably Markus Höttinger, for example) out-performing top line Grand Prix stars, there was speculation that the cars were far from being all of equivalent specification/competitive set-up.  Unsurprisingly, it wasn’t long before the ‘private’ teams began to complain that the ‘factory’ cars had a power advantage.  In response, a revs limit increase was sanctioned – going from the previously-specified 8,500 to 9,200.  Disquiet rumbled on however, and at the German event it was openly suggested that winner, Lauda’s, car was ‘special,’ in response to which ‘The Rat  said: “Nonsense, after the race at Silverstone my car windows were cleaned and the car was brought to Hockenheim. The cars are all equally fast.  If at all, you can only make a difference with the tyres. Although they are all the same, there are small differences and if you are lucky enough to find a set of tyres that are a bit faster, because they are simply made that way, then you can drive faster.”

Procar race, Zeltweg, August ’79.  Courtesy 2020 BMW M1 Club e.V.

Lauda, Stuck and Regazzoni arrived at the final race, at Monza, all in the running to take the championship.  Stuck, though classified as a ‘private’ driver had proven the series meister, especially in the later races, though Lauda was very nearly as quick and with consistency had racked up points on occasions when Stuck had suffered a DNF.  At Monza, Stuck won with a 20 seconds advantage over Lauda, with the remarkable Höttinger in 3^rd.  It made for a close finish to the championship, but was clear enough given Lauda’s 5 points advantage. 

’79 Procar champion, Niki Lauda with M1, German Grand Prix, ’08.  Courtesy BMW Group

There was an additional Procar race, run at Donington Pak in June, as a part of a meeting commemorating Gunnar Nilsson.  It was won by Nelson Piquet, but no championship points were awarded for this event. 

It was generally agreed that Procar had in ’79 fulfilled BMW’s ambitions and was widely regarded as a properly competitive series, not just a demonstration exercise run for marketing purposes.  In helping to consolidate BMW’s standing as a major player in global motorsport, it provided encouragement to the management in the Four Cylinder Tower to rekindle the company’s F1 aspirations.  Somewhat ironically, as a consequence, BMW itself ceded ‘ownership’ of the Procar series to the Formula One Constructors Association in order to focus effort and resources on a F1 engine programme.  At the same time, it was decided to entrust all the preparation of the ‘works’ M1s (i.e. those allocated to the F1 drivers) to BS Fabrications for the ’80 season.  Also revised for ’80 was the qualifying format by the removal of the privileged pre-determined starting grid positions allocated to the Grand Prix drivers. 

While the primary focus in ’79 was on the Procar series, wider utilisation of the race version M1 evolved with success.  Four years previously, French entrepreneur and amateur racing driver, Hervé Poulain had successfully proposed and implemented the ‘Art Car’ programme, in which contemporary artists were commissioned to apply a ‘livery’ to various BMW models destined to compete in the 24 Hours of Le Mans events.  The ’75 entry was a BMW 3.0 CSL painted by Alexander Calder and driven by Poulain, Sam Posy and Jean Guichet.  For ’79, an M1 with decoration by Andy Warhol was entered.  Group 4 compliant and in the IMSA GTX .25+ class, it was taken to 6^th overall, 2^nd in class by drivers, Poulain, Marcel Mignot and Manfred Winklelhock.

BMW M1 of Hervé Poulain, Le Mans, ’79.  Courtesy Classic and Vintage BMW

At National level, no M1s were ready to compete in the Deutsche Rennsport Meisterschaft, (Rennsport Trophäe,  Group 4 Division 1), until the fourth round at Salzburg in May.  In the eight remaining races of the season there were intermittent entries for Stuck, Lauda, Regazzoni, Jochen Mass, Franz Konrad, Wolfgang Schütz, Ralf-Dieter Schreiber, Walter Brun, Markus Höttinger and Lili Reisenbichler.  Class wins were achieved by Stuck (twice), Schütz (twice) and Mass.

BMW M1 of Niki Lauda, Norisring, DRM, June ’79.  Courtesy Harry Maurer

For ’80, a calendar of nine races was announced, including two UK races and three in Germany:

New teams for the season were: BMW Nederland, Schnitzer Motorsport, Sauber Motorsport, Team Merzario, Kannacher GT Racing, Team Austria, Team Lepitre, Ralf-Dieter Schreiber, Racing Team Jurgensen and Peter Oberdorfer.  No less than 40 drivers took part, though 17 entered only a single event. 

These five F1 drivers competed in both Procar seasons; left to right: Laffite, Pironi,, Jones, Piquet, Reutemann.  Courtesy Motorsport.com

The opening race at Donington showed that the revision of the qualifying rules was capable of causing quite a shake up in the relative competitiveness of the F1 drivers, with several strong performances from the ‘private’ drivers contributing to a close fought and incident-packed event won by Jan Lammers.

Winning Procar of Jan Lammers, April ’80, Donington Park.  Courtesy 2020 BMW M1 Club e.V

At the second round, the peculiar nature of the AVUS circuit, with its exceptionally long straights, brought the engine revs limit back under scrutiny. Although a maximum of 8,700 was again recommended in the interests of reliability, there was plenty of enthusiasm for going to 9,000-9,300.  Hans-Geog Bürger’s GS-entered car won the pole with 8,700 set, though other drivers claimed they were not competitive if restricted to less than 9,000.  However, the main talking point at the race’s conclusion was the performance of the Cassani driver, Manfred Schurti who beat Lammers to the win by six seconds.  Schurti was an accomplished driver with the Gelo, Martini and Porsche works teams, though with a less high profile than many of the Procar participants.  At Monaco, Stuck was back to his ’79 late season form, finishing ahead of Kelleners, 2^nd and Piquet, 3^rd.  Stuck won again at the Norisring but was down to 7^th at Brands Hatch, with 5 F1 drivers – including winner, Reutemann – ahead of him.  Didier Pironi found himself under a good deal of criticism in regard to collisions at the Hockenheim event, infuriating Stuck in particular, but emerged as the victor, and appeared not too bothered by the controversies!  However, such an incident-packed race once again proved that Procar was a full-bloodied racing series.  The final three races of the ’80 series – and the last Procar events of all time – were dominated by Nelson Piquet, the man who would win the F1 World Championship the following year, being first across the line in each.  This late run of form served to propel Piquet’s points total to 90, putting him well clear of Jones (77 points) and Stuck (71 points) and thus more than enough to secure his standing as the ’80 Procar champion.  His reward from BMW was a 635CSi,while Jones was presented with a BMW 528i, and Stuck received a BMW 323i. 

Race and Championship winner, Nelson Piquet, Imola September ’80.  Courtesy Getty Images

With the conclusion of the Procar series, the M1’s period as a BMW model was coming to an end.  Production was discontinued in ’80, though the last examples were not delivered to their first owners until into ’81.  453 M1s had been built, (some say 457), of which 54 were to Procar or Group 5 specification.  As regards the Group 5 cars, despite the homologation problem, BMW had been at work since ’78 on a suitable engine for the category.  Announced that year, a twin turbo version of the M88 had been developed and this was utilised from ’81.  Designated 88/2, it had a reduced cubic capacity – down to 3,191 cc – enabling M1s to run in the 4.5 litre (naturally aspirated) class.  Subject to boost pressure, the M88/2 could output almost 1,000 bhp.  The key to unlocking the M1’s entry to Group 5 competition was obtained in December ’80 when the FIA issued homologation papers under reference #670 with acknowledgement of completion of the required 400 units.

Part 3, to follow, covers the Group 5 M1s and a survey of M1s marketed for resale in recent years.

The One and Only - Part 1

Autumn ’72, I’m into my second year with the UK BMW importer and still marvelling that in this, my first post-education job, it’s not work at all.  And the prospect of even more enhanced fun is conjured when I’m instructed to prepare for my first trip to the Munich factory.  So, shortly after, I was revelling in my first four days in Bavaria.  There were many things to enjoy about the city, the South German culture and the ambience of the Lerchenauer Str. BMW campus – not least the recently completed, splendid Four Cylinder Tower – but the single experience that most inspired me was being allowed to get close up and personal with the fabulous Turbo which had made its debut appearance at the previous year’s Paris Motor Show.  As a vision of our automotive future, Paul Bracq’s creation even managed to trump the Mercedes C111-II that had so impressed me a couple of years earlier.  There was so much to like about Bruno Sacco’s bodywork design though I thought it could look even more purposeful if its height was reduced and its width increased just a touch.  That was exactly what Bracq did with his styling of the Turbo.  And all the talk around BMW   was about the possibility of such a wonderful car being put into production.

© 2026 Inspiration Grid and  Schiffer Publishing Ltd.

Meanwhile, Niki Lauda was ‘Stateside’ in October for the Canadian and U.S. Grands Prix.  He may well have wished he was elsewhere, as the car at his disposal for those races was a March 721G – not even a fully-blown F1 machine, but one of the marque’s Formula Two cars equipped with the ubiquitous Cosworth DFV engine.  It was, however, more competitive than the 721X – an innovative design by March’s Robin Herd.  Herd’s aim had been to improve the balance/handling of the car by incorporating a transverse gearbox.  However, from its debut in May ’72 at the Spanish Grand Prix, it was evident that the 721X was a very difficult car to drive.  So difficult in fact that after just three races, the team reverted to a conventional format with the 721G.  Lauda’s dismay, was compounded by the fact that he had had to borrow $250,000 to ‘buy’ his ’72 March drive.  Niki’s results for those two Grands Prix? – denied a likely, though lowly 15^th place finish in Canada as he had received help from marshals when stranded, and thus was unclassified (last on the road running) at the Glen.  His morale must have been further undermined by teammate Ronnie Peterson’s performance in his similar 721G – strong showing throughout the weekend and a 4^th place finish in the race.  Any dreams of being a future champion Lauda might be having over the winter would surely be very fleeting and unconvincing.

Courtesy graham64.wordpress.com

What was convincing in late ’72 was a spirit of optimism at the Lamborghini factory in Sant’Agata, where, by then, nearly 800 Miuras had been built and the ‘replacement’ Countach model’s development was progressing well – well enough, indeed, for a prototype to be shown at the following March’s Geneva Motor Show.  Coming up to its 10^th year as a car manufacturer, the business was riding the crest of a sales boom, increasing revenues and praise for the panache and innovative nature of its products.  For Ferruccio Lamborghini himself however, the outlook was very different.  His tractor business became especially problematic, prompting him to sell it out in ‘72 as a pre-emptive measure, fearing that it might become insolvent.  At the same time, he sold a significant chunk of his holdings in Automobili Lamborghini to Georges-Henri Rossetti.  Two years later he relinquished his entire stake in the business, leaving it in the joint ownership of Rossetti and René Leimer.

Courtesy Supercars.net

Late in ’71 Bernie Ecclestone had paid Ron Tauranac £100,000 for Motor Racing Developments/Brabham and was preoccupied with remodelling the business.  At the same time he was developing his interest in a role beyond team ownership and into the realm of the sport’s organisation, governance and commercial evolution; this would lead in ’74 to his involvement in the establishment of the Formula One Constructors Association.

Courtesy Sport Pro History

One more thing happening in autumn ’72 was the growing influence of Jochen Neerpasch on BMW’s plans for development of its motorsport ambition.  After a successful driving career, ’60-’68, Neerpasch was hired by Ford Germany to run its racing division.  His achievements in the role led to his being offered a similar position by Bob Lutz, Sales Director at BMW, which he took up in May ’72.  With the appointment, the company sought to establish an elite brand, BMW Motorsport GmbH, (‘BMW M’) within the marque, its objective being to prove in the Group 4 and 5 racing categories  that anything Porsche could do, BMW could do better!  Initially, Neerpasch focused on establishing a general perception of the company’s excellence in design and engineering for motorsport applications by means of a highly successful engine supply programme for Formula 2.  Alongside, the E9 Coupe was developed for top flight Touring Car racing.  A lightweight version had first been evolved in ’71 in collaboration with Alpina.  Neerpasch added to that by having a 3 litre, 200 bhp version built and homologated for Group 2.  Thus began a run of success for the CSL, starting by winning the ’73 European Touring Car Championship and sustaining success right through to ’79.

Neerpasch, (right) with Martin Braungart, 1972  Courtesy PressClub USA

These people and situations began to be drawn together when Neerpasch, together with Martin Braungart (overall project management) and Paul Rosche (engines) collaborated on a study of two possibilities – 1) BMW’s participation in Formula 1, and, 2) Creation of a coupe designed (rather than adapted to being such a vehicle) as a racing car.  Their findings and outline proposals were first reviewed by the BMW Board in September ’75.  The following month,  a go-ahead was given not only to the start of work on an engine for Formula 1, but also for the coupe, specifically a mid-engine type with 8 cylinder power.  The proposed configuration of the coupe was not something with which BMW had had previous experience, so Neerpasch requested and received permission to negotiate with Lamborghini for the Bolognese manufacturer to engineer and build the cars.  As a result, Lamborghini contracted in Spring ‘76 to handle all aspects with the exception of the engine.  Central to the agreement was the obligation for 2,000 cars to be made at Sant’Agata over a four year period.  As regards the body, it’s styling was entrusted to Italdesign, the carrozzeria founded by Giorgetto Giugiaro after he had stopped working with Ghia.  The brief from BMW was for a car with functional and production practicality but with the ‘spirit’ of Bracq’s Turbo preserved.  There was enough interpretive room to allow Giugiaro to incorporate the wedge element themes he had been evolving in ’74, ‘75 and early ’76 with the Lotus Esprit, Alfasud Sprint, Alfetta GT, VW Scirocco and  Maserati Medici II.  Back at Munich, the M team was consolidated with the appointment of additional senior personnel, Rainer Bratenstein (Engineer, Development), Hans Erdmann Schönbeck (Sales Strategy) and Dr. Karlheinz Radermacher (Board member responsible for Research & Development).  So far, so good.

Giorgetto Giugiaro  Courtesy Mahan 

But, as the early months of ’76 came and went, the outlook deteriorated.  Judging by the speed of early progress on the F1 engine project, it became clear that it would require significantly more time than originally anticipated, and a strategic rethink was necessary.  Accordingly, it was decided to suspend work and focus on the coupe.  Indeed, this too had become a source of concern, not only because a growing number of the project team members were feeling discomfort with the scale and scope of the programme – was a sales volume of 2000 really feasible, and how did the costs/benefits ratio look with the creation of a new engine involved?  Regarding this second consideration, there was a practical solution readily to hand – utilisation of the existing 6 cylinder in line engine. 

This reappraisal of the project, whilst fully justified from a BMW viewpoint, was bad news for Lamborghini. Whilst the company’s financial status, as mentioned above, had been secure during the early years, a much less lucrative era had set in following the first fuel price crisis in ’73. For Lamborghini, the situation was especially difficult given that its products were relatively expensive and its engines large and highly fuel-consumptive. With the volume of sales of its own products thus likely to contract, the anticipated revenue from building 2,000 M1s had become an essential support of the Italian firm’s ongoing financial health rather than a nice bonus. In Sant’Agata, it was thus a severe shock when BMW advised that it was withdrawing from the contract for 2,000 units. In its place a revised agreement was proposed based on some fundamental changes to the vehicle’s specifications and a lower volume of just 800. Lamborghini had no option but to accept this and duly agreed to a new contract in mid-October ’76.

Central to the revised specification of the M1 was the substitution of a purpose-developed version of the existing 6 cylinder twin cam M49, a unit of 3.2 litre capacity which had been powering the works CSL race cars. Designated M88, this became highly regarded as an emblem of the M Division’s engineering excellence with subsequent utilisation in the models considered by many as iconic, E24 M635CSi (E24) and M5 (E28). Paul Rosche sought and achieved a quantum leap in the engine’s performance potential by again incorporating a twin cam head, this time with 24 valves. BMW had begun to make 6 cylinder engines in the Thirties. By the Sixties, it had become recognised for particular expertise with this power unit type, acquiring a good reputation for efficiency, reliability and smooth power delivery characteristics. As that decade came to an end, a version of the engine, designated M30, became an important element in the company’s evolution beyond the ‘Neue Klasse’ (1.5-2.0 litre) models through which its fortunes were very successfully revived. The M30 was produced in 2.5, 2.8 and 3.0 litre capacities and powered the marque’s reputation-enhancing models – 2.5, 2.8 and 3.0 ‘E3’ saloons and the ‘E9’ coupes. The fastest 3 litre versions of these models were rated at just under 200 bhp, while the further developed ‘3.5’ for the racing CSLs was considerably more powerful. The M88 as specified for the M1 generated just under 280 bhp – enough to address any possible assertions that the M1 would fail to fulfil the original objective of being a ‘junior supercar.’ That classification was conventionally assigned only to cars with an eight cylinder engine – as had been BMW’s original intention. However, the performance of the M88 was sufficient to render the six versus eight issue purely academic. After all, the M88 would make the M1 a 280 bhp/243 lb/ft torque machine, while the Ferrari 308 GTB, even in Quattrovalvole form, deployed just 240 bhp and the Lamborghini Urraco P300 harnessed not much more at 247 bhp.

M88 engine.  Cortesy Rikojanuary (Facebook)

Paul Rosche.  Courtesy BMW

Part 2, to follow, covers the M1's development period, finalisation and start of production.

One One Five Twelve: Would that be Pounds or Kilograms? The Flat 12 Brabhams.

 

Brabham-Alfa Romeo BT45 #001

It’s well known that Bernie Ecclestone showed a flair for deal making while still a teenager, initially trading in motorcycle parts and accessories. Thus, when he started racing cars in 1950, his focus was as much on how this hobby could reward him financially as it was on competitiveness on-track. The scale of his ‘wheeling and dealing’ had snowballed sufficiently by the time he was in his thirties that he was entering cars in Grands Prix and managing a driver as prominent as the future (posthumous) ’70 World Champion, Jochen Rindt. His activities in and around the F1 scene allowed him knowledge and understanding of everything that was going on in terms of the sport’s financial and organisational aspects. Of the great many friends/acquaintances he cultivated, one of the most significant proved to be Andrea de Adamich, a well respected, intelligent Italian, good enough to drive in F1 (and World Championship sportscars) if not quite with the talent to be a title contender. He did, however, possess a good understanding of the engineering and team management elements of motorsport which he later put to good use in a second career as a journalist. Enjoying a reputation for credibility, de Adamich was able to discuss matters with a wide range of the involved personalities, including the sport’s governance executives, team owners and managers, becoming at times privy to information not circulating in the public domain.

De Adamich, seen below in conversation with Ecclestone*, was racing Alfa Romeo saloon cars in the early Sixties when he was in his early twenties. He did well enough to graduate to single seaters, and, in ’65, take the Italian F3 championship. That was an achievement which impressed Carlo Chiti, in charge at Autodelta, Alfa Romeo’s sporting arm, to the extent that de Adamich was inducted into Alfa’s touring car team. So he became a high profile driver who could and did score victories at major international events. In ’66 and ’67 he was European Touring Car Champion and before the end of the decade he had seen success at World Sportscar Championship races, run very competitively in F5000 and played a significant role in the development of the Alfa Romeo Tipo 33, culminating in the ’75 flat 12 version’s World Championship for Makes triumph. Meanwhile, from ’68 to ’73, he raced in 34 Grands Prix, with a best result, 4th in ’72 and ‘73 in Spain and Belgium, respectively. That ’73 season was his last in F1, with five outings in Brabhams. * At Balocco, 1976. Courtesy Ettore Colombo

While de Adamich was circulating on-track in F1, Ecclestone was also getting around the Grand Prix scene, keen to find new opportunities. Coming to his attention was the situation at Motor Racing Developments (Brabham), where things were unsettled after Jack Brabham’s retirement in ’70 and sale of his 50% of the business to co-owner, Ron Tauranac. Bernie had been acquainted with Tauranac in his time as Rindt’s manager when he was a Brabham driver in ’68, and would have been aware that although Ron had worked well with Jack, his heart had not been in the purchase of Jack’s shares since he saw himself as an engineer, not a corporate proprietor. Whatever was said in public to preserve a good perception of MRD’s prospects and commercial viability, de Adamich was quietly able to clue Ecclestone in further to what was actually going on. De Adamich himself liked the idea of Ecclestone getting involved at MRD and encouraged Bernie to make an offer to buy Tauranac out. In fact, there already was momentum towards that - perhaps initially at the Monaco Grand Prix, Tauranac had sounded Bernie out on the notion. It has been reported that Ecclestone offered £130,000 and this was acceptable to Tauranac. However, in October ’71, with Ron settled in his mind to move on, Ecclestone played a ‘gozunder’ on the point of signing the contract, reducing the ’price’ to £100,000. Bernie, being Bernie, deployed his ‘charm,’ with the result that Ron apparently took it on the chin and considered their friendship would be ongoing.

’72 was a difficult year for the ‘new’ MRD. The Ford Cosworth V8 DFV-engined BT33, BT34 and BT37 cars scored a mere 7 points in the International Cup for F1 Manufacturers, good enough only for a season finish in joint 9th, (last) place. Ecclestone formed the view that his team would not be able to achieve a rapid improvement in competitiveness as long as it continued to use the near-ubiquitous Cosworth DFV engine. The Ford-badged V8 at that point was typically delivering 450 bhp. He believed that the team needed a 500-plus bhp engine in a V12 configuration. The two 12 cylinders already disputing the championship were Ferrari’s Tipo 001 flat 12, giving 480 bhp and BRM’s P142 V12, rated at 440 bhp. But just beyond the realm of Formula One, another 3 litre V12 racing engine was under development – down in a quiet seaside location in Sussex. This was Harry Weslake’s Weslake Engineering works, within which a new power unit was being made for Ford/John Wyer Automotive/Gulf Racing for endurance sportscar applications. Pursuing his desire for a 500 bhp engine, when Ecclestone heard about the Weslake, he was keen to give it a try. So Brabham’s designer, Gordon Murray, was pressed into a project to modify a F2 BT38 to accommodate the engine, creating a ‘BT39,’ and Graham Hill was cajoled into driving it in a test at Silverstone. While this did not have an immediately positive outcome, the very fact that he’d seen something other than a DFV in a Brabham encouraged Ecclestone to step up his quest to find an engine that would fill the bill.

Brabham BT39-Ford Weslake V12  Courtesy OldRacingCars.com

Next stop on the search was at Weissach where Porsche could show Ecclestone a race calibre V12 yet to be assigned to a specific application. Gordon Murray recalls, ‘ . . . Porsche said, “Right, this is how much we are going to charge you for the engines,” and Bernie said, “No, no, no, no. You give us the engines and we will make them win.” Porsche said no. So that was the end of that.’

 

Ecclestone had presided over a season in which there was little success on the track but still cost him £80,000. So his focus much of the time had to be on finding sponsorship. There were talks with Aleardo Buzzi and John Hogan representing, Philip Morris. Ecclestone had become aware that the cigarette manufacturer was keen to switch its Marlboro brand sponsorship from BRM after the ’73 season. Talks seemed to be going well and the acquisition of a substantial budget was anticipated. But however good had been Ecclestone’s portrayal of the benefits Philip Morris would enjoy from the Brabham cars being seen in Marlboro livery, those same cars had received only modest levels of public attention given their absence from the head of the F1 field – the team had finished 4th in the Manufacturer’s Standings, with just two 3rd place finishes as best individual race results. With over double the number of Championship points and 3 Grands Prix victories, McLaren was able to present a good case to Buzzi and Hogan. Thus, to Bernie’s dismay, he learned that the Marlboro logo would be seen on the M23s, not his BT42s/43s in ’74.

Mostly, Carlos Reutemann and Carlos Pace were the drivers who carried Ecclestone’s hopes through the ‘74 season, though John Watson, Richard Robarts, Rikky von Opel, Wilson Fittipaldi, Gérard Larrousse, Teddy Pilette and Lella Lombardi all also had outings in F1 Brabhams. The MRD-entered cars ran in white, with little in the way of sponsorship decals, but the prospects for that shortcoming being rectified the following season were greatly boosted by Reutemann’s three Grand Prix victories, in South Africa, Austria and the U.S. – and the Watkins Glen outcome was further illustrious as Carlos Pace delivered on the promise he had been showing by making it a Brabham 1-2. Ecclestone’s morale was much boosted by that result, and his confidence was buoyed as he sought to capitalise on it by pitching for sponsorship from the Italian drinks manufacturer, Martini & Rossi. The company had based much of its marketing activity on brand exposure in motorsport since the early 60s when it began by establishing a ’Martini & Rossi Racing Team’ and helping fund the running of Alfa Romeos in sportscar racing. A higher profile development came in ’68 with a change of name to ‘Martini Racing’ and intended participation in both the sportscar and Formula 1 World Championships. It was soon closely associated with Porsche, leading to a Le Mans victory in ’71, while the team made a start in F1 with the Tecno cars of the Pederzani brothers. This venture had stemmed from the activities of Martini Racing’s advisor, David Yorke. Yorke had made his name and good reputation by his roles at Aston Martin and subsequently at JW Automotive Racing, with high achievements as team manager, including victory at Le Mans in ’68 and ’69 and with the Gulf 917s in ‘70/’71. Amongst his friends in the motorsport sphere was one Bernie Ecclestone. Unsurprisingly, in ’71, aware of Bernie’s interest in getting involved at MRD, Yorke had lobbied Martini to put its name on the Brabham cars. But, unexpectedly, the sponsorship deal was awarded to Tecno. Given that it was soon obvious that Formula 1 was something of a stretch for the Tecno cars and organisation, it is not surprising that Yorke was quick to recommend that the arrangement was terminated and funding transferred to MRD. It took time, though and it was not until the latter part of ’74 that Martini committed to a Brabham budget for the following season.

All this had, with full justification, been commanding Bernie’s attention, as incremental income was vital if there was to be any ongoing improvement in on-track competitiveness. But that objective was also affected of course by what the other teams were up to. And foremost amongst these, Ferrari’s situation would have regularly been figuring in Ecclestone’s thoughts. SpA Società Esercizio Fabbriche Automobili e Corse (SEFAC) had experienced a saga of difficulties with its flat 12 engine since its introduction for the ’70 season. However, ’74 had seen a significant improvement in the unit’s fulfilment of its power potential and reliability. Between them, drivers Nikki Lauda and Clay Regazzoni took three Grands Prix wins and eight podiums (2nd/3rd), earning the team second place in the Constructors’ Championship. There was a good deal of speculation that ’75 would see SEFAC go one place better. So, Ecclestone’s thoughts turned once again to the desirability of a 12 cylinder engine for his Brabham chassis.

 

If Ferrari was on the brink of a resurgence in Formula 1, its spiritual parent, Alfa Romeo, was continuing to see its glory years of ’50 and ’51 fade further into history. Within the company’s management, a division was growing between those who longed to repeat the two consecutive World Championships with the Alfettas, and others– typically younger, less time-served – who were uncomfortable with any ideas of renewed Grand Prix contention. The latter view stemmed from politically-based sentiment that as a ‘state-owned,’ (via the IRI holding company), enterprise, it should not be seen by the public as a lavish spender on a non-essential sporting activity. Surely, some reasoned, it was bad enough that large sums had been used through the subsidiary Autodelta business to develop and race the Tipo 33 prototypes – all without much success since its launch in ’67. But Autodelta boss, Carlo Chiti, was protected to some extent from the political manoeuvres as the premises were a few miles ‘off-site’ at Settimo Milanese. There, in the specialised milieu he had created, Chiti was able to operate with considerable freedom allowing him the scope to contemplate and plan for an Alfa Romeo F1 future. As he did so, he shared his aspirations with team members and associates, one of whom was Andrea de Adamich. In turn, de Adamich was keen to keep Bernie informed about developments and so, when Chiti began to talk about the possibility of modifying the 33’s Tipo 115-12 3.0 litre flat 12 engine for Formula 1 utilisation, Bernie was soon aware. The unit had been introduced in ’73 and powered the 33 to the World Championship two years later, albeit in a field of meagre competitors. For endurance racing, the engine was set up to produce 470-500 bhp. As would be proven for the ’77 sportscar season, a further 20 bhp was feasible and with such an output, a Formula 1 competitive advantage could be achieved, except . . . these levels of horsepower were generated at the cost of a relatively a heavy (178 Kg) engine and one that consumed fuel at a furious rate. However, that didn’t stop de Adamich extolling its virtues and reiterating Chiti’s confidence that with a range of modifications, such characteristics could be addressed and a Grand Prix-winning motor created.

Alfa Romeo Tipo 115-12 engine at the Nurburgring 1000 Kms, 73  Courtesy Rainer Schlegelmilch

So, early in ’75, Ecclestone was in talks with Chiti, and, buoyed by what de Adamich had told him regarding the technical considerations, was more concerned about costs rather than technicalities.  The last thing Bernie wanted to contemplate at that time was how much he would have to pay on an ongoing basis for supply of the engines.  And yet there was an answer he would like, stemming from a shift in the relative strengths of the pro/anti positions within the top management team at Arese disputing the future form of Alfa Romeo’s motorsport involvement.  Appointed to the role in the early Sixties, Giuseppe Luraghi proved to be a great strategic thinking President of the company.  One of his strongest traits was to be in favour of sporting activity both to preserve Alfa Romeo’s reputation for innovation and engineering excellence and to support the marketing of its road car production models.  But, by the early Seventies, his outlook was vigorously contested by some of his management colleagues – notably, his eventual successor, Ettore Massacesi - and the IRI, their aim being to see a significant cutting of costs.  As his period of being in charge drew towards its conclusion, he was perhaps keen to reinforce a future corporate pro-motorsport outlook.  Thus, an ambition to see Alfa Romeos once again battling for F1 World Championship points figured in the forward planning activities conducted in the Arese offices.  In broad terms, the aspiration was for there to be an Alfa Romeo Grand Prix car by the end of the decade.  In order to contain costs and streamline the development process, it was decided that an initial step should be the supply of engines to an existing competitor so that the optimisation of specification, installation issues and establishment of reliability could be achieved other than at Alfa Romeo’s expense.  Thus, it would be worthwhile for the engines to be supplied on a free of charge basis.

Consequently, to his (well concealed) surprise, when Ecclestone put it to Chiti that he’d be prepared to give the flat 12 a go in his race-winning Brabhams, but only if they didn’t cost him anything, Carlo, with a show of reluctance and of being indignant, agreed.  The negotiations had been taxing, but there was then no scope for Chiti to relax – he needed to implement a number of changes to the engine, whilst at the same time managing the further development process for the Tipo 33 application, which included the small matter of a twin turbo variant for the ’77 season.  For the Formula 1 version, there was the need for generalised weight saving, a reduction – from seven to four - in the number of main bearings, bigger valves and a raised compression ratio.  Meanwhile, back in England, Gordon Murray began designing the first Alfa-powered Brabham.  And on the commercial front, there was development too – perhaps partially stemming from the added Italian element in terms of the Brabhams’ new engine maker, Martini & Rossi, which had committed to another year as the main MRD sponsor and with it, an increased budget at that.

The Tipo 115-12 engine in F1 form.  Courtesy Ian Gordon Murray/Philip Porter

Murray’s BT 45 went from drawing board to track with considerable rapidity.  The prototype was shipped to Italy in early October ’75 and was run at Balocco at a press launch.  It was then returned to England and subjected to testing at Silverstone.  It was to some extent an evolution of the BT 44B mechanically – suspension and radiator location, for instance – but the chassis was markedly different since it had to accommodate the sheer size – especially the width – of the engine, the much larger necessary fuel capacity and the fact that the flat 12 could not be used as an integral part of the chassis, as was the case with the DFV.  This latter point, required the rearward extension from the tub of two outriggers for support, either side, of the engine crankcase, and was just one of several chassis features which added to its weight.  Indeed, the car weighed in at 620-630 Kg, whereas the 44 was said to be in the range 550-610 Kg.  And Murray expressed his particular dismay at having to incorporate no less than 4 dispersed fuel tanks to cope with the 215 litres likely to be burnt over the course of a Grand Prix!  This requirement precluded Murray from drawing a ‘triangular’ section body/chassis, which had become his signature style since the BT 42.  Adding to his concern about the engine, Murray has recalled that, ‘It had Italian fuel injection, too, which was quite crude and broke down a lot.’  But the BT 45 still looked good in its white paint finish and Martini Racing livery.

Complex fuel system required for four tanks.  Courtesy Ian Gordon Murray/Philip Porter

Brabham, along with the other eleven crack teams running the DFV, had enjoyed not only its performance characteristics, but also the quality and consistency of its engineering. Murray did not find quite the same qualities in the freight he was now receiving from Settimo Milanese: ‘One of the massive problems I had with the 45 series of cars is that when Alfa first gave us the drawings for the engine, I obviously designed the car for that. With the DFV you had a tight tolerance on the engine mountings. Every engine arrived and just slotted on the back. Rip one out, put another on. We were testing down at Balocco with the 45 and the engine blew up, which happened quite a lot. We got the next engine out and the difference on the mountings was millimetres so it just wouldn’t fit. So for the 45s generally, I had to design cams and eccentrics, and packers and spacers on all the engine mountings so that every time we changed the engine, you could adjust the car to fit the engine, which I never had to do before. So during this time there were all these sort of ‘Italian problems,’ if you like.’ Frustrating as these sort of issues were, the even more fundamental issue of the engine’s weight was beyond any one type of countermeasure. It was equipped with a titanium exhaust system, which was marginally helpful, but at the same time introduced a further negative factor in reliability terms as the material proved repeatedly liable to cracking. But the biggest concern at the outset was the inadequate specification of the lubrication system. There had not been a particular difficulty in this respect with the engine as deployed in the Tipo 33s, but with much less room in and around the body of the Formula 1 car, accommodating a generous quantity of oil – and such that its weight did not cause balance problems – was a yet another challenge for Murray. Against the 30 litres of oil which could be comfortably carried in a Tipo 33, the BT 45’s capability was a mere 8 litres. Even at the very first on-track test of the BT 45 at Silverstone, there was concern for a potential engine failure stemming from intermittent oil starvation because of surging, with related loss of pressure. There was evidently a scavenging weakness despite Chiti’s apparent care in designing the lubrication system, incorporating two cylinder head scavenge pumps and three front mounted, gear principle main oil pumps, drawing from six mesh protected drain points.

Brabham BT45  Courtesy Centro Documentazione Alfa Romeo

The problems were especially disappointing, as it might have been expected that with the original engine specification being biased towards the endurance form of racing, reliability would be assured even if there was work to do to extract the level of power that was essential for the short form event that constitutes a Grand Prix. But, this too provoked further diffidence as Reutemann’s feedback during the initial Silverstone test was to the effect that drivability was poor with power not delivered in a manageable, linear manner – urge was lacking at lower/medium engine speeds until as the rev limit was approached, the full surge of grunt was abruptly transmitted to the wheels. Possibly, Reutemann had a prejudice against the engine. I say this because, with the compression ratio further upped to 11:1 the output peak was in the order of 520 bhp@12000 rpm, with at least 400 bhp available from 9000 rpm.

BT45 First Test at Silverstone, October ’75  Courtesy David Phipps

The BT45-Alfa’s best result in the ’76 season was Pace’s 3rd at the French Grand Prix in July at Paul Ricard.  He also managed a 4th place finish, at the Nurburgring in August, Reutemann achieving the same placing in Spain in May.  Pace finished 14th in the Championship, Reutemann, 16th.  Brabham was placed 9th in the International Cup for F1 Manufacturers.  There were seven engine/engine-related DNF failures over the sixteen Grands Prix.

’76 BT45 engine installation in Carlos Pace’s car

For ’77 Murray designed a B specification version of the BT 45. However, this would not be ready until March for the 3rd race of the season at Kyalami. In the meantime, Pace qualified and raced to 2nd place at the opening event in Buenos Aires. Further optimism broke out at Brabham when John Watson took the new ‘B’ to 3rd place at the non-Championship Race of Champions at Brands Hatch. He went one better at July’s French Grand Prix, finishing a close second to Mario Andretti in his season-dominating Lotus 78 after leading all but the race’s final lap. Otherwise, the only other really notable results were a pair of 3rd places in Germany and Austria with Hans Stuck at the wheel. Much more had been expected, especially because the engine’s weight (175 Kg) had been reduced while the power output was increased – to 525 bhp – as a result of winter development work, at Autodelta, including the adoption of Lucas fuel injection.

Carlo Chiti beside a BT45B.  Gordon Murray is just visible in the top right.  Courtesy Ian Gordon Murray/Philip Porter

The performance of the Lotus, with four victories in ’77, was salutary and signalled the death knell of the Tipo 115-12.  Chapman’s latest machine pioneered the ground effects concept which was to revolutionise F1 design and soon become an essential characteristic if a car was to be at all competitive.  In simple terms, the high downforce feature was created by careful management/acceleration of airflow around, over/under and through the chassis/body, largely through enclosed longitudinal tunnels.  To provide for these within the relatively narrow chassis of a single seater racing car, it was necessary for the engine in turn to be as narrow as possible.  While the dimensions of the Cosworth V8 (680 mm) fitted the bill, the markedly substantial width of the Tipo 115-12 (1000 mm) certainly did not.  The engine’s width was considerably conditioned by its relatively long stroke of 53.6 mm, compounded by the use of cam followers which stood proud above the valve springs.  Furthermore, since the widest part of a flat engine, (measured laterally from cam cover to cam cover), is lower than as found on V configuration unit, accommodation compromises are inevitable with any chassis elements low in the structure and located along its outer edges – exactly where the ground effects-vital venturi tunnels need to run.

Murray, however, was not yet ready in ’77 to revise his design ‘philosophy’ to embrace Lotus-style ground effects principles.  He was nevertheless continuing to feel hamstrung by the Alfa engine’s dimensions, weight and fuel consumption.  These factors were denying the team the competitiveness they might have expected given 525 bhp on tap.  There wasn’t really anything he could do about the engine’s size, but he could chase Chiti vigorously for modifications which would improve fuel efficiency and there had to be scope for weight saving.  And now Murray’s creativity and lateral thinking came to the fore.  He determined  to circumvent the problems that had prevented him from drawing a ‘triangular,’ inherently weight-reducing, chassis, partly by eschewing the use of (bulky) conventional heat-exchanging units – radiators – and using the exposed body surfaces to fulfil this function.  This was achieved primarily by integrating four heat exchanging panels – two for coolant, two for oil – into the chassis, such that their outer surfaces, which were partially finned - ran in the ambient air flow.  This system – along with several innovations around the car’s instrumentation and on-board self-height adjustment mechanism – made the BT46 intriguingly distinctive in comparison with the other new-for-’78 cars.

Brabham BT46

But . . . even in the ambient temperatures encountered in winter testing at Silverstone, the BT46’s coolant got far too hot, albeit the oil cooling was adequate. There was no immediate fundamental solution and so the start of the ’78 season saw Brabham fielding a further revised BT45 – with ‘C’ designation – at the Argentine Grand Prix in mid-January. This was Nikki Lauda’s debut with the team and he marked it very well by finishing 2nd to Mario Andretti’s Lotus.

The BT46 had been considerably reworked while the 45C was filling in at the South American races. It appeared for its first race at Kyalami in March, equipped with conventional front coolant radiators. They were working well enough during practice and Lauda beat Andretti to the pole. He ran strongly in the race and looked assured of at least a podium finish, but the engine blew up after 52 laps. While both Lauda and Watson were able to run very competitively at the early season’s venues, rumour had it that the new Lotus 79 would have a huge effect on the comparative performance status of the entire field. If other teams/designers were overwhelmed by the quantum leap that the Lotus seemed likely to represent, Murray reacted by once again getting daring and innovative. His response was not to try and replicate the chassis/body concepts Lotus was known to be finalising, but to revive/refine the means by which the Can-Am Chaparral 2J had glued itself to the track . . . a gearbox-driven fan was mounted vertically to the rear of the BT46B, its purpose being to create a low pressure area underneath the chassis. The coolant radiator was relocated to a mounting above the engine – this was of particular importance as its positioning would enable Murray to assert that the fan’s main purpose was not for aerodynamic effect, but to boost the heat exchanging properties of the radiator. Whatever the realities of this contention, ‘tuning’ the system to optimise the degree of ‘vacuum’ generated beneath car’s floor was problematic and precluded a presentation of the BT46B at the Monaco race in early May. At the following Grand Prix in Belgium, the 79, employing optimal ground effects capability, won its first race with ease and seemed a shoe-in to be nominated as the season’s class of the field machine. But the Brabham was race-ready the following month and care was taken by Murray in talking about it to emphasise that for the most part the fan was a cooling device. However one wants to evaluate that notion, the simple fact is that the BT46B’s cornering performance was such that at the Swedish Grand Prix on 17th June, Lauda was able to defeat Andretti. With the other teams miffed that they had not thought of an effective answer to the Lotus 79, there was much controversy and Ecclestone dodged a protracted political wrangle by deciding not to enter the car for any more of the season’s Grands Prix.

Brabham BT46B – the ‘Fan Car’

The ’78 season concluded with Lauda fourth in the Championship thanks to the win in Sweden and another in Italy, and five other podium finishes.  Watson was sixth, having stood on the podium three times.  The team ranked third in the International Cup for F1 Constrictors.  So, a strong showing, much improved on the previous season.  The BT46 had been fast and dependable, with and without the fan.  The Tipo 115-12, too, had proven very competitive and relatively reliable, just seven DNFs being caused by engine failure.  Nonetheless, in looking ahead to ’79, Murray was convinced that ‘proper’ ground effects would be absolutely essential for any car seeking to compete with the Lotus.  And, by then, he was equally sure that this would not be feasible if his next design was powered by the cumbersome Alfa flat 12.  He said as much to Chiti, whose unexpected immediate response of ‘Hai ragione,’ would have been based on his own conclusion as soon as he saw Chapman’s Type 79.  That Chiti’s view coincided with Murray’s was confirmed by the speed at which he then set to work, resulting in a new F1 engine, this time in 60° V12 format, being presented before the end of the year.  Designated Tipo 1260, though not more powerful than the Tipo 115-12, it was able to be used as a stressed chassis component, simplifying Murray’s task in creating a new car.  Thus, the result – BT 48 – was complete and ready to run by mid-December ’78.  And at that point, a flat 12-engined Brabham decidedly became a thing of the past!