The Nearly Alfa - Part 1

The Alfa Romeo 183T was a ‘nearly car.’  As demonstrated at Spa in 1983, it was good enough to win Grands Prix.  Though it was – as are all racing cars – far from perfect, that its results fell below its potential was more to do with how it was operated rather than in its design/specification.  Key factors that undermined its results included a short window of opportunity.  Crucially, the following season’s limitation on permitted fuel use per race militated against the engine’s inherent consumption characteristics.  Additionally, two races were lost for lead driver, Andrea de Cesaris, because of technical regulations disqualifications.  And  performance was hampered early in the season because of inconsistent availability of the specific turbochargers suited to the Autodelta-developed V8 engine.  And, throughout ’82 and ’83, conflicting political considerations conspired to make it quite an achievement by Autodelta and Euroracing that the car displayed any measure of competitiveness and was present at all 15 Grands Prix.  In explaining the background, the development of the car and how it performed on-track, I need firstly to outline Alfa Romeo’s return to the Formula One scene long after winning the first two World Championships in ‘50/’51. 

Two decades on from its withdrawal from Grand Prix racing, the marque was dabbling as an engines supplier.  Initially this came about through Luciano Bianchi’s interest in fitting a Tipo 33 sport prototype 2.5 litre 105.80 engine to a Cooper F1 chassis.  This project stalled and the engine, in 3.0 litre form, emerged in its primary role as the motive power for the new Tipo 33/3 in February ‘69.  That season saw the return of Andrea De Adamich to the Settimo Milanese-based Autodelta Tipo 33 team after a spell with Ferrari.  Alongside, he had signed to drive in Formula 1 with the McLaren team.  Discussion between Autodelta chief, Carlo Chiti, and De Adamich resulted in the M7D and M14D versions of McLaren’s ‘70 F1 car carrying the 105.80 engine.  Also driven by Nanni Galli, neither car/driver was able to score any World Championship points.  The following season’s March 711 was engineered to accommodate both the Cosworth DFV, or the Alfa V8.  The Alfa powered version was driven mainly by De Adamich and Nanni Galli, though lead driver, Ronnie Peterson, contested the French Grand Prix in it.  As with the McLaren, results were disappointing and no World Championship points were gained.

McLaren-Alfa M14D - De Adamich, Holland, 1970 (Courtesy R Schlegelmilch)

Subsequent development of the Tipo 33 dictated the need for a 12 cylinder 3.0 litre engine, for which Chiti decided upon a 180° V (‘flat’) format.  Motor Racing Developments’ owner, Bernie Ecclestone, became interested in the engine for the team’s F1 Brabham cars.  Brabham designer, Gordon Murray, has said he believes that in a deal struck in ‘74 Ecclestone secured a supply of engines on a free of charge basis.  Unveiled in October ‘75, the BT45 was the first Brabham to be powered by the Tipo 115.12 unit.  Results were not encouraging, the size/weight of the engine and its prolific consumption of fuel proving challenging.  The BT46 was more competitive, thanks to some extent by developments which reduced the consumption.  The ‘78 BT46B was the fabled ‘Fan Car,’ which was victorious in Niki Lauda’s hands on its one and only Grand Prix outing in Sweden.  But the Lotus 78 and 79 changed the game entirely, ushering in the ground effects era.  The chassis architecture required for this – especially in terms of the floor underside and sidepod forms – made a wide engine block undesirable, so Murray prevailed upon Chiti to build a new 60° V12 power unit for the ‘79 season.  Chiti obliged, and the V12 BT48 debuted at the Argentine Grand Prix in January ‘79.  Murray felt that the inconsistency of the new engine’s specification – especially heads/camshafts – and its build quality, was worse than he had seen with the flat 12.  He became increasingly unhappy with the partnership, culminating in a switch to Cosworth DFV power for the final two World Championship rounds.

Brabham BT48, 1979. (Carlo Chiti is standing on the right)

While the Brabham team was wrestling with the BT45, Alfa Romeo President, Ettore Massacesi, gave the go-ahead for the creation of an all-Alfa F1 car.  This was announced to the public early in ‘78 and the first prototype was under testing by the summer.  After a long period in which there had been considerable resistance to such an idea within Arese and at Finmeccanica, (the state-created financial entity which ‘owned’ Alfa Romeo), once a running car could be observed, a wave of exaggerated enthusiasm took over, and an increasing number of internal advocates became besotted with the idea that the car could be debuted at that year’s Italian Grand Prix.  But this plan was scuttled in the wake of a test at the Paul Ricard circuit by Lauda in August.  His opinion was that the car was nowhere near ready for competition and an attempt to race it at Monza would probably result in embarrassment for the team and the corporate management.  So, for the remainder of ‘78, the 177 ran only in test sessions, with the driving shared by Bruno Giacomelli and Vittorio Brambilla.  Not until the following May was it deemed worthy of a race entry – to the Belgian Grand Prix at Zolder.  Giacomelli’s reasonable qualifying performance and race pace prior to a collision-prompted retirement provided encouragement.  The results of further outings were however relatively disappointing, though no surprise to the Autodelta team -  for, as soon as it was operating in the F1 race environment, the team had seen that an updated car with the new V12 engine was required as a matter of urgency.  Chiti - at this time assisted by Robert Choulet - was good at producing new designs and building prototypes within exceptionally short timescales and he did this again, surprising everyone by fielding the first 179 at September’s Italian Grand Prix at Monza.  Giacomelli qualified the new car 18^th and ran well in the race until retirement after a mistake and off-circuit excursion at Ascari.

177 with Bruno Giacomelli in the car and Vittorio Brambilla on the sidepod

Despite a positive start for the 179 in the latter part of the ‘79 season, the viability of the team was questionable as the new year dawned.  With Alfa Romeo’s lack of profitability, the justification for spending on the F1 programme was frequently and vigorously challenged and Massacesi had to be at his most resilient.  His saving grace arrived however in the form of substantial sponsorship funds from Phillip Morris to promote its Marlboro cigarette brand on the cars.  For ‘80 Giacomelli was partnered with Patrick Depailler, Brambilla fulfilling a testing role.  There were good showings at Argentina and Long Beach and at Watkins Glen where Giacomelli was on pole and led the race, but the season was marred by the loss of Depailler, killed while testing at Hockenheim.  For the following season Giacomelli was joined by Mario Andretti, who took 4^th place at Long Beach.  Though the team had a better car in the 179C and D versions, benefitting from input from Gerard Ducarouge, who had joined from Ligier, the only other highlights were Giacomelli’s 4^th and 3^rd at Montreal and Las Vegas, respectively.  1982 saw Andrea de Cesaris replacing Andretti and quickly proving his potential with pole and a spell leading at Long Beach.  Ducarouge’s value was fully confirmed by the superiority of his new car, the 182, in comparison with the 179.  He was assisted in the design of the 182 by Mario Tollentino.  The 177/179/182 era can be summed up as follows: Starts: 99; Wins 0; Podiums 3; Poles: 2; World Championship points – ’79 = 0; ’80 = 4; ’81 = 10; ’82 = 7.

Andrea de Cesaris in the 182 at Monaco, 1982 - classified 3rd 

In July ‘79, While Bruno Giacomelli was struggling to get the 177 round to a 17^th place finish at Dijon, Jean-Pierre Jabouille was taking the chequered flag and celebrating the first Grand Prix victory for a turbocharged car.  His Renault RS10 was a development of the RS01.  That car, pioneering the use of a 1.5 litre turbocharged engine in place of the 3 litre, normally aspirated type, had been first entered to a Grand Prix just two seasons previously.  Thus, another new era was ushered in – the 1.5 litre/turbocharged format would hold sway in the sport’s pinnacle category for the next nine seasons.  Chiti was not slow in recognising the significance of the Renault innovation and began work on a forced induction engine as ‘79 drew to a close.  Given that Jabouille and teammate Rene Arnoux had claimed pole in four of the seven remaining rounds of the ’79 championship, it was no surprise that Chiti was on the task with some urgency, but few would have expected that he’d chose the V8 format.  Many would argue that simplicity of the fundamentals was a key success feature in Formula 1 while forced induction was the source of high power outputs.  This was most obviously demonstrated by the BMW 4 cylinder M12/13, based on the stock M10 which had powered the 2002.  According to some claims, this engine was capable in qualifying tune of generating over 1,200 bhp, enough to power Nelson Piquet’s Brabham BT52 to World Championship victory in ‘83.  Its performance in ‘84 enabled him to record the pole lap at nine of the season’s Grands Prix.  That said, the most obvious configuration for the formula was a V6.  This is what Renault had decided upon for its pioneering EF1 engine.  And it was the layout that featured in the turbocharged engines that were then developed by Ferrari, Honda, Porsche (TAG), Cosworth and Motori-Moderni.  Other than Alfa Romeo and BMW, only Hart tried something different, with its in-line 4.  Considerations of the size and weight of a V6 were seen as highly favourable by designers, especially in regard to packaging within the chassis of the power unit and transmission/ancillaries.
 
Ever since the recognition of the importance of aerodynamics and the exploitation of ground effects and the consequent greater difficulty in close-following/overtaking in Formula 1, designers had been obliged to look for ways in which marginal performance advantages relevant to specific aspects of driveability - aside from out-and-out power – could be created.  A very notable example is the capability of a car to pick up engine and road speed as it exits a slow speed corner.  This became a particular focus of attention given that turbo lag was a negative feature of the cohort of new engines appearing in Formula 1.  Whilst this would be addressed successfully over time by engine management/software developments – and, ultimately, the use of ERS energy in today’s hybrid powertrains – in the early ‘80s the most realistic approach was to optimise the basic responsiveness of the reciprocating componentry.  This was indeed the determining objective which led to Chiti’s decision to pursue a V8 solution.  Crucially, the smaller mass and weight of the pistons/conrods and various rotating parts would allow them to be accelerated more rapidly than those of a six – or four – cylinder engine.  A notable example of the principle’s value would be seen at the ’83 Belgian Grand Prix – as Nigel Roebuck, in observing the race start and reporting for Autosport magazine, wrote: ‘The Italian V8 gets off the line like no other turbocharged car . . .’  Chiti’s confidence in the value of this characteristic was bolstered by his previous personal experience in designing the ATS and Alfa Romeo Tipo 33 V8s.  Additionally, he believed in the basic principle that, all things being equal, a V8 would always have a better ultimate power potential vis-à-vis that of a V6.  Conventional wisdom would balance that with the generally accepted fact that a V6 would have a fuel consumption advantage, and this would be of notable significance in regard to Chiti’s V8.
 
Anyone believing that on a quasi-DNA basis a marque can tend to repetitively manufacture products with distinctive engineering characteristics – good or bad – might well cite the fuel consumption deficiency of Alfa Romeo racing engines as a classic example.  In the late stages of the 158/159 models’ working life, the one thing that might have derailed their run of success was the raging thirst of the supercharged 8 cylinder engine.  Despite needing a gallon of Shell Dynamin for every 1–2 miles covered, the 158 and 159 in ‘50 and ‘51 respectively managed to win 10 of the 15 Grands Prix and the Championship for both seasons.  Not bad, considering that because of the volume of fuel needing to be carried/used, the design and weight of the cars were compromised and significant time was lost on-track for ‘extra’ refuelling stops.  Another example of this weakness was seen in the flat 12 initially developed for the Tipo 33 TT12 and, as recounted above, subsequently deployed in the late ‘70s Brabham F1 cars.  Gordon Murray lamented that whilst the Cosworth-powered cars needed 40 gallon tanks and would do a Grand Prix on 36-37 gallons, a 45 gallon tank was required for the Alfa engine. So when early test running of Chiti’s V8 for the ‘80s - designated ‘890’ – showed that its fuel efficiency would not be a strong point, this was not a dramatic surprise.  Indeed, Chiti himself, in stating that a turbocharged engine of this type/size could be expected to consume 11% more fuel than a normally aspirated unit, was apparently content with the situation, given that in a further comparison of the two engine types, the forced induction example would deliver 16% more power.  His confidence was also probably buoyed by the notion that a post-launch water injection development programme might well be able to achieve efficiency gains of real substance as had been seen with such a project carried out at Autodelta on the GTA touring car in the late ‘60s.  Nevertheless, a major influencing factor in the design of the 183T was the need for it to accommodate a 250 litres (55 gallon) fuel tank.

Alfa Romeo 890 engine

The questions of power unit configuration and fuel consumption were engineering-centred matters, largely within the control of Carlo Chiti.  There was one further factor which very significantly affected the initial development of the engine and its potential competitiveness in its first season of racing.  This was the sourcing and the specification of the turbochargers, and this issue had as much to do with politics as it did with engineering.  The engineering aspect was well covered – Autodelta had recently developed a single turbocharger version of the Alfetta GTV 2000 and built 400 for Group 4 homologation purposes.  In line with the then current norm, Chiti had opted for Kulne Kopp Kausch (KKK) turbochargers manufactured in Frankenthal, near Mannheim, Germany.  So it was unremarkable that Chiti’s new V8 wore KKKs as testing got underway.  But, whereas the Alfetta GTV 2000 Turbodelta project had been of some interest throughout the motor sport industry/community, Formula 1 represented a very much higher profile/general newsworthiness activity.  Consequently, intervention from far above Chiti’s head was soon being visited on the team at work in Settimo Milanese.

Part 2 will cover the development phase with the interim 182T, design/technical details of the 183T and its initial development and pre-season testing, followed by a race-by-race account of the car's further development and performances through the 1983 F1 season. 

l'Alfa Vince!

When I was visiting the Alfa Romeo headquarters at Arese in the early eighties, meetings were often disrupted by the noise and general disruption caused by workforce demonstrations which spilled out of the factory premises and into the office complex.  At that time, the place was a hotbed of political strife.  Often, I found myself lamenting the fact that considerable energy could be found for such activities, while apathy and a lack of dedication underlay so much of the poor quality that characterised the products these same people were helping stagger along the production lines.  But this was nothing new – Alfa Romeo had long been ‘state owned’ and able to function aloof from the commercial/economic principles that ensure that most companies manage their employees such that good order is maintained and a profitable operation enabled.

Fig.1. Political daubs on the Autodelta yard walls. Courtesy Robert Little

In the wake of WWI, Italy could not escape the Europe-wide economic crisis that saw crippling currency devaluations and raging inflation.  Things came to a head for Alfa Romeo in 1921 when its majority shareholder, Banco Nazionale di Sconto, collapsed.  It was however saved by absorption into a state institution, ‘IRI,’ which had been created by the Italian government.  Under this ‘ownership’ Alfa Romeo prospered through the twenties, thirties and forties, achieving success both in commercial car-building and motor sport terms .  However, in 1948, a new – though still basically state-governed – regime was introduced, leaving the company under direction from an organisation named Finmeccanica.  Resentment by the Alfa Romeo management of this arrangement ebbed and flowed over time, the main point of contention being Finmeccanica’s ability to interfere with production and the models programme strategies.  Almost as unwelcome was intrusion into the selection/appointment of senior leadership personnel.  Notwithstanding this latter point, the appointment of Giuseppe Luraghi as Alfa Romeo’s CEO in December 1960 was positive in that he championed the development of the Giulia models and the return to motor sport participation, including the establishment of Autodelta.  Also, he oversaw the move from Portello to Arese and the planning for the Alfasud project.  But within Finmeccanica and the government’s Economic Planning function, an arch economically conservative/anti-motor sport culture was maintained.  Consequently, as the seventies got underway, Luraghi was put under considerable pressure.  He was urged to abandon a plan to upgrade the Arese factory, to stop spending on motor sport and to abolish Autodelta.  The political climate featured a strong hard left element whereby the northern industrial area was represented as being a centre of capitalist greed which prospered at the expense of other regions – especially the South.  To address this, a plan was promoted to move a large proportion of vehicle production from Arese to a new site in Avellino, not so far from the new Alfasud plant at Pomigliano d'Arco.  All of this left Carlo Chiti, Autodelta itself, and the 33 programme in a notably insecure situation.

 

However, on-track, things were to prove a little more favourable for the team. The 12 cylinder 33 would start the 1974 World Championship quest with a 1-2-3 at Monza, though the rest of the season would be dominated by Matra.  Autodelta responded early on by deciding to dedicate most of the season to development of the car for an all-out championship onslaught in 1975, all the more attractive since there would be little Group 5 competition, (Matra having withdrawn), and  Porsche being focused on the GT category. 

Fig.2. T-33/TT/12 of Merzario/Andretti winning 1974 Monza 1000 kms. Courtesy Luciano Pasonni

Late 1971 had seen the introduction of the T-33/TT/3.  The TT designation stemmed from the chassis being constructed as a ‘'Telaio Tubolare,’ a development away from the monocoque format T-33/3 which had begun testing in winter 1968-69.  In parallel, Chiti designed and began the building of a new 3 litre 180° V12, intended for both sportscar and Formula 1 use.  To carry this engine, a tubular chassis based on the T-33/TT/3’s was built, and the resulting car began testing as 1973 dawned.  It should have been sooner, but various delays were experienced, much of the trouble being attributable to the political milieu and Luraghi’s and Autodelta’s consequent uncertain situation.

Fig.3. T-33/TT/3 #010. Courtesy Supercar Nostalgia/William I’Anson Ltd

Fig.4. 33 3.0 180° V12 engine. Courtesy of Robert Little

‘Uncertainty’ soon gave way to deterioration.  Chiti had enjoyed considerable autonomy in Luraghi’s regime.  He believed that a free rein was essential to him if he was to design/develop engines and chassis which he considered were beyond the understanding of administrators, finance people and even the production car engineers.  But as the Spring arrived and testing opportunities arose, Chiti sensed that his Luraghi-bestowed ‘protection’ was diminishing, while the negative communications originating from Finmeccanica demanding reduced costs/better results grew in frequency and intensity.  Nevertheless, when Chiti was able to stand trackside and just concentrate on how the new car was going, he could feel more sanguine.  Rolf Stommelen was able in March to break the track record at Paul Ricard and the following month the same feat was achieved at Monza in practice for the 1000 kms.  Unaccountably – though ‘officially’ ascribed to problems with parts suppliers – no TT/12s were run in the race.  Eventually, the new car’s race debut occurred at the Targa Florio, the historic race in its final full bloodied iteration.  With Stommelen and de Adamich aboard, the TT/12 was satisfyingly fast, taking a clear lead, and looking certain to be a winner at its first attempt, until . . . de Adamich was hit by a Lancia Fulvia and suffered retirement-enforcing suspension damage.

Fig.5. T-33/TT/12 at Balocco, Facetti at the wheel. Courtesy Alfa Romeo Auto Storico

Despite the signs that the TT/12 could be a really successful car, it was at this point that further pressure was exerted on Luraghi not only in regard to the main production organisation but also in the form of a challenge to the continuance of works motor sport involvement.  This situation seemed to affect the programme of race entries for the remainder of the season – just a single car at Zeltweg and non-entry for Watkins Glen and Kyalami.  But behind the scenes, engine development involving the cylinder heads enabled a useful power increase, proven by on-track performance in early winter testing at Vallelunga in the hands of newly-recruited driver Arturo Merzario.

 

By January 1974, Luraghi had finally had enough and he resigned.  The question of who should replace him as CEO immediately became a matter more conditioned by political bias than by the leadership, technical and commercial qualifications of the candidates.  With disagreement between the Christian Democrat and the Socialist factions unresolved, this important decision was fudged, a temporary incumbent being appointed.  This was Ermanno Guani, considered by many to be simply a puppet under the direction of IRI/Finmeccanica.  (Under Guani, a new Managing Director, Adolfo Bardini was appointed).  But at least there was no sudden termination of the racing programme or severe sanctions applied to Autodelta’s budgets/headcount.  Accordingly, testing for the new season began in February.  At this point there was some optimism resulting from Ferrari’s withdrawal, leaving Matra as the only serious opposition to Alfa Romeo’s quest for a World Championship.  After seeing some encouraging pace from Merzario at Monza, Autodelta sent two TT/12s to France for the Le Mans test in March.  The cars topped the timesheets, with Merzario 4.5 seconds quicker that the third placed, fastest, of the Matra MS670Bs.  Things got even better at the Monza 1000 kms, where the TT/12s were 1-2-3, led home by the car driven by Merzario and Mario Andretti.  Chiti was quoted as saying, ‘This was the greatest victory of my career.’  He was all the more disappointed – and bewildered – by the instruction from Bardini that no cars be sent to the next Championship round, at Spa.  Though participation was allowed for the following race, at the Nurburgring, the Monza magic had somehow been misplaced and only a second place could be achieved, leaving Matra by now well ahead in terms of championship points.  But though a determined effort could perhaps have allowed Alfa Romeo to close the gap and vie for the Championship, its own management decreed the opposite stance by instructing Autodelta to withdraw the Le Mans entries.  Thus, with the French team maintaining good performances and points scores in the remaining races, Matra-Simca finished the season as the champion constructor for the second successive year.  It then promptly announced that it would not contest a 1975 campaign.  At Arese the management was of like mind.  Costs were the dominant consideration and few of the senior figures believed in the positive link between motor sport participation and incremental sales, let alone the intrinsic spiritual value of the activity for a marque renowned for its sporting history.

Fig.6. At Monza prior to the 1-2-3 triumph, April 1974.  Chiti stands next to the car’s right hand side,

 with drivers, Brambilla, de Adamich, Zeccoli, Stommelen and Merzario behind it. Courtesy Alfa Romeo Auto Storico

Except . . . that autumn Guani was displaced by Gaetano Cortesi, an IRI-favoured executive.  As he settled into the CEO role at Alfa Romeo over the winter, signals began to emerge from his office which suggested that at least in 1975 there would be a racing programme for Autodelta to run.  Early in the New Year this became more likely when an agreement was reached with Willi Kauhsen to become involved in running the cars.  Most importantly for Cortesi in supporting his efforts to promote a less costs-obsessed culture in Arese, the German would bring with him a sizeable sponsorship budget which he had secured through associations formed in his previous role as a high profile works driver and entrant of factory-supported Porsches.  His expertise and experience went beyond endurance racing with his involvement in the 917 Can-Am and Interserie campaigns.

Fig.7. Chiti with Gaetano Cortesi. Courtesy Alfa Romeo Auto Storico

On paper the Championship prospects for Alfa Romeo in early 1975 were better than they had been for several years.  With Matra and Ferrari out of the way, the competition was relatively less intimidating.  Alpine Renault and Ligier both intended to run, but with cars less capable than the well-developed 12 cylinder MS670s of the compatriot Matra marque.  True, Porsche also had an updated, turbocharged 908 ready for action, but the 908/3 had performed poorly in 1974 and the new 2142 cc engine did not confer on the car a top speed capability equal to that enjoyed by the TT/12 and Alpine A442.  On the other hand, a substantial development programme enabled Autodelta to improve the TT/12’s chassis – especially the brakes and by the accommodation of wider tyres. And, making use of the Kauhsen sponsorship, the driver team was consolidated, with contracts for Merzario and Derek Bell; further agreements for some events were also made with Jacky Ickx, Jacques Laffite, Jochen Mass,  Mario Andretti, Henri Pescarolo and Nino Vaccarella.  The cars began the campaign with a red livery dominated by the team name initials in a white, huge size font, WKRT, on the front and on the rear wing. 

The promise was looking likely to be fulfilled when Merzario took pole position at the opening Championship round at Mugello.  However, brake problems delayed the car and allowed an Alpine victory, the Alfas finishing 2^nd and 3^rd.  Although that in itself was not a bad outcome, the post race atmosphere was clouded as a result of Merzario and Kauhsen not getting on.  Indeed, Willi’s involvement at this point was not especially positive since Chiti too harboured some resentment, feeling his ultimate authority was being challenged by the German.  Much of the problem stemmed from Kauhsen’s view that Merzario was ‘trouble’ and would not be in the team if he had his way.  But, when the next race – at Dijon – resulted in a morale-boosting Alfa win thanks to a very strong performance by Arturo, harmony began to set in. 

But, as confidence that this would be the Championship year grew at Autodelta, a new competitor emerged – the Gulf GR7 – and immediately proved itself by recording the fastest time in testing for the next round at Monza.  In the race itself, Merzario put in another robust performance, defeating the 908/3 pairing of Reinhold Jost/Mario Casoni and Larrousse/Jabouille’s Alpine; the Mass/Schenken Gulf suffered transmission problems and was classified in a lowly 20^th place.  At Spa, the TT/12s were 1^st and 2^nd, driven by Bell/Pescorolo and Merzario/Ickx, respectively.  Another 1-2 followed at the Coppa Florio, Enna, Merzario/Mass being first across the line this time. The Gelo Racing Team-entered Mirage came back into play at the Nurburgring, running not far behind, but Merzario/Laffite still managed to take the victory from Howden Ganley/Schenken with a margin of 40 seconds.  It was Bell/Pescorolo’s turn to win at Zeltweg, with Merzario/Vittorio Brambilla second.  The season concluded at Watkins Glen with a repeat win for Bell/Pescorolo, Merzario/Andretti in second. 

The success that 1975 proved to be stemmed from several factors.  The involvement of Kauhsen was certainly important, though the value of his sponsorship was more in terms of its existence providing a means of countering the economic hawks within IRI and Alfa Romeo, it being implied that much of the spending burden had been transferred out of house.  Perhaps there were some clever presentations of figures by the pro-racing/Autodelta players since, in reality the WKRT contribution amounted to only 35% of the World Championship budget.  Any illusory enhanced portrayal of the arrangement would no doubt have been supported and facilitated by Gaetano Cortesi.  Indeed, the new Alfa Romeo boss’s favourable disposition did much to ensure that Autodelta, Chiti in particular, enjoyed a period of reduced top-echelon management pressure, enabling it to function better in engineering terms as a developer of the car.  And the developments introduced during the season were largely successful.  As mentioned above, chassis/brakes improvements enhanced the TT/12’s competitiveness, as did an upping of engine power output to 500 bhp, (a 6% increase over the original rating).  Numerous detail changes were made to the bodywork of the T-33/TT/12, helping both airflows to the engine and brakes and the car’s aerodynamic efficiency both in drag reduction and downforce generating terms.  And, although he didn’t quite make a significant mark in Formula One, Arturo Merzario’s contribution to the Alfa Romeo Championship win is perhaps underrated.  Highly respected by hard task master, Carlo Abarth, ‘Little Art’ gained a lot of specific expertise at the beginning of his career in a test driver role at Corso Marche.  At Autodelta he remained always ready to put in test mileage and was able to give good, constructive feedback which was a positively enabling factor in the development process.  This attribute was probably as important for the success of the campaign as his four race victories.  Commercial developments also were important in sustaining the Championship campaign.  In May the cars appeared at Spa with a new livery for the Campari drinks maker, reflecting a useful sponsorship addition to the racing budget.  The following month, appropriately at the Nurburgring, the name of the sausage manufacturer, Redlefsen, was writ large on the 33s.

Fig.8. 1975: Top left, Jacky Ickx at Spa; right: Jochen Mass at the Nurburgring; bottom: Zeltweg.

 Courtesy Alfa Romeo Auto Storico

One week after the Watkins Glen victory, the now-non Championship Targa Florio, run two months later than had been the custom when the event was in its pomp, provided a further and concluding celebratory victory for the T-33/TT/12.  Merzario was paired with Targa specialist-supreme, Nino Vaccarella, and they had no difficulty in winning the race by the large margin of 19 minutes from a Chevron B26.

Fig.9. 1975 Targa Florio podium; Left to right: Merzario, Vaccarella, Chiti. 

Courtesy Alfa Romeo Auto Storico

As the summer gave way to autumn, the focus passed from the 33 to the utilisation of the 12 cylinder engine in a new partnership with Motor Racing Developments, (Bernie Ecclestone’s Brabham Formula One team).  The BT45 chassis designed by MRD’s Gordon Murray was ready for track testing by Carlos Reutemann in mid-October.  Thus, Alfa Romeo became involved in Grand Prix racing again for the first time since the (second) Championship-winning year of 1951.  This would give rise to a further two new engines – a V12 and a turbocharged V8 – before ending in 1988, with little success achieved, when the V8 was dropped after 3 seasons’ use by the Osella team.

Fig.10. One-off TT12 coupe – with V8 engine – for the Tour of Italy, 1975. Courtesy Alfa Romeo Auto Storico

Without any clear conviction, Alfa Romeo did decide to develop a version of the 33 for the newly-redefined Group 6 introduced in 1976.  On paper this appeared to be specified in stark contradiction to the principles that had made the TT/12 so dominant in 1975: the tubular chassis was to be replaced with a monocoque and the 3.0 litre capacity/natural aspiration, (which helped ensure good reliability) of the engine was due to be replaced by a 2140 cc version with twin turbocharged induction.  The race debut of the car, originally referred to as 33TS12, subsequently, SC12, was delayed, in a manner precursory to the saga of the Formula 1 890T engine in 1982-3, by difficulties over the sourcing of the turbocharger units.  Eventually, some appearances were made, and there were interludes of encouraging pace, but 1976 was really a blank year for Alfa Romeo in terms of sports cars racing.  1977 was certainly different, even if the scale of the success attained was limited.  Using the normally aspirated SC12, the team won all 8 rounds of The World Sportscar Championship.  This, however, was open only to Group 6 cars and was not the FIA’s premier competition for such machinery – that distinction being reserved for The World Championship for Makes, won in dominant fashion by Porsche with its phenomenal 936 model.  The turbocharged car ran in the hands of Merzario at the end of the season in Austria, but was outpaced there by Brambilla’s atmo SC12.  Perhaps just to ensure that the turbo SC12 would never emulate the glories racked up by the 3.0 version, the FIA announced that Group 6 was to be abolished as from 1978.

Fig.11. 1977 Alfa 33 SC12. Courtesy of Wouter Melissen

So, Alfa Romeo’s foremost motor sport role in the New Year was as the ongoing engine supplier to the Brabham team.  But this arrangement was about to change too because Brabham needed a narrower unit to enable the construction of a new chassis which could exploit the fast-developing principles of ground effects.  In response, Chiti had a 60° V12 design under way in October.  Behind the scenes, Chiti had also been at work for some time on the design of a chassis to be powered initially by his 180° V12 cylinder engine and with which to race in Formula 1 as an Alfa Romeo.  The car was ready to begin testing by mid-year and there was hope that it could make its race debut at Monza in September.  That proved to be over ambitious, and it was not until May 1979 that it was seen at a Grand Prix.  Regrettably, what happened over the following six seasons was never anywhere near as uplifting as what had been achieved with the T-33/TT/12.