The Nearly Alfa - Part 2

Once again, the control of Alfa Romeo by the state organisation, Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale – IRI – through its finanziaria, (financial entity), Finmeccanica, would be highly influential.  Not for the first time, the managements of Alfa Romeo and Autodelta were compelled to make decisions constrained by directives formulated on the basis of political expediency rather than engineering savvy.  Responding to recurrent government diktaks seeking to promote the use/consumption of Italian-made products, Finmeccanica ‘s nose intruded into the 890 engine project, stipulating that its turbochargers must be locally-sourced.  Accordingly, the KKKs were soon replaced by units made by the Alfa Romeo aeronautical manufacturing subsidiary, Avio.  Unfortunately, the performance and reliability of these was clearly inferior to the German blowers.  At this stage of the 890’s development, the induction characteristics were rendered furthermore problematic by the difficulty found in the setting up of eight individual Weber carburettors.  The latter issue was not resolved for almost a year – when a mechanical fuel injection system made by SPICA to Autodelta-dictated, 890-specific, parameters became available.  In the early days of the 183T, engine and turbocharger failures were not uncommon and were largely attributable to inconsistent running conditions, often stemming from fuel mixture anomalies.  However, while an 890 was running it was capable of 620 bhp at 11,000 rpm, competitive in simple power output terms.

Design, construction and development of the chassis was more straightforward.  Gerard Ducarouge, having been – somewhat unaccountably – sacked by Ligier, had joined Autodelta in August ’81.  His expertise was seen to benefit the team very swiftly, some perceiving the improved results achieved by Giacomelli with the 179C at the season’s last two championship rounds – 4^th in Canada and 3^rd at Las Vagas - as courtesy of the Frenchman.  More significantly, his design of a new car for the ’82 season demonstrated a capability for Autodelta to more readily adopt innovative technology.  Thus, the 182 was an early example of a Formula 1 car featuring a carbon fibre chassis.  In fact, as the new season got underway, only the McLaren MP4/1 was similarly constructed.  The 182 tubs were the work of pioneer of the material, Roger Sloman, at his Derby-based company, Advanced Composites.  Sloman recalled:

Chiti ordered a dozen chassis.  We must have only built five or six.  Within given external and some internal dimensions, how it was designed and built was up to us.  We used two female moulds, a top and a bottom half.  I guess it’s how everybody does it now.  Because you are forcing the weave into the corners, it can’t crease.  It’s better structurally and aesthetically.  Our Alfa 182 was beautiful and I was really proud of it – and disappointed when they decided to fit bodywork over the front end.  From the engine mounts to the front suspension, all along the cockpit top, there was a solid strap of unidirectional Kevlar that would basically hold the car together in a big accident; two very strong ‘ropes’ preventing the relatively fragile honeycomb skin from tearing in an accident.

182 carbon fibre monocoque

In addition to improved strength and stiffness attributes, this fabrication method resulted in a 40% weight saving .  The 182 chassis proved in need of little alteration/updating through the racing season and thus served as a good basis for the design of a turbo-powered replacement for ’83.  But while these practical matters were being progressed, the Alfa Romeo/Autodelta political milieu in which trouble had been simmering for long enough, now became comprehensively disrupted.  Finmeccanica and Masecessi himself had reached their limit of patience with Autodelta’s unfortunate cocktail of costs-generation coupled with sporting under-achievement.  The ’82 season had been yet another winless one, with de Cesaris and Giacomelli accumulating a meagre total of 7 World Championship points; in the Constructors’ table Alfa Romeo took 10^th place, (of 14).  In essence Masecessi wanted simply to divest Alfa Romeo of the ongoing cost and negative marketing effects of the Formula 1 programme.  He was however minded to try and achieve some return on the investment that had been made in the 890 engine and thus supplies of the unit were offered to several competitor teams which were still reliant upon the normally aspirated Cosworth engine.  When this initiative came to nothing and Masecessi felt out of options, a deus ex machina in human form intervened.  This was Nicolò di San Germano, an executive at Philip Morris who had been charged with managing the firm’s Marlboro brand sponsorship of the Alfa Romeo F1 team.  (More recently, di San Germano has been well known for founding the H2O Racing powerboat sport organisation).

Di San Germano brokered an arrangement whereby Masecessi handed over the F1 set-up to Giampaolo Pavanello’s Euroracing enterprise.  Based initially at Limbiate, midway between Milan and Como, the team had become high achieving in the late ‘70s, winning the Italian F3 championship in ’77, (Ghinzani).  The same driver repeated this feat in ’79, in a March-Alfa.  The team won the European title in ’80 (Alboreto) and ’81 (Baldi).  For ’82 the team fielded its own March-based chassis and continued its run of title victories, that season with Larrauri driving.  That was a high point, with Pirro in the second car being championship runner up and Euroracing winning two thirds of the rounds.  Despite these positives, entrusting the Alfa Romeo marque’s F1 future to an organisation with no previous experience in the category was certainly a high risk strategy.  Perhaps there was some genuine belief that the arrangement could be successful considering how well Euroracing had done in F3, but more likely it would enable Alfa Romeo to distance itself from any ongoing lack of glory.  Whatever the merits of the arrangement from a corporate perspective, the resultant personal chemistry was far from benign.  Ducarouge saw Pavenello as a minor player, adept only with the technical demands of the junior formulae.  Chiti, already feeling undervalued and undermined by Masecessi, had resented the ‘imposition’ on him of Ducarouge, and he did not get on with the Frenchman in simple human relationship terms.  Furthermore, Chiti had little respect for the Euroracing boss, thinking his own experience and achievements far superior to Pavenello’s.  Carlo, after all had been a major figure at Ferrari and ATS, had established and grown Autodelta, where he had designed and developed the World Championship-winning Tipo 33 and he had led the Formula 1 programme for over a decade.  What he said at the presentation of the 183T in February ’83 was highly instructive – he was most emphatic in declaring that Euroracing would not be running Alfa Romeo cars, but Alfa Romeo engines in Euroracing cars.  He indicated that the team had been supplied (rented) sixteen 890 units already, with a further four to come.  This presaged the focus of Autodelta’s F1 future in ’84 and beyond according to Chiti’s vision whereby supply of the 890 on a rental basis would be offered to several teams, including Osella, already an ’83 season customer with the V12.  But yet more of a shake-up was already planned above Chiti’s head, including a change of premises.  And although physical relocation of the team to Euroracing’s new base at Senago would spell the end of Autodelta and its Settimo Milanese premises, Chiti, himself, was to hang on until October of ‘84.

Left to right: Ducarouge, Chiti, Pavenello.

In amongst all these unsettling developments, there was a new car to be further tested and improved. The 183T was another Ducarouge/Tollentino design. Also as in ’82, the #22 car would be in the hands of de Cesaris, but his new teammate was Mauro Baldi, who had displaced Bruno Giacomelli in the #23 car. Baldi had shown his ability with the F3 championship win for Euroracing in ’81 and he had accrued a season of F1 experience in ’82 with Arrows. Both drivers were getting acquainted with the 890 engine in testing at the Paul Ricard circuit, Le Castellet, in December ’82. At this point the interim 182T was carrying the new power unit and in addition to running reliably, (de Cesaris covered 510 kms on 15th and 16th December with no significant engine problems), surprised many by also being quick – de Cesaris recording a best lap of 1:43.10. For comparison, Patrick Tambay’s Ferrari 126C2: 1:39.68; Eddie Cheever’s Renault RE30: 1:42.75; Nelson Piquet’s Brabham BT52: 1:41.80, (GP circuit).

182T at Monza, September '82

At Le Castellet in January ’83, the 182T was again boosting confidence in the new team.  Indeed, Autosport reported in its 3^rd February issue: ‘Alfa Romeo continued to dominate testing at Paul Ricard last week.’  De Cesaris’s best had been 1:03.55, with Baldi quite close on 1:05.25: Arnoux was unable to better 1:05:07 in his Ferrari. (short circuit times).  Ducarouge subsequently said that he believed an even quicker time would have been possible had the new SPICA fuel injection system not proven intermittently problematic.

 

There was a Press presentation of the 183T on 14^th February and some subsequent initial running at the Alfa Romeo proving ground at Balocco.  Given that the 182T had been performing well at Ricard and its replacement was 30 kgs lighter, there was an upbeat buzz around the team and the new car, though there was one reservation in that it had not been possible to carry out any wind tunnel testing.  The cars were in Rio in time for pre-race testing, beginning 4^th March.  As at Le Castellet, the pace was good and some reports indicated that the 183T in de Cesaris’s hands was the fastest car present.  It was certainly a front-runner, along with, surprisingly, the Toleman TG183 of Derek Warwick.

183T as presented at Balocco, February '83.

Thus the Marlboro Alfa Romeo team arrived at Rio, for the Brazilian Grand Prix, in mid-March ‘83 for the opening round of the World Championship with an expectation of genuine competitiveness.  However, the stipulation that Italian-made turbos must replace the KKKs had by then been confirmed by a press release which announced that Avio units would feature on the 890 engine for the ’83 season.  That this was a decidedly negative development was soon confirmed by the performance of the cars in practice at the Jacarepaguá track – two laps appeared to be the maximum they could run before a turbo failure intervened!  If that wasn’t bad enough, de Cesaris then failed to comply with an instruction to take the car to a routine weight check.  It was a process newly beefed up to better police compliance with the minimum weight stipulation of 540 kg.  Furthermore, the FIA had made it clear that disqualification would be invoked if any driver ignored a signal to pull into the weighing bay.  And this is just what de Cesaris did.  As a result, he was unable to continue to the conclusion of the final qualifying session.  So Baldi was carrying considerable responsibility as the relatively inexperienced sole representative of the Alfa Romeo marque.  He made no friends early in the race by running into Alboreto’s Tyrrell, (causing its retirement a few laps later), but did manage good pace, maintaining 6^th place in front of Warwick’s Toleman and Lauda’s McLaren.  But that order was the result of conspicuously blocking driving on Baldi’s part and when Warwick allowed Lauda past to see if he could get ahead, though Niki managed that, the Alfa collected the Toleman.  Warwick was able to continue, but Baldi was not, retiring the 183T with suspension damage.

De Cesaris in Brazil, March '83.

Round 2 was the U.S. West Grand Prix, held at Long Beach at the end of March.  This proved to be a curious affair, tyres being the key for success – those running on Michelins being at a considerable advantage to the Goodyear-shod competitors.  One such was John Watson and he took his McLaren all the way from 22^nd on the grid to race victory.  The Alfas were also on the French rubber, but it provided them with none of the magic apparently benefitting Watson.  De Cesaris, who had been on pole and led the race here 12 months previously, experienced no wonder-comeback from the ignominy of the Brazil disqualification – in practice he was no better than 19^th fastest, (with Baldi 21^st), engine power being again limited by the performance of the Avio turbo units.  The car did however keep going until gearbox problems caused retirement just past half distance.  Baldi had been into the wall and out on lap 27.

 

At this point, Euroracing showed some initiative and quietly made a deal to purchase four KKK units from a U.S. Porsche team.  The physical manufacturer identification and individual unit inscriptions were removed and the turbochargers fitted as replacements for the Avios on both cars, which then went to Le Castellet for the French Grand Prix.  Another improvement introduced at this event was the incorporation of quick action refuelling fillers similar to a modification seen on the Renault RE40.  With the refuelling race plan pioneered by Brabham having by now proven the best way to cover a Grand Prix distance at optimum speed, this was very welcome, especially taking account of the 890’s prolific thirst for fuel, (though on race day the team decided to run this race conventionally).  Whatever these developments promised in theory, the reality of de Cesaris’s fastest time in the first day’s practice was a pleasant surprise.  What was not though was -  a French expression especially relevant here – a déjà vu echo of the Brazil disqualification.  That excellent Friday performance was lost because the time was deleted when de Cesaris’s car was found in scrutineering to have empty fire extinguishers.  Andrea was half a second slower on the following day, good enough only for 7^th on the grid, while Baldi almost matched that time and took 8^th.  This encouraging performance of the #23 car was soon undermined in the race, it being struck from behind by Watson’s McLaren on lap 1.  De Cesaris ran in the top ten until he pitted with gear selection issues.  This lost him 4 laps and though he did run to the end of the race, he was classified down in 12^th place.  Baldi again retired after contact with Winkelhock’s ATS caused him to run off the circuit after 28 laps.

De Cesaris at Le Castellet.

Despite all the positive performance effects Ducarouge’s contributions had delivered, his 19 months with Autodelta/Euroracing had seen numerous interpersonal disagreements.  Chiti resented the Frenchman’s presence, seeing him as a threat to his status as the guru on all technical matters and likely to displace him eventually as the company’s head.  Ducarouge, very strong on chassis detailing, considered that Chiti should confine himself to issues around the powertrain, though he was not convinced that Carlo’s engines reflected correct contemporary design principles.  Pavenello apparently regarded Ducarouge’s experience as dangerous for himself, given his own relatively inadequate technical accomplishments, especially at the sport’s pinnacle.  Further conflicts arose over Ducarouge’s regular demands for increases in budget provisions in order to develop the cars to higher levels of competitiveness.  Thus the management, from Chiti/Pavenello upwards, saw the Le Castellet disqualification as an opportunity to attribute blame to Ducarouge and justification for his immediate dismissal.  This was not only unfair, as really the guilt belonged with the driver, but also a strategic blunder as Ducarouge’s flair and expertise remained the team’s best asset in striving for better results.  That this was the case was subsequently proven by what he achieved at the team to which he swiftly moved – Lotus.  His ’83 Lotus 94T began a revival of the team’s fortunes.  Two years later his 97T took Ayrton Senna to his very first F1 victory and in the season ’85-’87 Ducarouge’s designs scored seven Grand Prix victories.

 

For the next round, the San Marino Grand Prix, at Imola, Avio turbochargers were apparently back on the engines, at least according to Motor Sport magazine’s Denis Jenkinson, though he often got things wrong.  It’s possible that what he reported as seeing on the 183Ts as ‘units being made by Alfa Romeo themselves,’ were the debadged KKKs.  But maybe he was right because practice was conducted around the need for recurring fault diagnoses and rectifications in order to keep the cars running and with something near power competitiveness.  Actually, the cars were relatively quick on the first day of practice, placing 6^th and 7^th.  However, on race day, de Cesaris managed to roll his car during the warm-up session.  Surprisingly, damage was limited and repairs were completed in time for the race start.  This was a particular focus for the team as it hoped that the 183Ts would be fast-starting and nimble in the initial stages as they would be less heavy with petrol, refuelling being planned for introduction at this event.  Once things had settled down, they were pleased to see that their expectations had not been unrealistic for de Cesaris was running in 5^th and by half distance he was up to 4^th.  But . . . perhaps refuelling and Alfa Romeo pit work were not so compatible?  De Cesaris missed his box slot and there was a substantial loss of time.  20 laps later and he was out, with engine failure.  Baldi’s race concluded in similar fashion.

 

At the Monaco Grand Prix, Saturday practice and qualifying was disrupted by rain, so Thursday times determined the grid order – 7^th for de Cesaris, 13^th for Baldi.  An oil leak developed on de Cesaris’s car during the warm up session, so the Euroracing pit was far from calm and orderly as the cars were prepared for the start.  Once the race was underway the rain which had been on and off up to then stopped and as the track dried many runners were disadvantaged by having started on rain tyres and wet chassis settings.  De Cesaris retired with gearbox problems after only 13 of the 76 laps, but Baldi at least managed to finish 6^th and take a single World Championship point - his first for the team.

 

According to an ex-Euroracing engineer with whom I have recently been in touch, KKK turbos remained on the cars for the San Marino and Monaco Grands Prix.  His further recollection is that a reversion to Avios had subsequently been made in time for the cars’ preparation for the next event.  This might be inferred from the comments made at Spa by both Denis Jenkinson in his Motor Sport report: ‘new turbines in the turbo compressors continuing to give a noticeable increase in reliability;’  and Nigel Roebuck in his for Autosport: ‘Alfa Romeo now has the facility to turn up the boost without problem, claiming that 670 bhp is available for qualifying, 640 for the race.’  From these remarks it’s reasonable to conclude that – perhaps under vigorous urging from top management at Finmeccanica/Alfa Romeo as a response to corporate embarrassment over the clandestine use of the KKKs – Avio had made a concerted effort to improve the performance/efficiency of its units.

De Cesaris at Monaco

Disappointing though Monaco had been for de Cesaris, the showing at Spa for the Belgian Grand Prix proved to be his and the team’s best of the season.  In pre-race testing at the circuit, de Cesaris had posted the fastest time, and the car’s suitability there was confirmed in morning practice by again being top of the timings table.  After lunch and under official timing, #22 was 3^rd fastest, with Baldi’s #23, 12^th – a performance he could probably have bettered but for an engine blow-up.  These became the race grid positions when the Saturday sessions were washed out, rain falling throughout the day.  Roebuck observed: : ‘Andrea, disappointed that pole position had eluded him, was nevertheless delighted with the balance of his car through the very fast corners, if less enthusiastic about its agility in the slower ones.’  The race start was aborted as Marc Surer’s Arrows was stranded.  However, in the few moments the front of the grid thought it was ‘go,’ de Cesaris shot past Prost and Tambay, and into the lead.  Roebuck described the following events thus (extracts from his full report):

At the second attempt all was well, and we beheld the extraordinary spectacle of de Cesaris apparently squeezing in the sides of his Alfa to get between Prost’s Renault and Tambay’s Ferrari.  The Italian V8 gets off the line like no other turbocharged car, and one rather had the impression of a jet, thrust built up, then brakes released.  The Alfa scythed between the front row cars as if its throttle was jammed open, and it was good that the gap was wider than it seemed.~~~~~~~~~~ Down to La Source, de Cesaris was an undisputed leader.~~~~~~~~~~(At the end of lap 1) Andrea, belying his hard-won reputation, was driving the Alfa beautifully, with smoothness and precision, the car’s truly awesome horsepower slinging it from the corners visibly faster than anything else in the race.  The new turbocharger units have certainly improved the car’s competitiveness.  But how much boost was de Cesaris running?  We wondered that.~~~~~~~~~~While #22 charged along in the lead, however, its sister car was in the pits after only four laps.  Alfa Romeo is by far the most secretive team in Grand Prix racing, and their explanation  (not always given) after the race was that Baldi’s throttle cable had broken.~~~~~~~~~~After five laps it was clear that no one could live with the sheer pace of de Cesaris’s leading Alfa.~~~~~~~~~~At six laps de Cesaris had extended his lead to three seconds.~~~~~~~~~~De Cesaris completed 10 laps, quarter-distance, with almost five seconds lead over Prost.~~~~~~~~~~(at 19 laps) De Cesaris made his planned pit stop, but the Alfa mechanics made a mess of it, particularly those changing the left rear tyre.  The Alfa had led by seven seconds before its stop, but it was stationary for 25.33 seconds, 10 seconds above par.  Andrea had to start the hard work all over again.~~~~~~~~~~(lap 24) Prost was left with a 10 second lead over the hard-charging de Cesaris.~~~~~~~~~~(after 25 laps) The Alfa was missing, and soon the news came in that de Cesaris had pulled off with engine failure on the climb to Les Combes.  For many laps the car had been puffing smoke with every gear change, but its pace had been unaffected.  Had it overheated during the tardy pit stop?  No one at Alfa Romeo was saying, but it was desperately sad for Andrea, who had driven beautifully.

De Cesaris’s, and the team’s, disappointment was immense, but there was much to take as positive from the weekend, including fastest lap at 2:07.5, as he chased Prost after the pitstop.

De Cesaris leading at Sps.

In between the Belgian race and the next, the U.S. Detroit Grand Prix, improvements to the 890’s cylinder heads and suspension geometry/ride height were finalised.  The value of these changes was not immediately clear in practice/qualifying for the ‘Motor City’ street race, de Cesaris securing 8^th on the grid, Baldi a disappointing 25^th.  After causing an aborted start to the race, de Cesaris’s fortunes then temporarily looked up as he ran in 3^rd in the early stages.  However, turbo trouble set in, and, with reduced boost, he lost places and eventually had to retire the car on lap 34 shortly after the routine pit stop.  The reliability of the turbochargers was once again a very significant cause for concern.

Next up was the Canadian Grand Prix at Montreal.  The opening practice session did not provide much in the way of inspiration for the team, de Cesaris’s 183T suffering a spectacular engine blow up.  Later, the car had a turbo failure and consequent fire, though this at least excused him from a weight check (!) which had just been called for.  In amongst these vicissitudes de Cesaris qualified 8^th but Baldi was all the way down in 26^th.  In the race de Cesaris maintained 7^th in the opening stages but eventually had to give way to Rosberg’s normally aspirated Williams after they had had a coming together on lap 11, then fading further as his 890 V8 was running hot and losing power, leading by lap 42 to failure and retirement.  Baldi was the last classified finisher in 10^th place, 3 laps down on Arnoux’s winning Ferrari.

 

With in-race refuelling now well established as the preferred run plan, a ‘B’ specification 183 had been developed in time for the British Grand Prix at Silverstone.  This featured a monocoque of reduced size to take advantage of the opportunity to carry a smaller fuel tank.  Aerodynamic advantages were also expected as the chassis/body height was also decreased, allowing a better airflow to the rear wing surface.  In practice, however, the new cars were found to be no quicker than the original examples had been in previous test running at the circuit.  De Cesaris was able to qualify his car only 11^th and Baldi was 13^th.  Disappointing as these grid positions were, what was even more so was that de Cesaris’s time was 2.5 seconds slower than Arnoux’s pole effort.  His and Tambay’s Ferraris locked out the front row and were clearly dominant.  With front-running retirements, de Cesaris moved up as high as 4^th at one stage, but once again was the victim of a sloppy pit crew which he then compounded by stalling the engine and thus being delayed enough to drop back to 12^th.  He recovered to the extent of an 8^th place finish, unusually in this instance, behind Baldi, who was 7^th.

Left: 183T; right 183TB ('lowline').

The Ferraris were again the cars to beat at the next round, the German Grand Prix at Hockenheim.  De Cesaris was the closest to doing that in qualifying, though he was nearly 1.5 seconds off Tambay’s pole time.  Baldi managed 7^th.  The 183Ts seemed to be benefiting from better engine power derived from further turbo specification upgrades.  In the race de Cesaris was initially displaced by both Brabhams and both Renaults.  In the latter stages, Cheever’s Renault and then Piquet’s BMW failed, leaving de Cesaris in 2^nd, in which position he finished the race, though at reduced speed on the final lap as the 890 V8 had developed a rather ominous, abnormal noise.  Baldi’s car, however, was subject to a turbo failure and was retired just after half distance. 

Moving on to the Osterreichring for the Austrian Grand Prix, the team was in confident mood thanks to de Cesaris’s excellent result at Hockenheim.  This soon dissipated when de Cesaris’s engine blew up during practice.  With much track time lost while the necessary change was made, Andrea had to see his teammate outqualify him – Baldi was 9^th, de Cesaris, 11^th.  And, come race day, de Cesaris might well have felt that the gods were getting-even in response to his good fortune in Germany.  Firstly, his engine blew up during the warm-up session.  And although the team managed to get yet another installed for the race start, the particular unit was even worse than normal, fuel consumption-wise.  Thus, when the routine re-fuelling stop had to be delayed because of pit road congestion, the car ran out of fuel whilst going well in 4^th place.  Baldi had been out earlier, at just quarter distance, an engine oil leak being determined as terminal.

 

Perhaps the frustrations in Austria were the cause of de Cesaris’s grumpy disposition in practice for the Dutch Grand Prix at Zandvoort – but, whatever its origins, the on-running disputes he had with Riccardo Patrese proved a distraction and he and the car were probably capable of better than the 8^th fastest time he eventually recorded.  But his engine had also again given trouble, restricting the number of laps he was able to complete.  Baldi was 12^th.  As for the race, it was an early exit – after just 5 laps – for de Cesaris, with another engine failure.  Baldi, on the other hand, took his car to 5^th, his best result of the season. 

Prior to the Italian Grand Prix, tyre testing at the Monza circuit had seen de Cesaris once again setting the pace in the 183TB.  He continued to do so in first practice but was able to qualify for the race only in 6^th place after experiencing an engine failure.  Baldi had a turbocharger break and could do no better than10^th.  Both cars seemed to be lacking optimum straight line top speed, so important at Monza.  De Cesaris started the race strongly, lining up on lap 2 to overtake Tambay for 5^th, but the Ferrari forced the Alfa wide and its race was done, stranded in the run-off area.  Baldi’s car was also a very early retirement, limping into the pits on lap 5 with a badly smoking, failed turbocharger.

De Cesaris at Monza.

A ’European’ Grand Prix was run at Brands Hatch, England, in late September.  In pre-race tyre testing there the 183TB had displayed notably improved balance and grip.  However, back again for race practice, de Cesaris considered the driveability of the car less good, both in terms of handling and throttle response, wastegate revisions having apparently not improved turbo lag.  Whether these factors – or just a driving error – were to blame, de Cesaris had a substantial off on the first day of practice and after the car’s repair found himself dissatisfied with the engine’s performance.  Trying the spare car did not prove to be particularly effective as he was unable to qualify better than 14^th and only just a little quicker and one place forward of Baldi.  Finding the car much more to his liking on race day, de Cesaris worked up the field, and as the finish approached, he was firmly established in the points-scoring positions, eventually crossing the line in 4^th and thus an encouraging performance and only his fourth finish of the season to date.  Baldi made it only to half-distance before pulling out with a clutch failure.

Baldi at Brands Hatch.

The final round of the World Championship – the South African Grand Prix - was held at Kyalami.  De Cesaris and Baldi qualified 9^th and 17^th respectively.  De Cesaris made another of his lightning starts, up to 5^th by the end pf lap 1.  He maintained good pace throughout and was 4^th until near the end, but then, with Lauda retiring and Piquet going very cautiously in order to ensure his World Championship victory, #22 was 2^nd at flag fall.  Baldi had retired after just 5 laps with an engine failure.

 

So the season ended on something of a high, if not a vertiginous one.  De Cesaris had accumulated 15 points, for 8^th place in the drivers’ World Championship.  Baldi’s total was 3, 16^th.  Alfa Romeo stood 6^th in the constructors’ World Championship.  And that was it.  De Cesaris and Baldi were moving on, as was Marlboro.  Riccardo Patrese and Eddie Cheever, replacing the Italian drivers, proved mediocre at best in the following season, though they did not have a good car in the 184T, itself a compromise design as a result of the reduced fuel allowance introduced in the regulations for ’84.  The car, a development of the 183, was credited to Tollentino, featured a new, very distinctive Benetton livery, (the team’s new main sponsor), but little else of note.  The 185 was the designation for the following season, at the end of which Alfa Romeo announced its withdrawal as a F1 car constructor.  As an ending, this was somewhat less illustrious than that seen in 1951 when the 159 had retired gracefully as the World Championship-winning car.

De Cesaris leads at Spa.

The Nearly Alfa - Part 1

The Alfa Romeo 183T was a ‘nearly car.’  As demonstrated at Spa in 1983, it was good enough to win Grands Prix.  Though it was – as are all racing cars – far from perfect, that its results fell below its potential was more to do with how it was operated rather than in its design/specification.  Key factors that undermined its results included a short window of opportunity.  Crucially, the following season’s limitation on permitted fuel use per race militated against the engine’s inherent consumption characteristics.  Additionally, two races were lost for lead driver, Andrea de Cesaris, because of technical regulations disqualifications.  And  performance was hampered early in the season because of inconsistent availability of the specific turbochargers suited to the Autodelta-developed V8 engine.  And, throughout ’82 and ’83, conflicting political considerations conspired to make it quite an achievement by Autodelta and Euroracing that the car displayed any measure of competitiveness and was present at all 15 Grands Prix.  In explaining the background, the development of the car and how it performed on-track, I need firstly to outline Alfa Romeo’s return to the Formula One scene long after winning the first two World Championships in ‘50/’51. 

Two decades on from its withdrawal from Grand Prix racing, the marque was dabbling as an engines supplier.  Initially this came about through Luciano Bianchi’s interest in fitting a Tipo 33 sport prototype 2.5 litre 105.80 engine to a Cooper F1 chassis.  This project stalled and the engine, in 3.0 litre form, emerged in its primary role as the motive power for the new Tipo 33/3 in February ‘69.  That season saw the return of Andrea De Adamich to the Settimo Milanese-based Autodelta Tipo 33 team after a spell with Ferrari.  Alongside, he had signed to drive in Formula 1 with the McLaren team.  Discussion between Autodelta chief, Carlo Chiti, and De Adamich resulted in the M7D and M14D versions of McLaren’s ‘70 F1 car carrying the 105.80 engine.  Also driven by Nanni Galli, neither car/driver was able to score any World Championship points.  The following season’s March 711 was engineered to accommodate both the Cosworth DFV, or the Alfa V8.  The Alfa powered version was driven mainly by De Adamich and Nanni Galli, though lead driver, Ronnie Peterson, contested the French Grand Prix in it.  As with the McLaren, results were disappointing and no World Championship points were gained.

McLaren-Alfa M14D - De Adamich, Holland, 1970 (Courtesy R Schlegelmilch)

Subsequent development of the Tipo 33 dictated the need for a 12 cylinder 3.0 litre engine, for which Chiti decided upon a 180° V (‘flat’) format.  Motor Racing Developments’ owner, Bernie Ecclestone, became interested in the engine for the team’s F1 Brabham cars.  Brabham designer, Gordon Murray, has said he believes that in a deal struck in ‘74 Ecclestone secured a supply of engines on a free of charge basis.  Unveiled in October ‘75, the BT45 was the first Brabham to be powered by the Tipo 115.12 unit.  Results were not encouraging, the size/weight of the engine and its prolific consumption of fuel proving challenging.  The BT46 was more competitive, thanks to some extent by developments which reduced the consumption.  The ‘78 BT46B was the fabled ‘Fan Car,’ which was victorious in Niki Lauda’s hands on its one and only Grand Prix outing in Sweden.  But the Lotus 78 and 79 changed the game entirely, ushering in the ground effects era.  The chassis architecture required for this – especially in terms of the floor underside and sidepod forms – made a wide engine block undesirable, so Murray prevailed upon Chiti to build a new 60° V12 power unit for the ‘79 season.  Chiti obliged, and the V12 BT48 debuted at the Argentine Grand Prix in January ‘79.  Murray felt that the inconsistency of the new engine’s specification – especially heads/camshafts – and its build quality, was worse than he had seen with the flat 12.  He became increasingly unhappy with the partnership, culminating in a switch to Cosworth DFV power for the final two World Championship rounds.

Brabham BT48, 1979. (Carlo Chiti is standing on the right)

While the Brabham team was wrestling with the BT45, Alfa Romeo President, Ettore Massacesi, gave the go-ahead for the creation of an all-Alfa F1 car.  This was announced to the public early in ‘78 and the first prototype was under testing by the summer.  After a long period in which there had been considerable resistance to such an idea within Arese and at Finmeccanica, (the state-created financial entity which ‘owned’ Alfa Romeo), once a running car could be observed, a wave of exaggerated enthusiasm took over, and an increasing number of internal advocates became besotted with the idea that the car could be debuted at that year’s Italian Grand Prix.  But this plan was scuttled in the wake of a test at the Paul Ricard circuit by Lauda in August.  His opinion was that the car was nowhere near ready for competition and an attempt to race it at Monza would probably result in embarrassment for the team and the corporate management.  So, for the remainder of ‘78, the 177 ran only in test sessions, with the driving shared by Bruno Giacomelli and Vittorio Brambilla.  Not until the following May was it deemed worthy of a race entry – to the Belgian Grand Prix at Zolder.  Giacomelli’s reasonable qualifying performance and race pace prior to a collision-prompted retirement provided encouragement.  The results of further outings were however relatively disappointing, though no surprise to the Autodelta team -  for, as soon as it was operating in the F1 race environment, the team had seen that an updated car with the new V12 engine was required as a matter of urgency.  Chiti - at this time assisted by Robert Choulet - was good at producing new designs and building prototypes within exceptionally short timescales and he did this again, surprising everyone by fielding the first 179 at September’s Italian Grand Prix at Monza.  Giacomelli qualified the new car 18^th and ran well in the race until retirement after a mistake and off-circuit excursion at Ascari.

177 with Bruno Giacomelli in the car and Vittorio Brambilla on the sidepod

Despite a positive start for the 179 in the latter part of the ‘79 season, the viability of the team was questionable as the new year dawned.  With Alfa Romeo’s lack of profitability, the justification for spending on the F1 programme was frequently and vigorously challenged and Massacesi had to be at his most resilient.  His saving grace arrived however in the form of substantial sponsorship funds from Phillip Morris to promote its Marlboro cigarette brand on the cars.  For ‘80 Giacomelli was partnered with Patrick Depailler, Brambilla fulfilling a testing role.  There were good showings at Argentina and Long Beach and at Watkins Glen where Giacomelli was on pole and led the race, but the season was marred by the loss of Depailler, killed while testing at Hockenheim.  For the following season Giacomelli was joined by Mario Andretti, who took 4^th place at Long Beach.  Though the team had a better car in the 179C and D versions, benefitting from input from Gerard Ducarouge, who had joined from Ligier, the only other highlights were Giacomelli’s 4^th and 3^rd at Montreal and Las Vegas, respectively.  1982 saw Andrea de Cesaris replacing Andretti and quickly proving his potential with pole and a spell leading at Long Beach.  Ducarouge’s value was fully confirmed by the superiority of his new car, the 182, in comparison with the 179.  He was assisted in the design of the 182 by Mario Tollentino.  The 177/179/182 era can be summed up as follows: Starts: 99; Wins 0; Podiums 3; Poles: 2; World Championship points – ’79 = 0; ’80 = 4; ’81 = 10; ’82 = 7.

Andrea de Cesaris in the 182 at Monaco, 1982 - classified 3rd 

In July ‘79, While Bruno Giacomelli was struggling to get the 177 round to a 17^th place finish at Dijon, Jean-Pierre Jabouille was taking the chequered flag and celebrating the first Grand Prix victory for a turbocharged car.  His Renault RS10 was a development of the RS01.  That car, pioneering the use of a 1.5 litre turbocharged engine in place of the 3 litre, normally aspirated type, had been first entered to a Grand Prix just two seasons previously.  Thus, another new era was ushered in – the 1.5 litre/turbocharged format would hold sway in the sport’s pinnacle category for the next nine seasons.  Chiti was not slow in recognising the significance of the Renault innovation and began work on a forced induction engine as ‘79 drew to a close.  Given that Jabouille and teammate Rene Arnoux had claimed pole in four of the seven remaining rounds of the ’79 championship, it was no surprise that Chiti was on the task with some urgency, but few would have expected that he’d chose the V8 format.  Many would argue that simplicity of the fundamentals was a key success feature in Formula 1 while forced induction was the source of high power outputs.  This was most obviously demonstrated by the BMW 4 cylinder M12/13, based on the stock M10 which had powered the 2002.  According to some claims, this engine was capable in qualifying tune of generating over 1,200 bhp, enough to power Nelson Piquet’s Brabham BT52 to World Championship victory in ‘83.  Its performance in ‘84 enabled him to record the pole lap at nine of the season’s Grands Prix.  That said, the most obvious configuration for the formula was a V6.  This is what Renault had decided upon for its pioneering EF1 engine.  And it was the layout that featured in the turbocharged engines that were then developed by Ferrari, Honda, Porsche (TAG), Cosworth and Motori-Moderni.  Other than Alfa Romeo and BMW, only Hart tried something different, with its in-line 4.  Considerations of the size and weight of a V6 were seen as highly favourable by designers, especially in regard to packaging within the chassis of the power unit and transmission/ancillaries.
 
Ever since the recognition of the importance of aerodynamics and the exploitation of ground effects and the consequent greater difficulty in close-following/overtaking in Formula 1, designers had been obliged to look for ways in which marginal performance advantages relevant to specific aspects of driveability - aside from out-and-out power – could be created.  A very notable example is the capability of a car to pick up engine and road speed as it exits a slow speed corner.  This became a particular focus of attention given that turbo lag was a negative feature of the cohort of new engines appearing in Formula 1.  Whilst this would be addressed successfully over time by engine management/software developments – and, ultimately, the use of ERS energy in today’s hybrid powertrains – in the early ‘80s the most realistic approach was to optimise the basic responsiveness of the reciprocating componentry.  This was indeed the determining objective which led to Chiti’s decision to pursue a V8 solution.  Crucially, the smaller mass and weight of the pistons/conrods and various rotating parts would allow them to be accelerated more rapidly than those of a six – or four – cylinder engine.  A notable example of the principle’s value would be seen at the ’83 Belgian Grand Prix – as Nigel Roebuck, in observing the race start and reporting for Autosport magazine, wrote: ‘The Italian V8 gets off the line like no other turbocharged car . . .’  Chiti’s confidence in the value of this characteristic was bolstered by his previous personal experience in designing the ATS and Alfa Romeo Tipo 33 V8s.  Additionally, he believed in the basic principle that, all things being equal, a V8 would always have a better ultimate power potential vis-à-vis that of a V6.  Conventional wisdom would balance that with the generally accepted fact that a V6 would have a fuel consumption advantage, and this would be of notable significance in regard to Chiti’s V8.
 
Anyone believing that on a quasi-DNA basis a marque can tend to repetitively manufacture products with distinctive engineering characteristics – good or bad – might well cite the fuel consumption deficiency of Alfa Romeo racing engines as a classic example.  In the late stages of the 158/159 models’ working life, the one thing that might have derailed their run of success was the raging thirst of the supercharged 8 cylinder engine.  Despite needing a gallon of Shell Dynamin for every 1–2 miles covered, the 158 and 159 in ‘50 and ‘51 respectively managed to win 10 of the 15 Grands Prix and the Championship for both seasons.  Not bad, considering that because of the volume of fuel needing to be carried/used, the design and weight of the cars were compromised and significant time was lost on-track for ‘extra’ refuelling stops.  Another example of this weakness was seen in the flat 12 initially developed for the Tipo 33 TT12 and, as recounted above, subsequently deployed in the late ‘70s Brabham F1 cars.  Gordon Murray lamented that whilst the Cosworth-powered cars needed 40 gallon tanks and would do a Grand Prix on 36-37 gallons, a 45 gallon tank was required for the Alfa engine. So when early test running of Chiti’s V8 for the ‘80s - designated ‘890’ – showed that its fuel efficiency would not be a strong point, this was not a dramatic surprise.  Indeed, Chiti himself, in stating that a turbocharged engine of this type/size could be expected to consume 11% more fuel than a normally aspirated unit, was apparently content with the situation, given that in a further comparison of the two engine types, the forced induction example would deliver 16% more power.  His confidence was also probably buoyed by the notion that a post-launch water injection development programme might well be able to achieve efficiency gains of real substance as had been seen with such a project carried out at Autodelta on the GTA touring car in the late ‘60s.  Nevertheless, a major influencing factor in the design of the 183T was the need for it to accommodate a 250 litres (55 gallon) fuel tank.

Alfa Romeo 890 engine

The questions of power unit configuration and fuel consumption were engineering-centred matters, largely within the control of Carlo Chiti.  There was one further factor which very significantly affected the initial development of the engine and its potential competitiveness in its first season of racing.  This was the sourcing and the specification of the turbochargers, and this issue had as much to do with politics as it did with engineering.  The engineering aspect was well covered – Autodelta had recently developed a single turbocharger version of the Alfetta GTV 2000 and built 400 for Group 4 homologation purposes.  In line with the then current norm, Chiti had opted for Kulne Kopp Kausch (KKK) turbochargers manufactured in Frankenthal, near Mannheim, Germany.  So it was unremarkable that Chiti’s new V8 wore KKKs as testing got underway.  But, whereas the Alfetta GTV 2000 Turbodelta project had been of some interest throughout the motor sport industry/community, Formula 1 represented a very much higher profile/general newsworthiness activity.  Consequently, intervention from far above Chiti’s head was soon being visited on the team at work in Settimo Milanese.

Part 2 will cover the development phase with the interim 182T, design/technical details of the 183T and its initial development and pre-season testing, followed by a race-by-race account of the car's further development and performances through the 1983 F1 season. 

Andrea - What If? Part 3

Towards the end of the 1982 season the Alfa Romeo team was poised for breakthrough. Though the year’s results had been meagre, several positive measures of potential were in place. Much of the credit for the improvement of the 182 was owed to Gerard Ducarouge, and he was being retained. The 1.5 V8 turbo engine – which had been unveiled as long ago as 1980 – had been seen, albeit briefly at Monza, in a hack 182T, and the ‘proper’ turbo car, the 183T, was ready enough for winter testing at Paul Ricard – where it managed fastest time - and Rio. The Marlboro sponsorship was set to continue, and Andrea could be seen as an ongoing team-leader, lending stability and continuity.

But . . . at this very turning point, the opportunity was discarded. Fundamentally, Alfa Romeo – a state-owned, commercially underperforming car manufacturer – had neither the heart nor the funds to step up to the challenge. The company’s chairman, Ettore Massacesi, had a range of severe problems to tackle, most notably the lack of profitability, the uncompetitive nature and quality of the products and over-capacity, (especially at the Pomigliano plant). As an individual with no particular empathy for motorsport, his view of the Formula 1 activity was negative – it added significant costs and, since the results were mediocre at best, was not contributing to marketing efforts. Massacesi’s priorities became cost-cutting and implementing an agreement made with Nissan for the Arna model, which, it was hoped, would resolve the problem at Pomigliano, where everything was geared to the production of many more flat four engines than sales of the 33 and Sprint models could absorb. 

Massacesi chose a middle of the road answer, partially respecting the feeling that complete withdrawal at that point, with nothing much achieved since 1979, would be construed by many as pusillanimous. So, the responsibility for running the team was removed from subsidiary, Autodelta, and delegated to Euroracing. This was a team founded (in 1975) and run by Paolo Pavanello. It had been very successful in the Formula 3 category, winning the Italian and European (twice) championships. In 1982 the team had had taken the second of the European championships using March chassis, which it had modified and developed itself, and Alfa Romeo engines. Thus, the team was already well aligned with Alfa Romeo, even being located quite near to the Autodelta base at Settimo Milanese. For Massacesi the arrangement offered the prospect of constrained, capped costs, and the opportunity for Alfa Romeo to claim credit for any success but also the option to blame Pavanello for any failure. 

Andrea with Pavanello (Detroit) 1983

And the blame-game had an early outing in 1983! At the opening Grand Prix, in Rio, Andrea missed a car weight check in qualifying, and was summarily excluded from the event. Although the team attempted an appeal, there was a determination on FISA’s behalf to enforce strict compliance with the regulations. These had been amended over the winter, bringing in a new, lower minimum weight in an endeavour to reduce the inherent performance disadvantage borne by the Cosworth teams relative to the turbo cars run by the ‘manufacturers.’ The loss of running and potential points-scoring was bad enough, but, worse, as the culture required a scapegoat, Gerard Ducarouge was fired. Considering that he had previously been responsible for very successful design work at Matra and Ligier, and would repeat this at Lotus later in 1983/4, his was a loss that was significantly detrimental. 

Worryingly, prior to the weighing incident, Andrea’s practice in Brazil had been interrupted more than once by turbocharger problems. This was a weak aspect of the 183T, the components having been hastily developed in-house after a dispute with KKK, whose well-proven versions had been initially utilised. The situation was a pointer to Alfa Romeo’s corporate ineptitude in dealing with suppliers outside Italy. With better commercial ‘nouse’ the disagreement could have been resolved and continuity in this vital technical area assured. 

The running in Rio had also confirmed an issue of yet greater significance. Seemingly as some sort of self-harm DNA trait, Alfa Romeo’s post-war racing engines, be they inline fours, straight eights, vee eights or vee twelves, were notable for the high rate at which they consumed fuel. The new turbo V8 – Type 890 – carried on this ‘tradition,’ (the 890 being 11% thirstier than the V12 Type 1260). So, whilst the engine could output almost 100 bhp more than the 3.0 V12, optimum potential performance could not be achieved for two main reasons: 1) A 250 litre fuel tank was necessary, the mass of which made for a bulky car, compounded by the weight of the volume of fuel itself during the early phase of a race; b) To ensure that run-dry incidents were avoided, back-off to turbo boost was necessitated. 

All the disruption and change, including Andrea’s exclusion in Rio, which had affected the team since the latter part of 1982, continued to adversely influence performance at the second race, in Long Beach. In marked contrast with his pole-capturing feat here twelve months previously, Andrea could qualify no better than nineteenth, with new teammate, Mauro Baldi in twenty-first. Equally, the race did nothing for morale, Andrea retiring on lap 48, and Baldi out thanks to a spin. 

At Paul Ricard, April 1983

Andrea and the 183T came good at the next Grand Prix, at Paul Ricard. He initially qualified as the second fastest runner, but the time was subsequently disallowed when scrutineering revealed empty on-board fire extinguishers. Nevertheless he remained competitive the next day and recorded seventh fastest lap. The race began well enough, but the car’s gear linkage became maladjusted, resulting in considerable time lost in the pit. The eventual race conclusion, down in twelfth, did not reflect the potential speed of either car or driver. That potential was confirmed two weeks later in San Marino, where Andrea’s qualifying performance was good enough for eighth. That the car was improving was suggested by Baldi being able to go tenth fastest. There was wariness for the race in terms of reliability as the Autodelta-made turbochargers had given trouble throughout practice and qualifying. Despite this, Baldi at least finished, in tenth, but Andrea was out on lap 45 with a distributor problem. 

In Monaco, Andrea qualified seventh, but his race was over with just 13 laps completed, this time because of gearbox maladies. 

And then came Spa . . . 

. . . where Andrea took to the newly re-opened/reconfigured circuit with alacrity. Watching Friday practice, even Denis Jenkinson had to admit that Andrea was: ‘brave and fast, especially on his entry to corners.’ Not unexpectedly at Francorchamps, the following day saw plenty of rain, so Friday’s times served for qualification, but this was not a problem for Andrea, as he’d been third fastest, headed only by Alain Prost and Patrick Tambay. The race start was aborted as Marc Surer’s Arrows was stranded. However, in the few moments the front of the grid thought it was ‘go,’ Andrea shot past Prost and Tambay, and into the lead. Remarkably, exactly the same thing happened at the restart, and Andrea was comfortably in front around La Source and down the hill towards Eau Rouge. As the race settled down it was clear that Andrea was comfortable in the lead and not needing to drive on the limit, with Prost’s second-placed Renault not dropped, but, equally, unable to mount a challenge on the 183T. At half distance Andrea was in the pits for a scheduled stop, but this went very wrong, delaying his return to the track by around ten seconds longer than might have been expected. As well as the lost time/track position, the delay was thought to have resulted in excessive engine temperature, laying the ground for a consequent failure. Andrea’s pace was however good enough for him to rapidly recover to second, behind Prost, and the gap was closing when, on lap 25 the engine failed. His, and the team’s, disappointment was immense, but there was much to take as positive from the weekend, including fastest lap, as Andrea chased Prost after the pitstop.

At Spa, May 1983

Now, bear with me please, and let’s imagine that prior to this race, the following had happened: Alfa Romeo had, in 1982, appointed a motor sport-friendly chairman in replacement of Massecesi; this man had approved an increased budget for Formula 1 participation, including provision to strengthen the management of Autodelta, with that business remaining responsible for running the team, and still headed nominally by Carlo Chiti and, operationally, by Gerard Ducarouge; Ducarouge had acted swiftly to settle the dispute with KKK, allowing the 183T to run with the German maker’s turbocharger units; additionally, Ducarouge had instigated a top-priority project with the objective to improve the Type 890 engine’s fuel consumption by at least 5%. 

As those fundamental chunks of change are considered, they provoke another possibility that is not outlandish. Suppose Gordon Murray – emotionally Alfa-friendly from his Brabham-Alfa period – had lost interest in the successful Brabham-BMWs around 1984, and, instead of eventually moving to McLaren, had then elected to work on a consultancy basis to inspire and support Ducarouge’s work. Such a collaboration could have ensured that optimum advantage was realised from Alfa’s unique situation at the time of being the only team using a V8 turbo engine. This was an important factor given that even marginally superior measures of performance are the key to overtaking ability in closely matched competition. One area in particular is critical: the capability of the engine to pick-up and accelerate, (itself, and the car), from slow/low RPM corners. With its considerably smaller/lighter pistons, an 8 cylinder engine should always be able to do this better than a six or four cylinder engine of the same capacity. 

To unlock the promise offered by the scenario just outlined, the driver element needed to be formidable – and Alfa Romeo already had that in Andrea de Cesaris. In two full seasons, and still in his early twenties, Andrea had proven his speed with a pole position, fastest lap and race lead. The early stages of the 1983 season had seen him add enhanced consistency and better tactical thinking. Nigel Roebuck was one of several pundits who perceived a markedly more mature de Cesaris, saying, (in Autosport’s 1983 season review): 

De Cesaris made tremendous progress this year, and there were frequent signs that he is beginning to match his technique to the courage and speed of reaction which have always been present in his driving. Rosberg, who had frankly no time at all for Andrea 12 months ago, had a good old dice with him at Montreal, and afterwards commented that the Italian was a man transformed – still a hard racer, but now rational and fair. 

If you can accept the last four paragraphs above, I’d like to think that you too can imagine Nigel writing an even more glowing panegyric at the end of 1986. A season which had seen Andrea clinch his third consecutive World Championship, eclipsing the Alfa Romeo triumph of 1950-1!

At Österreichring, August 1983