One One Five Twelve: Would that be Pounds or Kilograms? The Flat 12 Brabhams.

 

Brabham-Alfa Romeo BT45 #001

It’s well known that Bernie Ecclestone showed a flair for deal making while still a teenager, initially trading in motorcycle parts and accessories. Thus, when he started racing cars in 1950, his focus was as much on how this hobby could reward him financially as it was on competitiveness on-track. The scale of his ‘wheeling and dealing’ had snowballed sufficiently by the time he was in his thirties that he was entering cars in Grands Prix and managing a driver as prominent as the future (posthumous) ’70 World Champion, Jochen Rindt. His activities in and around the F1 scene allowed him knowledge and understanding of everything that was going on in terms of the sport’s financial and organisational aspects. Of the great many friends/acquaintances he cultivated, one of the most significant proved to be Andrea de Adamich, a well respected, intelligent Italian, good enough to drive in F1 (and World Championship sportscars) if not quite with the talent to be a title contender. He did, however, possess a good understanding of the engineering and team management elements of motorsport which he later put to good use in a second career as a journalist. Enjoying a reputation for credibility, de Adamich was able to discuss matters with a wide range of the involved personalities, including the sport’s governance executives, team owners and managers, becoming at times privy to information not circulating in the public domain.

De Adamich, seen below in conversation with Ecclestone*, was racing Alfa Romeo saloon cars in the early Sixties when he was in his early twenties. He did well enough to graduate to single seaters, and, in ’65, take the Italian F3 championship. That was an achievement which impressed Carlo Chiti, in charge at Autodelta, Alfa Romeo’s sporting arm, to the extent that de Adamich was inducted into Alfa’s touring car team. So he became a high profile driver who could and did score victories at major international events. In ’66 and ’67 he was European Touring Car Champion and before the end of the decade he had seen success at World Sportscar Championship races, run very competitively in F5000 and played a significant role in the development of the Alfa Romeo Tipo 33, culminating in the ’75 flat 12 version’s World Championship for Makes triumph. Meanwhile, from ’68 to ’73, he raced in 34 Grands Prix, with a best result, 4th in ’72 and ‘73 in Spain and Belgium, respectively. That ’73 season was his last in F1, with five outings in Brabhams. * At Balocco, 1976. Courtesy Ettore Colombo

While de Adamich was circulating on-track in F1, Ecclestone was also getting around the Grand Prix scene, keen to find new opportunities. Coming to his attention was the situation at Motor Racing Developments (Brabham), where things were unsettled after Jack Brabham’s retirement in ’70 and sale of his 50% of the business to co-owner, Ron Tauranac. Bernie had been acquainted with Tauranac in his time as Rindt’s manager when he was a Brabham driver in ’68, and would have been aware that although Ron had worked well with Jack, his heart had not been in the purchase of Jack’s shares since he saw himself as an engineer, not a corporate proprietor. Whatever was said in public to preserve a good perception of MRD’s prospects and commercial viability, de Adamich was quietly able to clue Ecclestone in further to what was actually going on. De Adamich himself liked the idea of Ecclestone getting involved at MRD and encouraged Bernie to make an offer to buy Tauranac out. In fact, there already was momentum towards that - perhaps initially at the Monaco Grand Prix, Tauranac had sounded Bernie out on the notion. It has been reported that Ecclestone offered £130,000 and this was acceptable to Tauranac. However, in October ’71, with Ron settled in his mind to move on, Ecclestone played a ‘gozunder’ on the point of signing the contract, reducing the ’price’ to £100,000. Bernie, being Bernie, deployed his ‘charm,’ with the result that Ron apparently took it on the chin and considered their friendship would be ongoing.

’72 was a difficult year for the ‘new’ MRD. The Ford Cosworth V8 DFV-engined BT33, BT34 and BT37 cars scored a mere 7 points in the International Cup for F1 Manufacturers, good enough only for a season finish in joint 9th, (last) place. Ecclestone formed the view that his team would not be able to achieve a rapid improvement in competitiveness as long as it continued to use the near-ubiquitous Cosworth DFV engine. The Ford-badged V8 at that point was typically delivering 450 bhp. He believed that the team needed a 500-plus bhp engine in a V12 configuration. The two 12 cylinders already disputing the championship were Ferrari’s Tipo 001 flat 12, giving 480 bhp and BRM’s P142 V12, rated at 440 bhp. But just beyond the realm of Formula One, another 3 litre V12 racing engine was under development – down in a quiet seaside location in Sussex. This was Harry Weslake’s Weslake Engineering works, within which a new power unit was being made for Ford/John Wyer Automotive/Gulf Racing for endurance sportscar applications. Pursuing his desire for a 500 bhp engine, when Ecclestone heard about the Weslake, he was keen to give it a try. So Brabham’s designer, Gordon Murray, was pressed into a project to modify a F2 BT38 to accommodate the engine, creating a ‘BT39,’ and Graham Hill was cajoled into driving it in a test at Silverstone. While this did not have an immediately positive outcome, the very fact that he’d seen something other than a DFV in a Brabham encouraged Ecclestone to step up his quest to find an engine that would fill the bill.

Brabham BT39-Ford Weslake V12  Courtesy OldRacingCars.com

Next stop on the search was at Weissach where Porsche could show Ecclestone a race calibre V12 yet to be assigned to a specific application. Gordon Murray recalls, ‘ . . . Porsche said, “Right, this is how much we are going to charge you for the engines,” and Bernie said, “No, no, no, no. You give us the engines and we will make them win.” Porsche said no. So that was the end of that.’

 

Ecclestone had presided over a season in which there was little success on the track but still cost him £80,000. So his focus much of the time had to be on finding sponsorship. There were talks with Aleardo Buzzi and John Hogan representing, Philip Morris. Ecclestone had become aware that the cigarette manufacturer was keen to switch its Marlboro brand sponsorship from BRM after the ’73 season. Talks seemed to be going well and the acquisition of a substantial budget was anticipated. But however good had been Ecclestone’s portrayal of the benefits Philip Morris would enjoy from the Brabham cars being seen in Marlboro livery, those same cars had received only modest levels of public attention given their absence from the head of the F1 field – the team had finished 4th in the Manufacturer’s Standings, with just two 3rd place finishes as best individual race results. With over double the number of Championship points and 3 Grands Prix victories, McLaren was able to present a good case to Buzzi and Hogan. Thus, to Bernie’s dismay, he learned that the Marlboro logo would be seen on the M23s, not his BT42s/43s in ’74.

Mostly, Carlos Reutemann and Carlos Pace were the drivers who carried Ecclestone’s hopes through the ‘74 season, though John Watson, Richard Robarts, Rikky von Opel, Wilson Fittipaldi, Gérard Larrousse, Teddy Pilette and Lella Lombardi all also had outings in F1 Brabhams. The MRD-entered cars ran in white, with little in the way of sponsorship decals, but the prospects for that shortcoming being rectified the following season were greatly boosted by Reutemann’s three Grand Prix victories, in South Africa, Austria and the U.S. – and the Watkins Glen outcome was further illustrious as Carlos Pace delivered on the promise he had been showing by making it a Brabham 1-2. Ecclestone’s morale was much boosted by that result, and his confidence was buoyed as he sought to capitalise on it by pitching for sponsorship from the Italian drinks manufacturer, Martini & Rossi. The company had based much of its marketing activity on brand exposure in motorsport since the early 60s when it began by establishing a ’Martini & Rossi Racing Team’ and helping fund the running of Alfa Romeos in sportscar racing. A higher profile development came in ’68 with a change of name to ‘Martini Racing’ and intended participation in both the sportscar and Formula 1 World Championships. It was soon closely associated with Porsche, leading to a Le Mans victory in ’71, while the team made a start in F1 with the Tecno cars of the Pederzani brothers. This venture had stemmed from the activities of Martini Racing’s advisor, David Yorke. Yorke had made his name and good reputation by his roles at Aston Martin and subsequently at JW Automotive Racing, with high achievements as team manager, including victory at Le Mans in ’68 and ’69 and with the Gulf 917s in ‘70/’71. Amongst his friends in the motorsport sphere was one Bernie Ecclestone. Unsurprisingly, in ’71, aware of Bernie’s interest in getting involved at MRD, Yorke had lobbied Martini to put its name on the Brabham cars. But, unexpectedly, the sponsorship deal was awarded to Tecno. Given that it was soon obvious that Formula 1 was something of a stretch for the Tecno cars and organisation, it is not surprising that Yorke was quick to recommend that the arrangement was terminated and funding transferred to MRD. It took time, though and it was not until the latter part of ’74 that Martini committed to a Brabham budget for the following season.

All this had, with full justification, been commanding Bernie’s attention, as incremental income was vital if there was to be any ongoing improvement in on-track competitiveness. But that objective was also affected of course by what the other teams were up to. And foremost amongst these, Ferrari’s situation would have regularly been figuring in Ecclestone’s thoughts. SpA Società Esercizio Fabbriche Automobili e Corse (SEFAC) had experienced a saga of difficulties with its flat 12 engine since its introduction for the ’70 season. However, ’74 had seen a significant improvement in the unit’s fulfilment of its power potential and reliability. Between them, drivers Nikki Lauda and Clay Regazzoni took three Grands Prix wins and eight podiums (2nd/3rd), earning the team second place in the Constructors’ Championship. There was a good deal of speculation that ’75 would see SEFAC go one place better. So, Ecclestone’s thoughts turned once again to the desirability of a 12 cylinder engine for his Brabham chassis.

 

If Ferrari was on the brink of a resurgence in Formula 1, its spiritual parent, Alfa Romeo, was continuing to see its glory years of ’50 and ’51 fade further into history. Within the company’s management, a division was growing between those who longed to repeat the two consecutive World Championships with the Alfettas, and others– typically younger, less time-served – who were uncomfortable with any ideas of renewed Grand Prix contention. The latter view stemmed from politically-based sentiment that as a ‘state-owned,’ (via the IRI holding company), enterprise, it should not be seen by the public as a lavish spender on a non-essential sporting activity. Surely, some reasoned, it was bad enough that large sums had been used through the subsidiary Autodelta business to develop and race the Tipo 33 prototypes – all without much success since its launch in ’67. But Autodelta boss, Carlo Chiti, was protected to some extent from the political manoeuvres as the premises were a few miles ‘off-site’ at Settimo Milanese. There, in the specialised milieu he had created, Chiti was able to operate with considerable freedom allowing him the scope to contemplate and plan for an Alfa Romeo F1 future. As he did so, he shared his aspirations with team members and associates, one of whom was Andrea de Adamich. In turn, de Adamich was keen to keep Bernie informed about developments and so, when Chiti began to talk about the possibility of modifying the 33’s Tipo 115-12 3.0 litre flat 12 engine for Formula 1 utilisation, Bernie was soon aware. The unit had been introduced in ’73 and powered the 33 to the World Championship two years later, albeit in a field of meagre competitors. For endurance racing, the engine was set up to produce 470-500 bhp. As would be proven for the ’77 sportscar season, a further 20 bhp was feasible and with such an output, a Formula 1 competitive advantage could be achieved, except . . . these levels of horsepower were generated at the cost of a relatively a heavy (178 Kg) engine and one that consumed fuel at a furious rate. However, that didn’t stop de Adamich extolling its virtues and reiterating Chiti’s confidence that with a range of modifications, such characteristics could be addressed and a Grand Prix-winning motor created.

Alfa Romeo Tipo 115-12 engine at the Nurburgring 1000 Kms, 73  Courtesy Rainer Schlegelmilch

So, early in ’75, Ecclestone was in talks with Chiti, and, buoyed by what de Adamich had told him regarding the technical considerations, was more concerned about costs rather than technicalities.  The last thing Bernie wanted to contemplate at that time was how much he would have to pay on an ongoing basis for supply of the engines.  And yet there was an answer he would like, stemming from a shift in the relative strengths of the pro/anti positions within the top management team at Arese disputing the future form of Alfa Romeo’s motorsport involvement.  Appointed to the role in the early Sixties, Giuseppe Luraghi proved to be a great strategic thinking President of the company.  One of his strongest traits was to be in favour of sporting activity both to preserve Alfa Romeo’s reputation for innovation and engineering excellence and to support the marketing of its road car production models.  But, by the early Seventies, his outlook was vigorously contested by some of his management colleagues – notably, his eventual successor, Ettore Massacesi - and the IRI, their aim being to see a significant cutting of costs.  As his period of being in charge drew towards its conclusion, he was perhaps keen to reinforce a future corporate pro-motorsport outlook.  Thus, an ambition to see Alfa Romeos once again battling for F1 World Championship points figured in the forward planning activities conducted in the Arese offices.  In broad terms, the aspiration was for there to be an Alfa Romeo Grand Prix car by the end of the decade.  In order to contain costs and streamline the development process, it was decided that an initial step should be the supply of engines to an existing competitor so that the optimisation of specification, installation issues and establishment of reliability could be achieved other than at Alfa Romeo’s expense.  Thus, it would be worthwhile for the engines to be supplied on a free of charge basis.

Consequently, to his (well concealed) surprise, when Ecclestone put it to Chiti that he’d be prepared to give the flat 12 a go in his race-winning Brabhams, but only if they didn’t cost him anything, Carlo, with a show of reluctance and of being indignant, agreed.  The negotiations had been taxing, but there was then no scope for Chiti to relax – he needed to implement a number of changes to the engine, whilst at the same time managing the further development process for the Tipo 33 application, which included the small matter of a twin turbo variant for the ’77 season.  For the Formula 1 version, there was the need for generalised weight saving, a reduction – from seven to four - in the number of main bearings, bigger valves and a raised compression ratio.  Meanwhile, back in England, Gordon Murray began designing the first Alfa-powered Brabham.  And on the commercial front, there was development too – perhaps partially stemming from the added Italian element in terms of the Brabhams’ new engine maker, Martini & Rossi, which had committed to another year as the main MRD sponsor and with it, an increased budget at that.

The Tipo 115-12 engine in F1 form.  Courtesy Ian Gordon Murray/Philip Porter

Murray’s BT 45 went from drawing board to track with considerable rapidity.  The prototype was shipped to Italy in early October ’75 and was run at Balocco at a press launch.  It was then returned to England and subjected to testing at Silverstone.  It was to some extent an evolution of the BT 44B mechanically – suspension and radiator location, for instance – but the chassis was markedly different since it had to accommodate the sheer size – especially the width – of the engine, the much larger necessary fuel capacity and the fact that the flat 12 could not be used as an integral part of the chassis, as was the case with the DFV.  This latter point, required the rearward extension from the tub of two outriggers for support, either side, of the engine crankcase, and was just one of several chassis features which added to its weight.  Indeed, the car weighed in at 620-630 Kg, whereas the 44 was said to be in the range 550-610 Kg.  And Murray expressed his particular dismay at having to incorporate no less than 4 dispersed fuel tanks to cope with the 215 litres likely to be burnt over the course of a Grand Prix!  This requirement precluded Murray from drawing a ‘triangular’ section body/chassis, which had become his signature style since the BT 42.  Adding to his concern about the engine, Murray has recalled that, ‘It had Italian fuel injection, too, which was quite crude and broke down a lot.’  But the BT 45 still looked good in its white paint finish and Martini Racing livery.

Complex fuel system required for four tanks.  Courtesy Ian Gordon Murray/Philip Porter

Brabham, along with the other eleven crack teams running the DFV, had enjoyed not only its performance characteristics, but also the quality and consistency of its engineering. Murray did not find quite the same qualities in the freight he was now receiving from Settimo Milanese: ‘One of the massive problems I had with the 45 series of cars is that when Alfa first gave us the drawings for the engine, I obviously designed the car for that. With the DFV you had a tight tolerance on the engine mountings. Every engine arrived and just slotted on the back. Rip one out, put another on. We were testing down at Balocco with the 45 and the engine blew up, which happened quite a lot. We got the next engine out and the difference on the mountings was millimetres so it just wouldn’t fit. So for the 45s generally, I had to design cams and eccentrics, and packers and spacers on all the engine mountings so that every time we changed the engine, you could adjust the car to fit the engine, which I never had to do before. So during this time there were all these sort of ‘Italian problems,’ if you like.’ Frustrating as these sort of issues were, the even more fundamental issue of the engine’s weight was beyond any one type of countermeasure. It was equipped with a titanium exhaust system, which was marginally helpful, but at the same time introduced a further negative factor in reliability terms as the material proved repeatedly liable to cracking. But the biggest concern at the outset was the inadequate specification of the lubrication system. There had not been a particular difficulty in this respect with the engine as deployed in the Tipo 33s, but with much less room in and around the body of the Formula 1 car, accommodating a generous quantity of oil – and such that its weight did not cause balance problems – was a yet another challenge for Murray. Against the 30 litres of oil which could be comfortably carried in a Tipo 33, the BT 45’s capability was a mere 8 litres. Even at the very first on-track test of the BT 45 at Silverstone, there was concern for a potential engine failure stemming from intermittent oil starvation because of surging, with related loss of pressure. There was evidently a scavenging weakness despite Chiti’s apparent care in designing the lubrication system, incorporating two cylinder head scavenge pumps and three front mounted, gear principle main oil pumps, drawing from six mesh protected drain points.

Brabham BT45  Courtesy Centro Documentazione Alfa Romeo

The problems were especially disappointing, as it might have been expected that with the original engine specification being biased towards the endurance form of racing, reliability would be assured even if there was work to do to extract the level of power that was essential for the short form event that constitutes a Grand Prix. But, this too provoked further diffidence as Reutemann’s feedback during the initial Silverstone test was to the effect that drivability was poor with power not delivered in a manageable, linear manner – urge was lacking at lower/medium engine speeds until as the rev limit was approached, the full surge of grunt was abruptly transmitted to the wheels. Possibly, Reutemann had a prejudice against the engine. I say this because, with the compression ratio further upped to 11:1 the output peak was in the order of 520 bhp@12000 rpm, with at least 400 bhp available from 9000 rpm.

BT45 First Test at Silverstone, October ’75  Courtesy David Phipps

The BT45-Alfa’s best result in the ’76 season was Pace’s 3rd at the French Grand Prix in July at Paul Ricard.  He also managed a 4th place finish, at the Nurburgring in August, Reutemann achieving the same placing in Spain in May.  Pace finished 14th in the Championship, Reutemann, 16th.  Brabham was placed 9th in the International Cup for F1 Manufacturers.  There were seven engine/engine-related DNF failures over the sixteen Grands Prix.

’76 BT45 engine installation in Carlos Pace’s car

For ’77 Murray designed a B specification version of the BT 45. However, this would not be ready until March for the 3rd race of the season at Kyalami. In the meantime, Pace qualified and raced to 2nd place at the opening event in Buenos Aires. Further optimism broke out at Brabham when John Watson took the new ‘B’ to 3rd place at the non-Championship Race of Champions at Brands Hatch. He went one better at July’s French Grand Prix, finishing a close second to Mario Andretti in his season-dominating Lotus 78 after leading all but the race’s final lap. Otherwise, the only other really notable results were a pair of 3rd places in Germany and Austria with Hans Stuck at the wheel. Much more had been expected, especially because the engine’s weight (175 Kg) had been reduced while the power output was increased – to 525 bhp – as a result of winter development work, at Autodelta, including the adoption of Lucas fuel injection.

Carlo Chiti beside a BT45B.  Gordon Murray is just visible in the top right.  Courtesy Ian Gordon Murray/Philip Porter

The performance of the Lotus, with four victories in ’77, was salutary and signalled the death knell of the Tipo 115-12.  Chapman’s latest machine pioneered the ground effects concept which was to revolutionise F1 design and soon become an essential characteristic if a car was to be at all competitive.  In simple terms, the high downforce feature was created by careful management/acceleration of airflow around, over/under and through the chassis/body, largely through enclosed longitudinal tunnels.  To provide for these within the relatively narrow chassis of a single seater racing car, it was necessary for the engine in turn to be as narrow as possible.  While the dimensions of the Cosworth V8 (680 mm) fitted the bill, the markedly substantial width of the Tipo 115-12 (1000 mm) certainly did not.  The engine’s width was considerably conditioned by its relatively long stroke of 53.6 mm, compounded by the use of cam followers which stood proud above the valve springs.  Furthermore, since the widest part of a flat engine, (measured laterally from cam cover to cam cover), is lower than as found on V configuration unit, accommodation compromises are inevitable with any chassis elements low in the structure and located along its outer edges – exactly where the ground effects-vital venturi tunnels need to run.

Murray, however, was not yet ready in ’77 to revise his design ‘philosophy’ to embrace Lotus-style ground effects principles.  He was nevertheless continuing to feel hamstrung by the Alfa engine’s dimensions, weight and fuel consumption.  These factors were denying the team the competitiveness they might have expected given 525 bhp on tap.  There wasn’t really anything he could do about the engine’s size, but he could chase Chiti vigorously for modifications which would improve fuel efficiency and there had to be scope for weight saving.  And now Murray’s creativity and lateral thinking came to the fore.  He determined  to circumvent the problems that had prevented him from drawing a ‘triangular,’ inherently weight-reducing, chassis, partly by eschewing the use of (bulky) conventional heat-exchanging units – radiators – and using the exposed body surfaces to fulfil this function.  This was achieved primarily by integrating four heat exchanging panels – two for coolant, two for oil – into the chassis, such that their outer surfaces, which were partially finned - ran in the ambient air flow.  This system – along with several innovations around the car’s instrumentation and on-board self-height adjustment mechanism – made the BT46 intriguingly distinctive in comparison with the other new-for-’78 cars.

Brabham BT46

But . . . even in the ambient temperatures encountered in winter testing at Silverstone, the BT46’s coolant got far too hot, albeit the oil cooling was adequate. There was no immediate fundamental solution and so the start of the ’78 season saw Brabham fielding a further revised BT45 – with ‘C’ designation – at the Argentine Grand Prix in mid-January. This was Nikki Lauda’s debut with the team and he marked it very well by finishing 2nd to Mario Andretti’s Lotus.

The BT46 had been considerably reworked while the 45C was filling in at the South American races. It appeared for its first race at Kyalami in March, equipped with conventional front coolant radiators. They were working well enough during practice and Lauda beat Andretti to the pole. He ran strongly in the race and looked assured of at least a podium finish, but the engine blew up after 52 laps. While both Lauda and Watson were able to run very competitively at the early season’s venues, rumour had it that the new Lotus 79 would have a huge effect on the comparative performance status of the entire field. If other teams/designers were overwhelmed by the quantum leap that the Lotus seemed likely to represent, Murray reacted by once again getting daring and innovative. His response was not to try and replicate the chassis/body concepts Lotus was known to be finalising, but to revive/refine the means by which the Can-Am Chaparral 2J had glued itself to the track . . . a gearbox-driven fan was mounted vertically to the rear of the BT46B, its purpose being to create a low pressure area underneath the chassis. The coolant radiator was relocated to a mounting above the engine – this was of particular importance as its positioning would enable Murray to assert that the fan’s main purpose was not for aerodynamic effect, but to boost the heat exchanging properties of the radiator. Whatever the realities of this contention, ‘tuning’ the system to optimise the degree of ‘vacuum’ generated beneath car’s floor was problematic and precluded a presentation of the BT46B at the Monaco race in early May. At the following Grand Prix in Belgium, the 79, employing optimal ground effects capability, won its first race with ease and seemed a shoe-in to be nominated as the season’s class of the field machine. But the Brabham was race-ready the following month and care was taken by Murray in talking about it to emphasise that for the most part the fan was a cooling device. However one wants to evaluate that notion, the simple fact is that the BT46B’s cornering performance was such that at the Swedish Grand Prix on 17th June, Lauda was able to defeat Andretti. With the other teams miffed that they had not thought of an effective answer to the Lotus 79, there was much controversy and Ecclestone dodged a protracted political wrangle by deciding not to enter the car for any more of the season’s Grands Prix.

Brabham BT46B – the ‘Fan Car’

The ’78 season concluded with Lauda fourth in the Championship thanks to the win in Sweden and another in Italy, and five other podium finishes.  Watson was sixth, having stood on the podium three times.  The team ranked third in the International Cup for F1 Constrictors.  So, a strong showing, much improved on the previous season.  The BT46 had been fast and dependable, with and without the fan.  The Tipo 115-12, too, had proven very competitive and relatively reliable, just seven DNFs being caused by engine failure.  Nonetheless, in looking ahead to ’79, Murray was convinced that ‘proper’ ground effects would be absolutely essential for any car seeking to compete with the Lotus.  And, by then, he was equally sure that this would not be feasible if his next design was powered by the cumbersome Alfa flat 12.  He said as much to Chiti, whose unexpected immediate response of ‘Hai ragione,’ would have been based on his own conclusion as soon as he saw Chapman’s Type 79.  That Chiti’s view coincided with Murray’s was confirmed by the speed at which he then set to work, resulting in a new F1 engine, this time in 60° V12 format, being presented before the end of the year.  Designated Tipo 1260, though not more powerful than the Tipo 115-12, it was able to be used as a stressed chassis component, simplifying Murray’s task in creating a new car.  Thus, the result – BT 48 – was complete and ready to run by mid-December ’78.  And at that point, a flat 12-engined Brabham decidedly became a thing of the past!

The Low Glow Halo - Alfa Romeo 2600 Sprint Zagato

In 1985 I encountered my first Alfa Romeo 2600 Sprint Zagato ‘in the flesh’ on a visit to Piero Pesaro’s Alfetta Racing Centre in Brentford.  Whilst we were walking around the premises, discussing the possibility of appointing the business as an official Alfa Romeo ‘Service Point,’ we reached a corner where a Junior Z and a TZ1 were at rest.  My attention thus became diverted from the 2600 SZ, at which I’d intended to take a close look.  Some years later (!) I’m now taking the opportunity to do that, even if only on a virtual basis.  Back then, our UK sales were on a marked downward trend, and we needed not only better quality ‘regular’ production cars but also a ‘halo’ model to help re-establish the marque’s reputation and attractiveness to new car buyers.  Two decades earlier, Alfa Romeo , though enjoying improving sales volume prospects with the Giulia family of models, was intent on the same thing, believing that however practical the Giulia was for the current market in volume terms, there should be a six cylinder model at the head of the range to convey brand values related to sport/performance and prestige/technical sophistication.  As a result, the 2600 was created and presented in Geneva in ’62.  Initially there was a Berlina, a Bertone Sprint coupe and a Touring Cabriolet.  On launch these models were not perceived by the Press as ‘halo car’ material, being cosmetically little different from the 2000 models they effectively replaced.  However, the new six cylinder in line engine was recognised as a significant addition to the marque’s inventory and worthy of a more glamorous body form to carry it.  With an established relationship in mind and the success of the recent collaboration resulting in the Giulietta SZ and the ongoing TZ project, it was not surprising that Zagato was looked to for this, especially as a 2600 Sprint body by the Carrozzeria could be expected to enhance performance through light weight, (even though Alfa Romeo specified that it should be made of steel), as well as being aesthetically in tune with the Zeitgeist.  As is usually reported, Ercole Spada, (at Zagato since ’60), drew the initial shape, but said in more recent times that he was not responsible for the finalised, production styling.  In this form, from chassis # 856006, one hundred 2600 SZs were made during ‘65/’66/’67.

Alfa Romeo 2600 Sprint Zagato body. Courtesy Scuderia Azzurra

By the time the Zagato version of the 2600 Sprint was presented at the ’65 Frankfurt Show – three years on from the first prototype – it had a big job to do.  Ongoing evaluation of the Berlina, Coupe and Cabriolet models had not been favourable and it had been generally accepted that the car had failed as a ‘top of the range’ product worthy of Alfa Romeo’s heritage.  Performance and handling were not rated favourably by journalists, test drivers, dealers and customers alike.  The Solex carburettor set-up was considered much to blame for the performance aspect.  The triple 44 PHH carburettors operated on the two stage principle and were therefore dependent on optimum delivery of vacuum.  Less ‘temperamental’ Webers - 40 DCOEs  - were available as a factory option with a bespoke manifold.  The handling shortcomings were attributed to a major extent to the weight and far-forward location of the engine.  With this in mind, it is quite amusing to read Bill Boddy’s report/road test of the Sprint in Motor Sport magazine’s November ’63 issue.  It is a formulaic, bland piece typical of the man, generally complimenting the car, presumably – as was the convention then – as reciprocation for the wining and dining he would have enjoyed on Alfa Romeo-hosted press events such as new model launches, factory tours, etc.  His headline summary read: “A beautifully-appointed, smooth-running, extremely handsome Italian saloon with impeccable handling and controls.”  In fact, the Zagato version was needed as soon as possible if there was to be any chance of salvaging Alfa’s ‘halo car’ aspiration.  As would become ever more clear as time moved on, doing this with a six cylinder car was not an inherent expertise Post-War at Portello/Arese.  The Alfa 6, 164 3.0 and Alfa 90 were 70s/80s duds and it wasn’t until the GTV6, Alfa 75 3.0 and SZ (ES30) arrived that the company had products that in any way fulfilled the desired role.

Left:#856075, Solex 44PHHs. Courtesy SVS Ltd; right: #856061, Webers. Courtesy Milestone Motor Cars

But the 2600 SZ did have ‘ingredients’ that offered hope in ’65.  Thanks to Zagato’s body construction principles, (even though the Carrozzeria was not commissioned to build it in aluminium as was its usual custom), it weighed 9% less than the Bertone-bodied Sprint.  This, along with 20 more bhp from a modified state of tune of the triple Solexes, certainly helped with the performance aspect while also allowing better handling/steering.  The SZ could accelerate from rest to 60 mph in 9.1 secs and reach a top speed of 130 mph.  The original first prototype, #856001, was constructed on a Spider chassis and shown in late ’62.  This was subject to further development the following year and eventually appeared as below, with notable refinements to the front panel, shield grille and bonnet intakes.  Note also that the rear haunches/C post are very different from the forms adopted for the production version.

Courtesy Peter Bovym Fotografie

It was early ’64 before a third prototype emerged.  The front end styling had been further revised, giving a pronounced aggressive appearance characterised by the enlarged shield grille.  #856003 was taken up as his ‘daily driver’ by Elio Zagato.  The car is shown below, left, and in comparison with an early production example, #856015 (Q3, ’65), illustrating how the front end had been ‘tidied’ in finalising the styling.  Of main note are: simplification of bonnet/front panel; relocation of Alfa Romeo badge to incorporation with the grille shield frame; revised grille mesh pattern; relocation of indicator lenses to the leading edge of front wings:

Courtesy Zagato-Cars (left) and Bonhams Cars (right)

Production version of grille, #856061. Courtesy Milestone Motor Cars

Left, #856034. Courtesy Zagato-Cars; right, #856053. Courtesy Fantasy Junction

The rear, chromed bumper bar was one piece with two integrated number plate lamp holders on the upper face in the centre.  On early cars this mainly had a constant depth along its total length with a slight taper towards the wheel arches.  On later examples the corners were flared, as seen, right, below:

Left, rear bumper, early version. Courtesy Lana-Classic; right, #856079. Courtesy Cool Classic Club

The type and location of the tail lamp units and reverse lamp remained unchanged throughout the production run.  Customisation is seen on #8560075 which has a rear plate lamp mounted centrally on the underside of the trailing edge of the boot lid.  #856079 had a boot lid release knob mounted above the tail lamp unit in the rear face of the right hand wing.

Tail lamp unit, #856079. Courtesy Cool Classic Club

A body detail feature often commented on is the absence of an external, body-coloured sill (rocker in the U.S.) panel.  I judge this successful, helping to make the 2600 SZ appear more of a lightweight car than it actually is when metrically assessed.  It does however exaggerate the extent of ground clearance and possibly causes the wheels to look somewhat oversize.

#856029. Courtesy ISSIMI, Inc.

 

As mentioned above, the Alfa Romeo ‘Cross & Serpent’ roundel badge was mounted centrally above the front intake:

#8560079. Courtesy Cool Classic Club

As for other Zagato-bodied cars of the era, ‘Zagato Milano’ badges were mounted on the front wings above the indicator repeater lamp, between the door leading edge and the trailing edge of the front wheel arch at a level slightly above the height of front tyre:

Left, #856053. Courtesy Fantasy Junction; right, #856079. Courtesy Cool Classic Club

The rear badge was a simple chrome ‘2600 SZ’ script with no base plate.  It was applied to the lower, vertical face of the boot lid between its right hand edge and the right hand edge of the number plate niche at a level a little above the lower edge of the tail lamp.

#856053. Courtesy Fantasy Junction

The rear badge is replicated in style terms inside the car, applied to the glovebox door:

#856053. Courtesy Fantasy Junction

The 415 mm, three slotted spoke, black rimmed, steering wheel was of a type commonly fitted to several Alfa Romeo GT/Sport models of the period.  The spokes were chrome plated and the horn button featured a gold coloured rendition of the traditional 'Cross & Serpent' image, as seen below:

As might be expected with a car of this type, some owners specified alternative wheels – some preferring a wood rimmed type by Nardi or Moto-Lita. 

16” magnesium road wheels with chrome hub caps were standard.  Original tyre fitment was with Pirelli Cinturato CA67, 175 HR 400s.  There are example SZs running on Borrani wire wheels.

#856053. Courtesy Fantasy Junction

Despite the relatively exclusive nature of the SZ and its successful aesthetic character, it was not a success.  Value for money may have been a significant factor, for its price was just short of £3,000 – around £45,000 in 2024 terms.  Back in ’67, what you paid for an SZ would have bought you two GT Juniors with plenty of change!  If this brought about any customer hesitation to purchase, a record of achievements on the racetrack, as with any ‘specialist’ car of this sort, could well have been an effective counter-measure.  However, whilst GTs bodied by Zagato for Abarth and Lancia, (and for Alfa Romeo with the Giulietta SZ), had proved highly capable in the motor sport arena, there was little or no such activity associated with the 2600 SZ.  Notable reasons include: thanks to the body being of steel, the car was not especially light weight; a concern that the crankshaft was lacking in durability became a received wisdom; though the wheelbase was shorter than that of the 2600 Berlinetta and Sprint models, it was still regarded as a chassis lacking nimble characteristics; Alfa Romeo was preoccupied in its developments for and support to motor sport enterprises with the 4 cylinder cars, especially the Giulia coupes and the tubular chassis, built-for-racing, TZ and TZ2 models.  It is believed that a factory project to create a twin spark head was initiated, but soon abandoned.  Equally, work to homologate the car with the FIA was not pursued with any vigour.  It has been suggested that #856034 was prepared as a rally car by Autodelta with involvement too of the Etceterina, Patriarca.  Also referenced – but not substantiated – is the modification for competition of #856013 by the tuner/constructor, Conrero; (the car in contemporary times has worn a Conrero sticker on its boot lid).

Left,#856013. Courtesy Route59; right, #856034. Courtesy ClassicCars.com

Although the 2600 SZ did not glow halo-esque as the intended marque/range icon, it did radiate elegant optics and was fast/well handling enough to be rated as an authentic Grand Tourer.  From many angles its appearance is lithe and dynamic.  Those that have survived – mostly by now ably restored – provide a glimpse today of how stylish Alfa Romeo was before its decline set in the decade after the model’s production.

The Nearly Alfa - Part 2

Once again, the control of Alfa Romeo by the state organisation, Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale – IRI – through its finanziaria, (financial entity), Finmeccanica, would be highly influential.  Not for the first time, the managements of Alfa Romeo and Autodelta were compelled to make decisions constrained by directives formulated on the basis of political expediency rather than engineering savvy.  Responding to recurrent government diktaks seeking to promote the use/consumption of Italian-made products, Finmeccanica ‘s nose intruded into the 890 engine project, stipulating that its turbochargers must be locally-sourced.  Accordingly, the KKKs were soon replaced by units made by the Alfa Romeo aeronautical manufacturing subsidiary, Avio.  Unfortunately, the performance and reliability of these was clearly inferior to the German blowers.  At this stage of the 890’s development, the induction characteristics were rendered furthermore problematic by the difficulty found in the setting up of eight individual Weber carburettors.  The latter issue was not resolved for almost a year – when a mechanical fuel injection system made by SPICA to Autodelta-dictated, 890-specific, parameters became available.  In the early days of the 183T, engine and turbocharger failures were not uncommon and were largely attributable to inconsistent running conditions, often stemming from fuel mixture anomalies.  However, while an 890 was running it was capable of 620 bhp at 11,000 rpm, competitive in simple power output terms.

Design, construction and development of the chassis was more straightforward.  Gerard Ducarouge, having been – somewhat unaccountably – sacked by Ligier, had joined Autodelta in August ’81.  His expertise was seen to benefit the team very swiftly, some perceiving the improved results achieved by Giacomelli with the 179C at the season’s last two championship rounds – 4^th in Canada and 3^rd at Las Vagas - as courtesy of the Frenchman.  More significantly, his design of a new car for the ’82 season demonstrated a capability for Autodelta to more readily adopt innovative technology.  Thus, the 182 was an early example of a Formula 1 car featuring a carbon fibre chassis.  In fact, as the new season got underway, only the McLaren MP4/1 was similarly constructed.  The 182 tubs were the work of pioneer of the material, Roger Sloman, at his Derby-based company, Advanced Composites.  Sloman recalled:

Chiti ordered a dozen chassis.  We must have only built five or six.  Within given external and some internal dimensions, how it was designed and built was up to us.  We used two female moulds, a top and a bottom half.  I guess it’s how everybody does it now.  Because you are forcing the weave into the corners, it can’t crease.  It’s better structurally and aesthetically.  Our Alfa 182 was beautiful and I was really proud of it – and disappointed when they decided to fit bodywork over the front end.  From the engine mounts to the front suspension, all along the cockpit top, there was a solid strap of unidirectional Kevlar that would basically hold the car together in a big accident; two very strong ‘ropes’ preventing the relatively fragile honeycomb skin from tearing in an accident.

182 carbon fibre monocoque

In addition to improved strength and stiffness attributes, this fabrication method resulted in a 40% weight saving .  The 182 chassis proved in need of little alteration/updating through the racing season and thus served as a good basis for the design of a turbo-powered replacement for ’83.  But while these practical matters were being progressed, the Alfa Romeo/Autodelta political milieu in which trouble had been simmering for long enough, now became comprehensively disrupted.  Finmeccanica and Masecessi himself had reached their limit of patience with Autodelta’s unfortunate cocktail of costs-generation coupled with sporting under-achievement.  The ’82 season had been yet another winless one, with de Cesaris and Giacomelli accumulating a meagre total of 7 World Championship points; in the Constructors’ table Alfa Romeo took 10^th place, (of 14).  In essence Masecessi wanted simply to divest Alfa Romeo of the ongoing cost and negative marketing effects of the Formula 1 programme.  He was however minded to try and achieve some return on the investment that had been made in the 890 engine and thus supplies of the unit were offered to several competitor teams which were still reliant upon the normally aspirated Cosworth engine.  When this initiative came to nothing and Masecessi felt out of options, a deus ex machina in human form intervened.  This was Nicolò di San Germano, an executive at Philip Morris who had been charged with managing the firm’s Marlboro brand sponsorship of the Alfa Romeo F1 team.  (More recently, di San Germano has been well known for founding the H2O Racing powerboat sport organisation).

Di San Germano brokered an arrangement whereby Masecessi handed over the F1 set-up to Giampaolo Pavanello’s Euroracing enterprise.  Based initially at Limbiate, midway between Milan and Como, the team had become high achieving in the late ‘70s, winning the Italian F3 championship in ’77, (Ghinzani).  The same driver repeated this feat in ’79, in a March-Alfa.  The team won the European title in ’80 (Alboreto) and ’81 (Baldi).  For ’82 the team fielded its own March-based chassis and continued its run of title victories, that season with Larrauri driving.  That was a high point, with Pirro in the second car being championship runner up and Euroracing winning two thirds of the rounds.  Despite these positives, entrusting the Alfa Romeo marque’s F1 future to an organisation with no previous experience in the category was certainly a high risk strategy.  Perhaps there was some genuine belief that the arrangement could be successful considering how well Euroracing had done in F3, but more likely it would enable Alfa Romeo to distance itself from any ongoing lack of glory.  Whatever the merits of the arrangement from a corporate perspective, the resultant personal chemistry was far from benign.  Ducarouge saw Pavenello as a minor player, adept only with the technical demands of the junior formulae.  Chiti, already feeling undervalued and undermined by Masecessi, had resented the ‘imposition’ on him of Ducarouge, and he did not get on with the Frenchman in simple human relationship terms.  Furthermore, Chiti had little respect for the Euroracing boss, thinking his own experience and achievements far superior to Pavenello’s.  Carlo, after all had been a major figure at Ferrari and ATS, had established and grown Autodelta, where he had designed and developed the World Championship-winning Tipo 33 and he had led the Formula 1 programme for over a decade.  What he said at the presentation of the 183T in February ’83 was highly instructive – he was most emphatic in declaring that Euroracing would not be running Alfa Romeo cars, but Alfa Romeo engines in Euroracing cars.  He indicated that the team had been supplied (rented) sixteen 890 units already, with a further four to come.  This presaged the focus of Autodelta’s F1 future in ’84 and beyond according to Chiti’s vision whereby supply of the 890 on a rental basis would be offered to several teams, including Osella, already an ’83 season customer with the V12.  But yet more of a shake-up was already planned above Chiti’s head, including a change of premises.  And although physical relocation of the team to Euroracing’s new base at Senago would spell the end of Autodelta and its Settimo Milanese premises, Chiti, himself, was to hang on until October of ‘84.

Left to right: Ducarouge, Chiti, Pavenello.

In amongst all these unsettling developments, there was a new car to be further tested and improved. The 183T was another Ducarouge/Tollentino design. Also as in ’82, the #22 car would be in the hands of de Cesaris, but his new teammate was Mauro Baldi, who had displaced Bruno Giacomelli in the #23 car. Baldi had shown his ability with the F3 championship win for Euroracing in ’81 and he had accrued a season of F1 experience in ’82 with Arrows. Both drivers were getting acquainted with the 890 engine in testing at the Paul Ricard circuit, Le Castellet, in December ’82. At this point the interim 182T was carrying the new power unit and in addition to running reliably, (de Cesaris covered 510 kms on 15th and 16th December with no significant engine problems), surprised many by also being quick – de Cesaris recording a best lap of 1:43.10. For comparison, Patrick Tambay’s Ferrari 126C2: 1:39.68; Eddie Cheever’s Renault RE30: 1:42.75; Nelson Piquet’s Brabham BT52: 1:41.80, (GP circuit).

182T at Monza, September '82

At Le Castellet in January ’83, the 182T was again boosting confidence in the new team.  Indeed, Autosport reported in its 3^rd February issue: ‘Alfa Romeo continued to dominate testing at Paul Ricard last week.’  De Cesaris’s best had been 1:03.55, with Baldi quite close on 1:05.25: Arnoux was unable to better 1:05:07 in his Ferrari. (short circuit times).  Ducarouge subsequently said that he believed an even quicker time would have been possible had the new SPICA fuel injection system not proven intermittently problematic.

 

There was a Press presentation of the 183T on 14^th February and some subsequent initial running at the Alfa Romeo proving ground at Balocco.  Given that the 182T had been performing well at Ricard and its replacement was 30 kgs lighter, there was an upbeat buzz around the team and the new car, though there was one reservation in that it had not been possible to carry out any wind tunnel testing.  The cars were in Rio in time for pre-race testing, beginning 4^th March.  As at Le Castellet, the pace was good and some reports indicated that the 183T in de Cesaris’s hands was the fastest car present.  It was certainly a front-runner, along with, surprisingly, the Toleman TG183 of Derek Warwick.

183T as presented at Balocco, February '83.

Thus the Marlboro Alfa Romeo team arrived at Rio, for the Brazilian Grand Prix, in mid-March ‘83 for the opening round of the World Championship with an expectation of genuine competitiveness.  However, the stipulation that Italian-made turbos must replace the KKKs had by then been confirmed by a press release which announced that Avio units would feature on the 890 engine for the ’83 season.  That this was a decidedly negative development was soon confirmed by the performance of the cars in practice at the Jacarepaguá track – two laps appeared to be the maximum they could run before a turbo failure intervened!  If that wasn’t bad enough, de Cesaris then failed to comply with an instruction to take the car to a routine weight check.  It was a process newly beefed up to better police compliance with the minimum weight stipulation of 540 kg.  Furthermore, the FIA had made it clear that disqualification would be invoked if any driver ignored a signal to pull into the weighing bay.  And this is just what de Cesaris did.  As a result, he was unable to continue to the conclusion of the final qualifying session.  So Baldi was carrying considerable responsibility as the relatively inexperienced sole representative of the Alfa Romeo marque.  He made no friends early in the race by running into Alboreto’s Tyrrell, (causing its retirement a few laps later), but did manage good pace, maintaining 6^th place in front of Warwick’s Toleman and Lauda’s McLaren.  But that order was the result of conspicuously blocking driving on Baldi’s part and when Warwick allowed Lauda past to see if he could get ahead, though Niki managed that, the Alfa collected the Toleman.  Warwick was able to continue, but Baldi was not, retiring the 183T with suspension damage.

De Cesaris in Brazil, March '83.

Round 2 was the U.S. West Grand Prix, held at Long Beach at the end of March.  This proved to be a curious affair, tyres being the key for success – those running on Michelins being at a considerable advantage to the Goodyear-shod competitors.  One such was John Watson and he took his McLaren all the way from 22^nd on the grid to race victory.  The Alfas were also on the French rubber, but it provided them with none of the magic apparently benefitting Watson.  De Cesaris, who had been on pole and led the race here 12 months previously, experienced no wonder-comeback from the ignominy of the Brazil disqualification – in practice he was no better than 19^th fastest, (with Baldi 21^st), engine power being again limited by the performance of the Avio turbo units.  The car did however keep going until gearbox problems caused retirement just past half distance.  Baldi had been into the wall and out on lap 27.

 

At this point, Euroracing showed some initiative and quietly made a deal to purchase four KKK units from a U.S. Porsche team.  The physical manufacturer identification and individual unit inscriptions were removed and the turbochargers fitted as replacements for the Avios on both cars, which then went to Le Castellet for the French Grand Prix.  Another improvement introduced at this event was the incorporation of quick action refuelling fillers similar to a modification seen on the Renault RE40.  With the refuelling race plan pioneered by Brabham having by now proven the best way to cover a Grand Prix distance at optimum speed, this was very welcome, especially taking account of the 890’s prolific thirst for fuel, (though on race day the team decided to run this race conventionally).  Whatever these developments promised in theory, the reality of de Cesaris’s fastest time in the first day’s practice was a pleasant surprise.  What was not though was -  a French expression especially relevant here – a déjà vu echo of the Brazil disqualification.  That excellent Friday performance was lost because the time was deleted when de Cesaris’s car was found in scrutineering to have empty fire extinguishers.  Andrea was half a second slower on the following day, good enough only for 7^th on the grid, while Baldi almost matched that time and took 8^th.  This encouraging performance of the #23 car was soon undermined in the race, it being struck from behind by Watson’s McLaren on lap 1.  De Cesaris ran in the top ten until he pitted with gear selection issues.  This lost him 4 laps and though he did run to the end of the race, he was classified down in 12^th place.  Baldi again retired after contact with Winkelhock’s ATS caused him to run off the circuit after 28 laps.

De Cesaris at Le Castellet.

Despite all the positive performance effects Ducarouge’s contributions had delivered, his 19 months with Autodelta/Euroracing had seen numerous interpersonal disagreements.  Chiti resented the Frenchman’s presence, seeing him as a threat to his status as the guru on all technical matters and likely to displace him eventually as the company’s head.  Ducarouge, very strong on chassis detailing, considered that Chiti should confine himself to issues around the powertrain, though he was not convinced that Carlo’s engines reflected correct contemporary design principles.  Pavenello apparently regarded Ducarouge’s experience as dangerous for himself, given his own relatively inadequate technical accomplishments, especially at the sport’s pinnacle.  Further conflicts arose over Ducarouge’s regular demands for increases in budget provisions in order to develop the cars to higher levels of competitiveness.  Thus the management, from Chiti/Pavenello upwards, saw the Le Castellet disqualification as an opportunity to attribute blame to Ducarouge and justification for his immediate dismissal.  This was not only unfair, as really the guilt belonged with the driver, but also a strategic blunder as Ducarouge’s flair and expertise remained the team’s best asset in striving for better results.  That this was the case was subsequently proven by what he achieved at the team to which he swiftly moved – Lotus.  His ’83 Lotus 94T began a revival of the team’s fortunes.  Two years later his 97T took Ayrton Senna to his very first F1 victory and in the season ’85-’87 Ducarouge’s designs scored seven Grand Prix victories.

 

For the next round, the San Marino Grand Prix, at Imola, Avio turbochargers were apparently back on the engines, at least according to Motor Sport magazine’s Denis Jenkinson, though he often got things wrong.  It’s possible that what he reported as seeing on the 183Ts as ‘units being made by Alfa Romeo themselves,’ were the debadged KKKs.  But maybe he was right because practice was conducted around the need for recurring fault diagnoses and rectifications in order to keep the cars running and with something near power competitiveness.  Actually, the cars were relatively quick on the first day of practice, placing 6^th and 7^th.  However, on race day, de Cesaris managed to roll his car during the warm-up session.  Surprisingly, damage was limited and repairs were completed in time for the race start.  This was a particular focus for the team as it hoped that the 183Ts would be fast-starting and nimble in the initial stages as they would be less heavy with petrol, refuelling being planned for introduction at this event.  Once things had settled down, they were pleased to see that their expectations had not been unrealistic for de Cesaris was running in 5^th and by half distance he was up to 4^th.  But . . . perhaps refuelling and Alfa Romeo pit work were not so compatible?  De Cesaris missed his box slot and there was a substantial loss of time.  20 laps later and he was out, with engine failure.  Baldi’s race concluded in similar fashion.

 

At the Monaco Grand Prix, Saturday practice and qualifying was disrupted by rain, so Thursday times determined the grid order – 7^th for de Cesaris, 13^th for Baldi.  An oil leak developed on de Cesaris’s car during the warm up session, so the Euroracing pit was far from calm and orderly as the cars were prepared for the start.  Once the race was underway the rain which had been on and off up to then stopped and as the track dried many runners were disadvantaged by having started on rain tyres and wet chassis settings.  De Cesaris retired with gearbox problems after only 13 of the 76 laps, but Baldi at least managed to finish 6^th and take a single World Championship point - his first for the team.

 

According to an ex-Euroracing engineer with whom I have recently been in touch, KKK turbos remained on the cars for the San Marino and Monaco Grands Prix.  His further recollection is that a reversion to Avios had subsequently been made in time for the cars’ preparation for the next event.  This might be inferred from the comments made at Spa by both Denis Jenkinson in his Motor Sport report: ‘new turbines in the turbo compressors continuing to give a noticeable increase in reliability;’  and Nigel Roebuck in his for Autosport: ‘Alfa Romeo now has the facility to turn up the boost without problem, claiming that 670 bhp is available for qualifying, 640 for the race.’  From these remarks it’s reasonable to conclude that – perhaps under vigorous urging from top management at Finmeccanica/Alfa Romeo as a response to corporate embarrassment over the clandestine use of the KKKs – Avio had made a concerted effort to improve the performance/efficiency of its units.

De Cesaris at Monaco

Disappointing though Monaco had been for de Cesaris, the showing at Spa for the Belgian Grand Prix proved to be his and the team’s best of the season.  In pre-race testing at the circuit, de Cesaris had posted the fastest time, and the car’s suitability there was confirmed in morning practice by again being top of the timings table.  After lunch and under official timing, #22 was 3^rd fastest, with Baldi’s #23, 12^th – a performance he could probably have bettered but for an engine blow-up.  These became the race grid positions when the Saturday sessions were washed out, rain falling throughout the day.  Roebuck observed: : ‘Andrea, disappointed that pole position had eluded him, was nevertheless delighted with the balance of his car through the very fast corners, if less enthusiastic about its agility in the slower ones.’  The race start was aborted as Marc Surer’s Arrows was stranded.  However, in the few moments the front of the grid thought it was ‘go,’ de Cesaris shot past Prost and Tambay, and into the lead.  Roebuck described the following events thus (extracts from his full report):

At the second attempt all was well, and we beheld the extraordinary spectacle of de Cesaris apparently squeezing in the sides of his Alfa to get between Prost’s Renault and Tambay’s Ferrari.  The Italian V8 gets off the line like no other turbocharged car, and one rather had the impression of a jet, thrust built up, then brakes released.  The Alfa scythed between the front row cars as if its throttle was jammed open, and it was good that the gap was wider than it seemed.~~~~~~~~~~ Down to La Source, de Cesaris was an undisputed leader.~~~~~~~~~~(At the end of lap 1) Andrea, belying his hard-won reputation, was driving the Alfa beautifully, with smoothness and precision, the car’s truly awesome horsepower slinging it from the corners visibly faster than anything else in the race.  The new turbocharger units have certainly improved the car’s competitiveness.  But how much boost was de Cesaris running?  We wondered that.~~~~~~~~~~While #22 charged along in the lead, however, its sister car was in the pits after only four laps.  Alfa Romeo is by far the most secretive team in Grand Prix racing, and their explanation  (not always given) after the race was that Baldi’s throttle cable had broken.~~~~~~~~~~After five laps it was clear that no one could live with the sheer pace of de Cesaris’s leading Alfa.~~~~~~~~~~At six laps de Cesaris had extended his lead to three seconds.~~~~~~~~~~De Cesaris completed 10 laps, quarter-distance, with almost five seconds lead over Prost.~~~~~~~~~~(at 19 laps) De Cesaris made his planned pit stop, but the Alfa mechanics made a mess of it, particularly those changing the left rear tyre.  The Alfa had led by seven seconds before its stop, but it was stationary for 25.33 seconds, 10 seconds above par.  Andrea had to start the hard work all over again.~~~~~~~~~~(lap 24) Prost was left with a 10 second lead over the hard-charging de Cesaris.~~~~~~~~~~(after 25 laps) The Alfa was missing, and soon the news came in that de Cesaris had pulled off with engine failure on the climb to Les Combes.  For many laps the car had been puffing smoke with every gear change, but its pace had been unaffected.  Had it overheated during the tardy pit stop?  No one at Alfa Romeo was saying, but it was desperately sad for Andrea, who had driven beautifully.

De Cesaris’s, and the team’s, disappointment was immense, but there was much to take as positive from the weekend, including fastest lap at 2:07.5, as he chased Prost after the pitstop.

De Cesaris leading at Sps.

In between the Belgian race and the next, the U.S. Detroit Grand Prix, improvements to the 890’s cylinder heads and suspension geometry/ride height were finalised.  The value of these changes was not immediately clear in practice/qualifying for the ‘Motor City’ street race, de Cesaris securing 8^th on the grid, Baldi a disappointing 25^th.  After causing an aborted start to the race, de Cesaris’s fortunes then temporarily looked up as he ran in 3^rd in the early stages.  However, turbo trouble set in, and, with reduced boost, he lost places and eventually had to retire the car on lap 34 shortly after the routine pit stop.  The reliability of the turbochargers was once again a very significant cause for concern.

Next up was the Canadian Grand Prix at Montreal.  The opening practice session did not provide much in the way of inspiration for the team, de Cesaris’s 183T suffering a spectacular engine blow up.  Later, the car had a turbo failure and consequent fire, though this at least excused him from a weight check (!) which had just been called for.  In amongst these vicissitudes de Cesaris qualified 8^th but Baldi was all the way down in 26^th.  In the race de Cesaris maintained 7^th in the opening stages but eventually had to give way to Rosberg’s normally aspirated Williams after they had had a coming together on lap 11, then fading further as his 890 V8 was running hot and losing power, leading by lap 42 to failure and retirement.  Baldi was the last classified finisher in 10^th place, 3 laps down on Arnoux’s winning Ferrari.

 

With in-race refuelling now well established as the preferred run plan, a ‘B’ specification 183 had been developed in time for the British Grand Prix at Silverstone.  This featured a monocoque of reduced size to take advantage of the opportunity to carry a smaller fuel tank.  Aerodynamic advantages were also expected as the chassis/body height was also decreased, allowing a better airflow to the rear wing surface.  In practice, however, the new cars were found to be no quicker than the original examples had been in previous test running at the circuit.  De Cesaris was able to qualify his car only 11^th and Baldi was 13^th.  Disappointing as these grid positions were, what was even more so was that de Cesaris’s time was 2.5 seconds slower than Arnoux’s pole effort.  His and Tambay’s Ferraris locked out the front row and were clearly dominant.  With front-running retirements, de Cesaris moved up as high as 4^th at one stage, but once again was the victim of a sloppy pit crew which he then compounded by stalling the engine and thus being delayed enough to drop back to 12^th.  He recovered to the extent of an 8^th place finish, unusually in this instance, behind Baldi, who was 7^th.

Left: 183T; right 183TB ('lowline').

The Ferraris were again the cars to beat at the next round, the German Grand Prix at Hockenheim.  De Cesaris was the closest to doing that in qualifying, though he was nearly 1.5 seconds off Tambay’s pole time.  Baldi managed 7^th.  The 183Ts seemed to be benefiting from better engine power derived from further turbo specification upgrades.  In the race de Cesaris was initially displaced by both Brabhams and both Renaults.  In the latter stages, Cheever’s Renault and then Piquet’s BMW failed, leaving de Cesaris in 2^nd, in which position he finished the race, though at reduced speed on the final lap as the 890 V8 had developed a rather ominous, abnormal noise.  Baldi’s car, however, was subject to a turbo failure and was retired just after half distance. 

Moving on to the Osterreichring for the Austrian Grand Prix, the team was in confident mood thanks to de Cesaris’s excellent result at Hockenheim.  This soon dissipated when de Cesaris’s engine blew up during practice.  With much track time lost while the necessary change was made, Andrea had to see his teammate outqualify him – Baldi was 9^th, de Cesaris, 11^th.  And, come race day, de Cesaris might well have felt that the gods were getting-even in response to his good fortune in Germany.  Firstly, his engine blew up during the warm-up session.  And although the team managed to get yet another installed for the race start, the particular unit was even worse than normal, fuel consumption-wise.  Thus, when the routine re-fuelling stop had to be delayed because of pit road congestion, the car ran out of fuel whilst going well in 4^th place.  Baldi had been out earlier, at just quarter distance, an engine oil leak being determined as terminal.

 

Perhaps the frustrations in Austria were the cause of de Cesaris’s grumpy disposition in practice for the Dutch Grand Prix at Zandvoort – but, whatever its origins, the on-running disputes he had with Riccardo Patrese proved a distraction and he and the car were probably capable of better than the 8^th fastest time he eventually recorded.  But his engine had also again given trouble, restricting the number of laps he was able to complete.  Baldi was 12^th.  As for the race, it was an early exit – after just 5 laps – for de Cesaris, with another engine failure.  Baldi, on the other hand, took his car to 5^th, his best result of the season. 

Prior to the Italian Grand Prix, tyre testing at the Monza circuit had seen de Cesaris once again setting the pace in the 183TB.  He continued to do so in first practice but was able to qualify for the race only in 6^th place after experiencing an engine failure.  Baldi had a turbocharger break and could do no better than10^th.  Both cars seemed to be lacking optimum straight line top speed, so important at Monza.  De Cesaris started the race strongly, lining up on lap 2 to overtake Tambay for 5^th, but the Ferrari forced the Alfa wide and its race was done, stranded in the run-off area.  Baldi’s car was also a very early retirement, limping into the pits on lap 5 with a badly smoking, failed turbocharger.

De Cesaris at Monza.

A ’European’ Grand Prix was run at Brands Hatch, England, in late September.  In pre-race tyre testing there the 183TB had displayed notably improved balance and grip.  However, back again for race practice, de Cesaris considered the driveability of the car less good, both in terms of handling and throttle response, wastegate revisions having apparently not improved turbo lag.  Whether these factors – or just a driving error – were to blame, de Cesaris had a substantial off on the first day of practice and after the car’s repair found himself dissatisfied with the engine’s performance.  Trying the spare car did not prove to be particularly effective as he was unable to qualify better than 14^th and only just a little quicker and one place forward of Baldi.  Finding the car much more to his liking on race day, de Cesaris worked up the field, and as the finish approached, he was firmly established in the points-scoring positions, eventually crossing the line in 4^th and thus an encouraging performance and only his fourth finish of the season to date.  Baldi made it only to half-distance before pulling out with a clutch failure.

Baldi at Brands Hatch.

The final round of the World Championship – the South African Grand Prix - was held at Kyalami.  De Cesaris and Baldi qualified 9^th and 17^th respectively.  De Cesaris made another of his lightning starts, up to 5^th by the end pf lap 1.  He maintained good pace throughout and was 4^th until near the end, but then, with Lauda retiring and Piquet going very cautiously in order to ensure his World Championship victory, #22 was 2^nd at flag fall.  Baldi had retired after just 5 laps with an engine failure.

 

So the season ended on something of a high, if not a vertiginous one.  De Cesaris had accumulated 15 points, for 8^th place in the drivers’ World Championship.  Baldi’s total was 3, 16^th.  Alfa Romeo stood 6^th in the constructors’ World Championship.  And that was it.  De Cesaris and Baldi were moving on, as was Marlboro.  Riccardo Patrese and Eddie Cheever, replacing the Italian drivers, proved mediocre at best in the following season, though they did not have a good car in the 184T, itself a compromise design as a result of the reduced fuel allowance introduced in the regulations for ’84.  The car, a development of the 183, was credited to Tollentino, featured a new, very distinctive Benetton livery, (the team’s new main sponsor), but little else of note.  The 185 was the designation for the following season, at the end of which Alfa Romeo announced its withdrawal as a F1 car constructor.  As an ending, this was somewhat less illustrious than that seen in 1951 when the 159 had retired gracefully as the World Championship-winning car.

De Cesaris leads at Spa.