l'Alfa Vince!
When
I was visiting the Alfa Romeo headquarters at Arese in the early eighties,
meetings were often disrupted by the noise and general disruption caused by
workforce demonstrations which spilled out of the factory premises and into the
office complex. At that time, the place
was a hotbed of political strife. Often,
I found myself lamenting the fact that considerable energy could be found for
such activities, while apathy and a lack of dedication underlay so much of the poor
quality that characterised the products these same people were helping stagger
along the production lines. But this was
nothing new – Alfa Romeo had long been ‘state owned’ and able to function aloof
from the commercial/economic principles that ensure that most companies manage
their employees such that good order is maintained and a profitable operation
enabled.
Fig.1.
Political daubs on the Autodelta yard walls. Courtesy Robert Little
In
the wake of WWI, Italy could not escape the Europe-wide economic crisis that saw
crippling currency devaluations and raging inflation. Things came to a head for Alfa Romeo in 1921
when its majority shareholder, Banco Nazionale di Sconto, collapsed. It was however saved by absorption into a
state institution, ‘IRI,’ which had been created by the Italian
government. Under this ‘ownership’ Alfa
Romeo prospered through the twenties, thirties and forties, achieving success both in commercial car-building and
motor sport terms . However, in 1948, a new – though still
basically state-governed – regime was introduced, leaving the company under
direction from an organisation named Finmeccanica. Resentment by the Alfa Romeo management of
this arrangement ebbed and flowed over time, the main point of contention being
Finmeccanica’s ability to interfere with production and the models programme
strategies. Almost as unwelcome was intrusion
into the selection/appointment of senior leadership personnel. Notwithstanding this latter point, the
appointment of Giuseppe Luraghi as Alfa Romeo’s CEO in December 1960 was
positive in that he championed the development of the Giulia models and the
return to motor sport participation, including the establishment of Autodelta. Also, he oversaw the move from Portello to
Arese and the planning for the Alfasud project.
But within Finmeccanica and the government’s Economic Planning function,
an arch economically conservative/anti-motor sport culture was maintained. Consequently, as the seventies got underway, Luraghi
was put under considerable pressure. He
was urged to abandon a plan to upgrade the Arese factory, to stop spending on
motor sport and to abolish Autodelta. The
political climate featured a strong hard left element whereby the northern
industrial area was represented as being a centre of capitalist greed which
prospered at the expense of other regions – especially the South. To address this, a plan was promoted to move
a large proportion of vehicle production from Arese to a new site in Avellino,
not so far from
the new Alfasud plant at Pomigliano d'Arco.
All of this left Carlo Chiti, Autodelta itself, and the 33 programme in
a notably insecure situation.
However,
on-track, things were to prove a little more favourable for the team. The 12 cylinder 33 would start the 1974 World
Championship quest with a 1-2-3 at Monza, though the rest of the season would
be dominated by Matra. Autodelta
responded early on by deciding to dedicate most of the season to development of
the car for an all-out championship onslaught in 1975, all the more attractive
since there would be little Group 5 competition, (Matra having withdrawn), and Porsche being focused on the GT category.
Fig.2.
T-33/TT/12 of Merzario/Andretti winning 1974 Monza 1000 kms. Courtesy Luciano
Pasonni
Late
1971 had seen the introduction of the T-33/TT/3. The TT designation stemmed from the chassis
being constructed as a ‘'Telaio Tubolare,’ a development away from the
monocoque format T-33/3 which had begun testing in winter 1968-69. In parallel, Chiti designed and began the
building of a new 3 litre 180° V12, intended for
both sportscar and Formula 1 use. To
carry this engine, a tubular chassis based on the T-33/TT/3’s was built, and
the resulting car began testing as 1973 dawned.
It should have been sooner, but various delays were experienced, much of
the trouble being attributable to the political milieu and Luraghi’s and
Autodelta’s consequent uncertain situation.
Fig.3.
T-33/TT/3 #010. Courtesy Supercar Nostalgia/William I’Anson Ltd
Fig.4. 33 3.0 180° V12
engine. Courtesy of Robert Little
‘Uncertainty’
soon gave way to deterioration. Chiti
had enjoyed considerable autonomy in Luraghi’s regime. He believed that a free rein was essential to
him if he was to design/develop engines and chassis which he considered were
beyond the understanding of administrators, finance people and even the
production car engineers. But as the
Spring arrived and testing opportunities arose, Chiti sensed that his Luraghi-bestowed
‘protection’ was diminishing, while the negative communications originating
from Finmeccanica demanding reduced costs/better results grew in frequency and
intensity. Nevertheless, when Chiti was
able to stand trackside and just concentrate on how the new car was going, he
could feel more sanguine. Rolf Stommelen
was able in March to break the track record at Paul Ricard and the following
month the same feat was achieved at Monza in practice for the 1000 kms. Unaccountably – though ‘officially’ ascribed
to problems with parts suppliers – no TT/12s were run in the race. Eventually, the new car’s race debut occurred
at the Targa Florio, the historic race in its final full bloodied iteration. With Stommelen and de Adamich aboard, the
TT/12 was satisfyingly fast, taking a clear lead, and looking certain to be a
winner at its first attempt, until . . . de Adamich was hit by a Lancia Fulvia
and suffered retirement-enforcing suspension damage.
Fig.5. T-33/TT/12 at
Balocco, Facetti at the wheel. Courtesy Alfa Romeo Auto
Storico
Despite
the signs that the TT/12 could be a really successful car, it was at this point
that further pressure was exerted on Luraghi not only in regard to the main
production organisation but also in the form of a challenge to the continuance
of works motor sport involvement. This situation
seemed to affect the programme of race entries for the remainder of the season –
just a single car at Zeltweg and non-entry for Watkins Glen and Kyalami. But behind the scenes, engine development
involving the cylinder heads enabled a useful power increase, proven by
on-track performance in early winter testing at Vallelunga in the hands of
newly-recruited driver Arturo Merzario.
By January 1974, Luraghi had
finally had enough and he resigned. The
question of who should replace him as CEO immediately became a matter more
conditioned by political bias than by the leadership, technical and commercial
qualifications of the candidates. With
disagreement between the Christian Democrat and the Socialist factions
unresolved, this important decision was fudged, a temporary incumbent being
appointed. This was Ermanno Guani, considered
by many to be simply a puppet under the direction of IRI/Finmeccanica. (Under Guani, a new Managing Director, Adolfo
Bardini was appointed). But at least
there was no sudden termination of the racing programme or severe sanctions applied
to Autodelta’s budgets/headcount. Accordingly,
testing for the new season began in February.
At this point there was some optimism resulting from Ferrari’s
withdrawal, leaving Matra as the only serious opposition to Alfa Romeo’s quest
for a World Championship. After seeing
some encouraging pace from Merzario at Monza, Autodelta sent two TT/12s to
France for the Le Mans test in March. The
cars topped the timesheets, with Merzario 4.5 seconds quicker that the third
placed, fastest, of the Matra MS670Bs. Things
got even better at the Monza 1000 kms, where the TT/12s were 1-2-3, led home by
the car driven by Merzario and Mario Andretti.
Chiti was quoted as saying, ‘This was the greatest victory of my
career.’ He was all the more
disappointed – and bewildered – by the instruction from Bardini that no cars be
sent to the next Championship round, at Spa.
Though participation was allowed for the following race, at the Nurburgring,
the Monza magic had somehow been misplaced and only a second place could be
achieved, leaving Matra by now well ahead in terms of championship points. But though a determined effort could perhaps
have allowed Alfa Romeo to close the gap and vie for the Championship, its own
management decreed the opposite stance by instructing Autodelta to withdraw the
Le Mans entries. Thus, with the French
team maintaining good performances and points scores in the remaining races, Matra-Simca
finished the season as the champion constructor for the second successive year.
It then promptly announced that it would
not contest a 1975 campaign. At Arese
the management was of like mind. Costs
were the dominant consideration and few of the senior figures believed in the positive
link between motor sport participation and incremental sales, let alone the intrinsic
spiritual value of the activity for a marque renowned for its sporting history.
with drivers, Brambilla, de Adamich, Zeccoli, Stommelen and Merzario
behind it. Courtesy Alfa Romeo Auto Storico
Except
. . . that autumn Guani was displaced by Gaetano Cortesi, an IRI-favoured executive. As he settled into the CEO role at Alfa Romeo
over the winter, signals began to emerge from his office which suggested that at
least in 1975 there would be a racing programme for Autodelta to run. Early in the New Year this became more likely
when an agreement was reached with Willi Kauhsen to become involved in running
the cars. Most importantly for Cortesi
in supporting his efforts to promote a less costs-obsessed culture in Arese,
the German would bring with him a sizeable sponsorship budget which he had
secured through associations formed in his previous role as a high profile
works driver and entrant of factory-supported Porsches. His expertise and experience went beyond
endurance racing with his involvement in the 917 Can-Am and Interserie
campaigns.
Fig.7.
Chiti with Gaetano Cortesi. Courtesy Alfa Romeo Auto Storico
On
paper the Championship prospects for Alfa Romeo in early 1975 were better than
they had been for several years. With
Matra and Ferrari out of the way, the competition was relatively less
intimidating. Alpine Renault and Ligier
both intended to run, but with cars less capable than the well-developed 12
cylinder MS670s of the compatriot Matra marque.
True, Porsche also had an updated, turbocharged 908 ready for action,
but the 908/3 had performed poorly in 1974 and the new 2142 cc engine did not confer
on the car a top speed capability equal to that enjoyed by the TT/12 and Alpine
A442. On the other hand, a substantial
development programme enabled Autodelta to improve the TT/12’s chassis –
especially the brakes and by the accommodation of wider tyres. And, making use
of the Kauhsen sponsorship, the driver team was consolidated, with contracts
for Merzario and Derek Bell; further agreements for some events were also made
with Jacky
Ickx, Jacques Laffite, Jochen
Mass, Mario Andretti, Henri Pescarolo
and Nino Vaccarella. The cars began the
campaign with a red livery dominated by the team name initials in a white, huge
size font, WKRT, on the front and on the rear wing.
The
promise was looking likely to be fulfilled when Merzario took pole position at
the opening Championship round at Mugello.
However, brake problems delayed the car and allowed an Alpine victory,
the Alfas finishing 2nd and 3rd. Although that in itself was not a bad
outcome, the post race atmosphere was clouded as a result of Merzario and
Kauhsen not getting on. Indeed, Willi’s involvement
at this point was not especially positive since Chiti too harboured some
resentment, feeling his ultimate authority was being challenged by the German. Much of the problem stemmed from Kauhsen’s
view that Merzario was ‘trouble’ and would not be in the team if he had his
way. But, when the next race – at Dijon
– resulted in a morale-boosting Alfa win thanks to a very strong performance by
Arturo, harmony began to set in.
But,
as confidence that this would be the Championship year grew at Autodelta, a new
competitor emerged – the Gulf GR7 – and immediately proved itself by recording
the fastest time in testing for the next round at Monza. In the race itself, Merzario put in another robust
performance, defeating the 908/3 pairing of Reinhold Jost/Mario Casoni and Larrousse/Jabouille’s
Alpine; the Mass/Schenken Gulf suffered transmission problems and was
classified in a lowly 20th place.
At Spa, the TT/12s were 1st and 2nd, driven by
Bell/Pescorolo and Merzario/Ickx, respectively.
Another 1-2 followed at the Coppa Florio, Enna, Merzario/Mass being
first across the line this time. The Gelo Racing Team-entered Mirage came back
into play at the Nurburgring, running not far behind, but Merzario/Laffite
still managed to take the victory from Howden Ganley/Schenken with a margin of
40 seconds. It was Bell/Pescorolo’s turn
to win at Zeltweg, with Merzario/Vittorio Brambilla second. The season concluded at Watkins Glen with a
repeat win for Bell/Pescorolo, Merzario/Andretti in second.
The
success that 1975 proved to be stemmed from several factors. The involvement of Kauhsen was certainly
important, though the value of his sponsorship was more in terms of its
existence providing a means of countering the economic hawks within IRI and Alfa
Romeo, it being implied that much of the spending burden had been transferred
out of house. Perhaps there were some
clever presentations of figures by the pro-racing/Autodelta players since, in
reality the WKRT contribution amounted to only 35% of the World Championship
budget. Any illusory enhanced portrayal
of the arrangement would no doubt have been supported and facilitated by Gaetano
Cortesi. Indeed, the new Alfa Romeo boss’s
favourable disposition did much to ensure that Autodelta, Chiti in particular,
enjoyed a period of reduced top-echelon management pressure, enabling it to function
better in engineering terms as a developer of the car. And the developments introduced during the
season were largely successful. As
mentioned above, chassis/brakes improvements enhanced the TT/12’s
competitiveness, as did an upping of engine power output to 500 bhp, (a 6%
increase over the original rating).
Numerous detail changes were made to the bodywork of the T-33/TT/12,
helping both airflows to the engine and brakes and the car’s aerodynamic efficiency
both in drag reduction and downforce generating terms. And, although he didn’t quite make a
significant mark in Formula One, Arturo Merzario’s contribution to the Alfa
Romeo Championship win is perhaps underrated.
Highly respected by hard task master, Carlo Abarth, ‘Little Art’ gained
a lot of specific expertise at the beginning of his career in a test driver
role at Corso Marche. At Autodelta he
remained always ready to put in test mileage and was able to give good,
constructive feedback which was a positively enabling factor in the development
process. This attribute was probably as
important for the success of the campaign as his four race victories. Commercial developments also were important
in sustaining the Championship campaign.
In May the cars appeared at Spa with a new livery for the Campari drinks
maker, reflecting a useful sponsorship addition to the racing budget. The following month, appropriately at the
Nurburgring, the name of the sausage manufacturer, Redlefsen, was writ large on
the 33s.
Fig.8.
1975: Top left, Jacky Ickx at Spa; right: Jochen Mass at the Nurburgring;
bottom: Zeltweg.
Courtesy Alfa Romeo Auto Storico
One
week after the Watkins Glen victory, the now-non Championship Targa Florio, run
two months later than had been the custom when the event was in its pomp, provided
a further and concluding celebratory victory for the T-33/TT/12. Merzario was paired with Targa
specialist-supreme, Nino Vaccarella, and they had no difficulty in winning the
race by the large margin of 19 minutes from a Chevron B26.
Fig.9. 1975 Targa
Florio podium; Left to right: Merzario, Vaccarella, Chiti.
Courtesy Alfa Romeo
Auto Storico
As
the summer gave way to autumn, the focus passed from the 33 to the utilisation
of the 12 cylinder engine in a new partnership with Motor Racing Developments, (Bernie
Ecclestone’s Brabham Formula One team).
The BT45 chassis designed by MRD’s Gordon Murray was ready for track
testing by Carlos Reutemann in mid-October.
Thus, Alfa Romeo became involved in Grand Prix racing again for the
first time since the (second) Championship-winning year of 1951. This would give rise to a further two new
engines – a V12 and a turbocharged V8 – before ending in 1988, with little
success achieved, when the V8 was dropped after 3 seasons’ use by the Osella
team.
Fig.10. One-off TT12
coupe – with V8 engine – for the Tour of Italy, 1975. Courtesy Alfa Romeo Auto
Storico
Without
any clear conviction, Alfa Romeo did decide to develop a version of the 33 for
the newly-redefined Group 6 introduced in 1976.
On paper this appeared to be specified in stark contradiction to the principles
that had made the TT/12 so dominant in 1975: the tubular chassis was to be
replaced with a monocoque and the 3.0 litre capacity/natural aspiration, (which
helped ensure good reliability) of the engine was due to be replaced by a 2140
cc version with twin turbocharged induction.
The race debut of the car, originally referred to as 33TS12,
subsequently, SC12, was delayed, in a manner precursory to the saga of the
Formula 1 890T engine in 1982-3, by difficulties over the sourcing of the
turbocharger units. Eventually, some
appearances were made, and there were interludes of encouraging pace, but 1976
was really a blank year for Alfa Romeo in terms of sports cars racing. 1977 was certainly different, even if the
scale of the success attained was limited.
Using the normally aspirated SC12, the team won all 8 rounds of The
World Sportscar Championship. This, however,
was open only to Group 6 cars and was not the FIA’s premier competition for such
machinery – that distinction being reserved for The World Championship for
Makes, won in dominant fashion by Porsche with its phenomenal 936 model. The turbocharged car ran in the hands of
Merzario at the end of the season in Austria, but was outpaced there by Brambilla’s
atmo SC12. Perhaps just to ensure that
the turbo SC12 would never emulate the glories racked up by the 3.0 version,
the FIA announced that Group 6 was to be abolished as from 1978.
Fig.11. 1977 Alfa 33
SC12. Courtesy of Wouter Melissen
So,
Alfa Romeo’s foremost motor sport role in the New Year was as the ongoing
engine supplier to the Brabham team. But
this arrangement was about to change too because Brabham needed a narrower unit
to enable the construction of a new chassis which could exploit the fast-developing
principles of ground effects. In
response, Chiti had a 60° V12 design under way in October. Behind the scenes, Chiti had also been at
work for some time on the design of a chassis to be powered initially by his 180°
V12 cylinder engine and with which to race in Formula 1 as an Alfa Romeo. The car was ready to begin testing by
mid-year and there was hope that it could make its race debut at Monza in
September. That proved to be over
ambitious, and it was not until May 1979 that it was seen at a Grand Prix. Regrettably, what happened over the following
six seasons was never anywhere near as uplifting as what had been achieved with
the T-33/TT/12.
Comments
Post a Comment