One One Five Twelve: Would that be Pounds or Kilograms? The Flat 12 Brabhams.

 

Brabham-Alfa Romeo BT45 #001

It’s well known that Bernie Ecclestone showed a flair for deal making while still a teenager, initially trading in motorcycle parts and accessories. Thus, when he started racing cars in 1950, his focus was as much on how this hobby could reward him financially as it was on competitiveness on-track. The scale of his ‘wheeling and dealing’ had snowballed sufficiently by the time he was in his thirties that he was entering cars in Grands Prix and managing a driver as prominent as the future (posthumous) ’70 World Champion, Jochen Rindt. His activities in and around the F1 scene allowed him knowledge and understanding of everything that was going on in terms of the sport’s financial and organisational aspects. Of the great many friends/acquaintances he cultivated, one of the most significant proved to be Andrea de Adamich, a well respected, intelligent Italian, good enough to drive in F1 (and World Championship sportscars) if not quite with the talent to be a title contender. He did, however, possess a good understanding of the engineering and team management elements of motorsport which he later put to good use in a second career as a journalist. Enjoying a reputation for credibility, de Adamich was able to discuss matters with a wide range of the involved personalities, including the sport’s governance executives, team owners and managers, becoming at times privy to information not circulating in the public domain.

De Adamich, seen below in conversation with Ecclestone*, was racing Alfa Romeo saloon cars in the early Sixties when he was in his early twenties. He did well enough to graduate to single seaters, and, in ’65, take the Italian F3 championship. That was an achievement which impressed Carlo Chiti, in charge at Autodelta, Alfa Romeo’s sporting arm, to the extent that de Adamich was inducted into Alfa’s touring car team. So he became a high profile driver who could and did score victories at major international events. In ’66 and ’67 he was European Touring Car Champion and before the end of the decade he had seen success at World Sportscar Championship races, run very competitively in F5000 and played a significant role in the development of the Alfa Romeo Tipo 33, culminating in the ’75 flat 12 version’s World Championship for Makes triumph. Meanwhile, from ’68 to ’73, he raced in 34 Grands Prix, with a best result, 4th in ’72 and ‘73 in Spain and Belgium, respectively. That ’73 season was his last in F1, with five outings in Brabhams. * At Balocco, 1976. Courtesy Ettore Colombo

While de Adamich was circulating on-track in F1, Ecclestone was also getting around the Grand Prix scene, keen to find new opportunities. Coming to his attention was the situation at Motor Racing Developments (Brabham), where things were unsettled after Jack Brabham’s retirement in ’70 and sale of his 50% of the business to co-owner, Ron Tauranac. Bernie had been acquainted with Tauranac in his time as Rindt’s manager when he was a Brabham driver in ’68, and would have been aware that although Ron had worked well with Jack, his heart had not been in the purchase of Jack’s shares since he saw himself as an engineer, not a corporate proprietor. Whatever was said in public to preserve a good perception of MRD’s prospects and commercial viability, de Adamich was quietly able to clue Ecclestone in further to what was actually going on. De Adamich himself liked the idea of Ecclestone getting involved at MRD and encouraged Bernie to make an offer to buy Tauranac out. In fact, there already was momentum towards that - perhaps initially at the Monaco Grand Prix, Tauranac had sounded Bernie out on the notion. It has been reported that Ecclestone offered £130,000 and this was acceptable to Tauranac. However, in October ’71, with Ron settled in his mind to move on, Ecclestone played a ‘gozunder’ on the point of signing the contract, reducing the ’price’ to £100,000. Bernie, being Bernie, deployed his ‘charm,’ with the result that Ron apparently took it on the chin and considered their friendship would be ongoing.

’72 was a difficult year for the ‘new’ MRD. The Ford Cosworth V8 DFV-engined BT33, BT34 and BT37 cars scored a mere 7 points in the International Cup for F1 Manufacturers, good enough only for a season finish in joint 9th, (last) place. Ecclestone formed the view that his team would not be able to achieve a rapid improvement in competitiveness as long as it continued to use the near-ubiquitous Cosworth DFV engine. The Ford-badged V8 at that point was typically delivering 450 bhp. He believed that the team needed a 500-plus bhp engine in a V12 configuration. The two 12 cylinders already disputing the championship were Ferrari’s Tipo 001 flat 12, giving 480 bhp and BRM’s P142 V12, rated at 440 bhp. But just beyond the realm of Formula One, another 3 litre V12 racing engine was under development – down in a quiet seaside location in Sussex. This was Harry Weslake’s Weslake Engineering works, within which a new power unit was being made for Ford/John Wyer Automotive/Gulf Racing for endurance sportscar applications. Pursuing his desire for a 500 bhp engine, when Ecclestone heard about the Weslake, he was keen to give it a try. So Brabham’s designer, Gordon Murray, was pressed into a project to modify a F2 BT38 to accommodate the engine, creating a ‘BT39,’ and Graham Hill was cajoled into driving it in a test at Silverstone. While this did not have an immediately positive outcome, the very fact that he’d seen something other than a DFV in a Brabham encouraged Ecclestone to step up his quest to find an engine that would fill the bill.

Brabham BT39-Ford Weslake V12  Courtesy OldRacingCars.com

Next stop on the search was at Weissach where Porsche could show Ecclestone a race calibre V12 yet to be assigned to a specific application. Gordon Murray recalls, ‘ . . . Porsche said, “Right, this is how much we are going to charge you for the engines,” and Bernie said, “No, no, no, no. You give us the engines and we will make them win.” Porsche said no. So that was the end of that.’

 

Ecclestone had presided over a season in which there was little success on the track but still cost him £80,000. So his focus much of the time had to be on finding sponsorship. There were talks with Aleardo Buzzi and John Hogan representing, Philip Morris. Ecclestone had become aware that the cigarette manufacturer was keen to switch its Marlboro brand sponsorship from BRM after the ’73 season. Talks seemed to be going well and the acquisition of a substantial budget was anticipated. But however good had been Ecclestone’s portrayal of the benefits Philip Morris would enjoy from the Brabham cars being seen in Marlboro livery, those same cars had received only modest levels of public attention given their absence from the head of the F1 field – the team had finished 4th in the Manufacturer’s Standings, with just two 3rd place finishes as best individual race results. With over double the number of Championship points and 3 Grands Prix victories, McLaren was able to present a good case to Buzzi and Hogan. Thus, to Bernie’s dismay, he learned that the Marlboro logo would be seen on the M23s, not his BT42s/43s in ’74.

Mostly, Carlos Reutemann and Carlos Pace were the drivers who carried Ecclestone’s hopes through the ‘74 season, though John Watson, Richard Robarts, Rikky von Opel, Wilson Fittipaldi, Gérard Larrousse, Teddy Pilette and Lella Lombardi all also had outings in F1 Brabhams. The MRD-entered cars ran in white, with little in the way of sponsorship decals, but the prospects for that shortcoming being rectified the following season were greatly boosted by Reutemann’s three Grand Prix victories, in South Africa, Austria and the U.S. – and the Watkins Glen outcome was further illustrious as Carlos Pace delivered on the promise he had been showing by making it a Brabham 1-2. Ecclestone’s morale was much boosted by that result, and his confidence was buoyed as he sought to capitalise on it by pitching for sponsorship from the Italian drinks manufacturer, Martini & Rossi. The company had based much of its marketing activity on brand exposure in motorsport since the early 60s when it began by establishing a ’Martini & Rossi Racing Team’ and helping fund the running of Alfa Romeos in sportscar racing. A higher profile development came in ’68 with a change of name to ‘Martini Racing’ and intended participation in both the sportscar and Formula 1 World Championships. It was soon closely associated with Porsche, leading to a Le Mans victory in ’71, while the team made a start in F1 with the Tecno cars of the Pederzani brothers. This venture had stemmed from the activities of Martini Racing’s advisor, David Yorke. Yorke had made his name and good reputation by his roles at Aston Martin and subsequently at JW Automotive Racing, with high achievements as team manager, including victory at Le Mans in ’68 and ’69 and with the Gulf 917s in ‘70/’71. Amongst his friends in the motorsport sphere was one Bernie Ecclestone. Unsurprisingly, in ’71, aware of Bernie’s interest in getting involved at MRD, Yorke had lobbied Martini to put its name on the Brabham cars. But, unexpectedly, the sponsorship deal was awarded to Tecno. Given that it was soon obvious that Formula 1 was something of a stretch for the Tecno cars and organisation, it is not surprising that Yorke was quick to recommend that the arrangement was terminated and funding transferred to MRD. It took time, though and it was not until the latter part of ’74 that Martini committed to a Brabham budget for the following season.

All this had, with full justification, been commanding Bernie’s attention, as incremental income was vital if there was to be any ongoing improvement in on-track competitiveness. But that objective was also affected of course by what the other teams were up to. And foremost amongst these, Ferrari’s situation would have regularly been figuring in Ecclestone’s thoughts. SpA Società Esercizio Fabbriche Automobili e Corse (SEFAC) had experienced a saga of difficulties with its flat 12 engine since its introduction for the ’70 season. However, ’74 had seen a significant improvement in the unit’s fulfilment of its power potential and reliability. Between them, drivers Nikki Lauda and Clay Regazzoni took three Grands Prix wins and eight podiums (2nd/3rd), earning the team second place in the Constructors’ Championship. There was a good deal of speculation that ’75 would see SEFAC go one place better. So, Ecclestone’s thoughts turned once again to the desirability of a 12 cylinder engine for his Brabham chassis.

 

If Ferrari was on the brink of a resurgence in Formula 1, its spiritual parent, Alfa Romeo, was continuing to see its glory years of ’50 and ’51 fade further into history. Within the company’s management, a division was growing between those who longed to repeat the two consecutive World Championships with the Alfettas, and others– typically younger, less time-served – who were uncomfortable with any ideas of renewed Grand Prix contention. The latter view stemmed from politically-based sentiment that as a ‘state-owned,’ (via the IRI holding company), enterprise, it should not be seen by the public as a lavish spender on a non-essential sporting activity. Surely, some reasoned, it was bad enough that large sums had been used through the subsidiary Autodelta business to develop and race the Tipo 33 prototypes – all without much success since its launch in ’67. But Autodelta boss, Carlo Chiti, was protected to some extent from the political manoeuvres as the premises were a few miles ‘off-site’ at Settimo Milanese. There, in the specialised milieu he had created, Chiti was able to operate with considerable freedom allowing him the scope to contemplate and plan for an Alfa Romeo F1 future. As he did so, he shared his aspirations with team members and associates, one of whom was Andrea de Adamich. In turn, de Adamich was keen to keep Bernie informed about developments and so, when Chiti began to talk about the possibility of modifying the 33’s Tipo 115-12 3.0 litre flat 12 engine for Formula 1 utilisation, Bernie was soon aware. The unit had been introduced in ’73 and powered the 33 to the World Championship two years later, albeit in a field of meagre competitors. For endurance racing, the engine was set up to produce 470-500 bhp. As would be proven for the ’77 sportscar season, a further 20 bhp was feasible and with such an output, a Formula 1 competitive advantage could be achieved, except . . . these levels of horsepower were generated at the cost of a relatively a heavy (178 Kg) engine and one that consumed fuel at a furious rate. However, that didn’t stop de Adamich extolling its virtues and reiterating Chiti’s confidence that with a range of modifications, such characteristics could be addressed and a Grand Prix-winning motor created.

Alfa Romeo Tipo 115-12 engine at the Nurburgring 1000 Kms, 73  Courtesy Rainer Schlegelmilch

So, early in ’75, Ecclestone was in talks with Chiti, and, buoyed by what de Adamich had told him regarding the technical considerations, was more concerned about costs rather than technicalities.  The last thing Bernie wanted to contemplate at that time was how much he would have to pay on an ongoing basis for supply of the engines.  And yet there was an answer he would like, stemming from a shift in the relative strengths of the pro/anti positions within the top management team at Arese disputing the future form of Alfa Romeo’s motorsport involvement.  Appointed to the role in the early Sixties, Giuseppe Luraghi proved to be a great strategic thinking President of the company.  One of his strongest traits was to be in favour of sporting activity both to preserve Alfa Romeo’s reputation for innovation and engineering excellence and to support the marketing of its road car production models.  But, by the early Seventies, his outlook was vigorously contested by some of his management colleagues – notably, his eventual successor, Ettore Massacesi - and the IRI, their aim being to see a significant cutting of costs.  As his period of being in charge drew towards its conclusion, he was perhaps keen to reinforce a future corporate pro-motorsport outlook.  Thus, an ambition to see Alfa Romeos once again battling for F1 World Championship points figured in the forward planning activities conducted in the Arese offices.  In broad terms, the aspiration was for there to be an Alfa Romeo Grand Prix car by the end of the decade.  In order to contain costs and streamline the development process, it was decided that an initial step should be the supply of engines to an existing competitor so that the optimisation of specification, installation issues and establishment of reliability could be achieved other than at Alfa Romeo’s expense.  Thus, it would be worthwhile for the engines to be supplied on a free of charge basis.

Consequently, to his (well concealed) surprise, when Ecclestone put it to Chiti that he’d be prepared to give the flat 12 a go in his race-winning Brabhams, but only if they didn’t cost him anything, Carlo, with a show of reluctance and of being indignant, agreed.  The negotiations had been taxing, but there was then no scope for Chiti to relax – he needed to implement a number of changes to the engine, whilst at the same time managing the further development process for the Tipo 33 application, which included the small matter of a twin turbo variant for the ’77 season.  For the Formula 1 version, there was the need for generalised weight saving, a reduction – from seven to four - in the number of main bearings, bigger valves and a raised compression ratio.  Meanwhile, back in England, Gordon Murray began designing the first Alfa-powered Brabham.  And on the commercial front, there was development too – perhaps partially stemming from the added Italian element in terms of the Brabhams’ new engine maker, Martini & Rossi, which had committed to another year as the main MRD sponsor and with it, an increased budget at that.

The Tipo 115-12 engine in F1 form.  Courtesy Ian Gordon Murray/Philip Porter

Murray’s BT 45 went from drawing board to track with considerable rapidity.  The prototype was shipped to Italy in early October ’75 and was run at Balocco at a press launch.  It was then returned to England and subjected to testing at Silverstone.  It was to some extent an evolution of the BT 44B mechanically – suspension and radiator location, for instance – but the chassis was markedly different since it had to accommodate the sheer size – especially the width – of the engine, the much larger necessary fuel capacity and the fact that the flat 12 could not be used as an integral part of the chassis, as was the case with the DFV.  This latter point, required the rearward extension from the tub of two outriggers for support, either side, of the engine crankcase, and was just one of several chassis features which added to its weight.  Indeed, the car weighed in at 620-630 Kg, whereas the 44 was said to be in the range 550-610 Kg.  And Murray expressed his particular dismay at having to incorporate no less than 4 dispersed fuel tanks to cope with the 215 litres likely to be burnt over the course of a Grand Prix!  This requirement precluded Murray from drawing a ‘triangular’ section body/chassis, which had become his signature style since the BT 42.  Adding to his concern about the engine, Murray has recalled that, ‘It had Italian fuel injection, too, which was quite crude and broke down a lot.’  But the BT 45 still looked good in its white paint finish and Martini Racing livery.

Complex fuel system required for four tanks.  Courtesy Ian Gordon Murray/Philip Porter

Brabham, along with the other eleven crack teams running the DFV, had enjoyed not only its performance characteristics, but also the quality and consistency of its engineering. Murray did not find quite the same qualities in the freight he was now receiving from Settimo Milanese: ‘One of the massive problems I had with the 45 series of cars is that when Alfa first gave us the drawings for the engine, I obviously designed the car for that. With the DFV you had a tight tolerance on the engine mountings. Every engine arrived and just slotted on the back. Rip one out, put another on. We were testing down at Balocco with the 45 and the engine blew up, which happened quite a lot. We got the next engine out and the difference on the mountings was millimetres so it just wouldn’t fit. So for the 45s generally, I had to design cams and eccentrics, and packers and spacers on all the engine mountings so that every time we changed the engine, you could adjust the car to fit the engine, which I never had to do before. So during this time there were all these sort of ‘Italian problems,’ if you like.’ Frustrating as these sort of issues were, the even more fundamental issue of the engine’s weight was beyond any one type of countermeasure. It was equipped with a titanium exhaust system, which was marginally helpful, but at the same time introduced a further negative factor in reliability terms as the material proved repeatedly liable to cracking. But the biggest concern at the outset was the inadequate specification of the lubrication system. There had not been a particular difficulty in this respect with the engine as deployed in the Tipo 33s, but with much less room in and around the body of the Formula 1 car, accommodating a generous quantity of oil – and such that its weight did not cause balance problems – was a yet another challenge for Murray. Against the 30 litres of oil which could be comfortably carried in a Tipo 33, the BT 45’s capability was a mere 8 litres. Even at the very first on-track test of the BT 45 at Silverstone, there was concern for a potential engine failure stemming from intermittent oil starvation because of surging, with related loss of pressure. There was evidently a scavenging weakness despite Chiti’s apparent care in designing the lubrication system, incorporating two cylinder head scavenge pumps and three front mounted, gear principle main oil pumps, drawing from six mesh protected drain points.

Brabham BT45  Courtesy Centro Documentazione Alfa Romeo

The problems were especially disappointing, as it might have been expected that with the original engine specification being biased towards the endurance form of racing, reliability would be assured even if there was work to do to extract the level of power that was essential for the short form event that constitutes a Grand Prix. But, this too provoked further diffidence as Reutemann’s feedback during the initial Silverstone test was to the effect that drivability was poor with power not delivered in a manageable, linear manner – urge was lacking at lower/medium engine speeds until as the rev limit was approached, the full surge of grunt was abruptly transmitted to the wheels. Possibly, Reutemann had a prejudice against the engine. I say this because, with the compression ratio further upped to 11:1 the output peak was in the order of 520 bhp@12000 rpm, with at least 400 bhp available from 9000 rpm.

BT45 First Test at Silverstone, October ’75  Courtesy David Phipps

The BT45-Alfa’s best result in the ’76 season was Pace’s 3rd at the French Grand Prix in July at Paul Ricard.  He also managed a 4th place finish, at the Nurburgring in August, Reutemann achieving the same placing in Spain in May.  Pace finished 14th in the Championship, Reutemann, 16th.  Brabham was placed 9th in the International Cup for F1 Manufacturers.  There were seven engine/engine-related DNF failures over the sixteen Grands Prix.

’76 BT45 engine installation in Carlos Pace’s car

For ’77 Murray designed a B specification version of the BT 45. However, this would not be ready until March for the 3rd race of the season at Kyalami. In the meantime, Pace qualified and raced to 2nd place at the opening event in Buenos Aires. Further optimism broke out at Brabham when John Watson took the new ‘B’ to 3rd place at the non-Championship Race of Champions at Brands Hatch. He went one better at July’s French Grand Prix, finishing a close second to Mario Andretti in his season-dominating Lotus 78 after leading all but the race’s final lap. Otherwise, the only other really notable results were a pair of 3rd places in Germany and Austria with Hans Stuck at the wheel. Much more had been expected, especially because the engine’s weight (175 Kg) had been reduced while the power output was increased – to 525 bhp – as a result of winter development work, at Autodelta, including the adoption of Lucas fuel injection.

Carlo Chiti beside a BT45B.  Gordon Murray is just visible in the top right.  Courtesy Ian Gordon Murray/Philip Porter

The performance of the Lotus, with four victories in ’77, was salutary and signalled the death knell of the Tipo 115-12.  Chapman’s latest machine pioneered the ground effects concept which was to revolutionise F1 design and soon become an essential characteristic if a car was to be at all competitive.  In simple terms, the high downforce feature was created by careful management/acceleration of airflow around, over/under and through the chassis/body, largely through enclosed longitudinal tunnels.  To provide for these within the relatively narrow chassis of a single seater racing car, it was necessary for the engine in turn to be as narrow as possible.  While the dimensions of the Cosworth V8 (680 mm) fitted the bill, the markedly substantial width of the Tipo 115-12 (1000 mm) certainly did not.  The engine’s width was considerably conditioned by its relatively long stroke of 53.6 mm, compounded by the use of cam followers which stood proud above the valve springs.  Furthermore, since the widest part of a flat engine, (measured laterally from cam cover to cam cover), is lower than as found on V configuration unit, accommodation compromises are inevitable with any chassis elements low in the structure and located along its outer edges – exactly where the ground effects-vital venturi tunnels need to run.

Murray, however, was not yet ready in ’77 to revise his design ‘philosophy’ to embrace Lotus-style ground effects principles.  He was nevertheless continuing to feel hamstrung by the Alfa engine’s dimensions, weight and fuel consumption.  These factors were denying the team the competitiveness they might have expected given 525 bhp on tap.  There wasn’t really anything he could do about the engine’s size, but he could chase Chiti vigorously for modifications which would improve fuel efficiency and there had to be scope for weight saving.  And now Murray’s creativity and lateral thinking came to the fore.  He determined  to circumvent the problems that had prevented him from drawing a ‘triangular,’ inherently weight-reducing, chassis, partly by eschewing the use of (bulky) conventional heat-exchanging units – radiators – and using the exposed body surfaces to fulfil this function.  This was achieved primarily by integrating four heat exchanging panels – two for coolant, two for oil – into the chassis, such that their outer surfaces, which were partially finned - ran in the ambient air flow.  This system – along with several innovations around the car’s instrumentation and on-board self-height adjustment mechanism – made the BT46 intriguingly distinctive in comparison with the other new-for-’78 cars.

Brabham BT46

But . . . even in the ambient temperatures encountered in winter testing at Silverstone, the BT46’s coolant got far too hot, albeit the oil cooling was adequate. There was no immediate fundamental solution and so the start of the ’78 season saw Brabham fielding a further revised BT45 – with ‘C’ designation – at the Argentine Grand Prix in mid-January. This was Nikki Lauda’s debut with the team and he marked it very well by finishing 2nd to Mario Andretti’s Lotus.

The BT46 had been considerably reworked while the 45C was filling in at the South American races. It appeared for its first race at Kyalami in March, equipped with conventional front coolant radiators. They were working well enough during practice and Lauda beat Andretti to the pole. He ran strongly in the race and looked assured of at least a podium finish, but the engine blew up after 52 laps. While both Lauda and Watson were able to run very competitively at the early season’s venues, rumour had it that the new Lotus 79 would have a huge effect on the comparative performance status of the entire field. If other teams/designers were overwhelmed by the quantum leap that the Lotus seemed likely to represent, Murray reacted by once again getting daring and innovative. His response was not to try and replicate the chassis/body concepts Lotus was known to be finalising, but to revive/refine the means by which the Can-Am Chaparral 2J had glued itself to the track . . . a gearbox-driven fan was mounted vertically to the rear of the BT46B, its purpose being to create a low pressure area underneath the chassis. The coolant radiator was relocated to a mounting above the engine – this was of particular importance as its positioning would enable Murray to assert that the fan’s main purpose was not for aerodynamic effect, but to boost the heat exchanging properties of the radiator. Whatever the realities of this contention, ‘tuning’ the system to optimise the degree of ‘vacuum’ generated beneath car’s floor was problematic and precluded a presentation of the BT46B at the Monaco race in early May. At the following Grand Prix in Belgium, the 79, employing optimal ground effects capability, won its first race with ease and seemed a shoe-in to be nominated as the season’s class of the field machine. But the Brabham was race-ready the following month and care was taken by Murray in talking about it to emphasise that for the most part the fan was a cooling device. However one wants to evaluate that notion, the simple fact is that the BT46B’s cornering performance was such that at the Swedish Grand Prix on 17th June, Lauda was able to defeat Andretti. With the other teams miffed that they had not thought of an effective answer to the Lotus 79, there was much controversy and Ecclestone dodged a protracted political wrangle by deciding not to enter the car for any more of the season’s Grands Prix.

Brabham BT46B – the ‘Fan Car’

The ’78 season concluded with Lauda fourth in the Championship thanks to the win in Sweden and another in Italy, and five other podium finishes.  Watson was sixth, having stood on the podium three times.  The team ranked third in the International Cup for F1 Constrictors.  So, a strong showing, much improved on the previous season.  The BT46 had been fast and dependable, with and without the fan.  The Tipo 115-12, too, had proven very competitive and relatively reliable, just seven DNFs being caused by engine failure.  Nonetheless, in looking ahead to ’79, Murray was convinced that ‘proper’ ground effects would be absolutely essential for any car seeking to compete with the Lotus.  And, by then, he was equally sure that this would not be feasible if his next design was powered by the cumbersome Alfa flat 12.  He said as much to Chiti, whose unexpected immediate response of ‘Hai ragione,’ would have been based on his own conclusion as soon as he saw Chapman’s Type 79.  That Chiti’s view coincided with Murray’s was confirmed by the speed at which he then set to work, resulting in a new F1 engine, this time in 60° V12 format, being presented before the end of the year.  Designated Tipo 1260, though not more powerful than the Tipo 115-12, it was able to be used as a stressed chassis component, simplifying Murray’s task in creating a new car.  Thus, the result – BT 48 – was complete and ready to run by mid-December ’78.  And at that point, a flat 12-engined Brabham decidedly became a thing of the past!

The Nearly Alfa - Part 1

The Alfa Romeo 183T was a ‘nearly car.’  As demonstrated at Spa in 1983, it was good enough to win Grands Prix.  Though it was – as are all racing cars – far from perfect, that its results fell below its potential was more to do with how it was operated rather than in its design/specification.  Key factors that undermined its results included a short window of opportunity.  Crucially, the following season’s limitation on permitted fuel use per race militated against the engine’s inherent consumption characteristics.  Additionally, two races were lost for lead driver, Andrea de Cesaris, because of technical regulations disqualifications.  And  performance was hampered early in the season because of inconsistent availability of the specific turbochargers suited to the Autodelta-developed V8 engine.  And, throughout ’82 and ’83, conflicting political considerations conspired to make it quite an achievement by Autodelta and Euroracing that the car displayed any measure of competitiveness and was present at all 15 Grands Prix.  In explaining the background, the development of the car and how it performed on-track, I need firstly to outline Alfa Romeo’s return to the Formula One scene long after winning the first two World Championships in ‘50/’51. 

Two decades on from its withdrawal from Grand Prix racing, the marque was dabbling as an engines supplier.  Initially this came about through Luciano Bianchi’s interest in fitting a Tipo 33 sport prototype 2.5 litre 105.80 engine to a Cooper F1 chassis.  This project stalled and the engine, in 3.0 litre form, emerged in its primary role as the motive power for the new Tipo 33/3 in February ‘69.  That season saw the return of Andrea De Adamich to the Settimo Milanese-based Autodelta Tipo 33 team after a spell with Ferrari.  Alongside, he had signed to drive in Formula 1 with the McLaren team.  Discussion between Autodelta chief, Carlo Chiti, and De Adamich resulted in the M7D and M14D versions of McLaren’s ‘70 F1 car carrying the 105.80 engine.  Also driven by Nanni Galli, neither car/driver was able to score any World Championship points.  The following season’s March 711 was engineered to accommodate both the Cosworth DFV, or the Alfa V8.  The Alfa powered version was driven mainly by De Adamich and Nanni Galli, though lead driver, Ronnie Peterson, contested the French Grand Prix in it.  As with the McLaren, results were disappointing and no World Championship points were gained.

McLaren-Alfa M14D - De Adamich, Holland, 1970 (Courtesy R Schlegelmilch)

Subsequent development of the Tipo 33 dictated the need for a 12 cylinder 3.0 litre engine, for which Chiti decided upon a 180° V (‘flat’) format.  Motor Racing Developments’ owner, Bernie Ecclestone, became interested in the engine for the team’s F1 Brabham cars.  Brabham designer, Gordon Murray, has said he believes that in a deal struck in ‘74 Ecclestone secured a supply of engines on a free of charge basis.  Unveiled in October ‘75, the BT45 was the first Brabham to be powered by the Tipo 115.12 unit.  Results were not encouraging, the size/weight of the engine and its prolific consumption of fuel proving challenging.  The BT46 was more competitive, thanks to some extent by developments which reduced the consumption.  The ‘78 BT46B was the fabled ‘Fan Car,’ which was victorious in Niki Lauda’s hands on its one and only Grand Prix outing in Sweden.  But the Lotus 78 and 79 changed the game entirely, ushering in the ground effects era.  The chassis architecture required for this – especially in terms of the floor underside and sidepod forms – made a wide engine block undesirable, so Murray prevailed upon Chiti to build a new 60° V12 power unit for the ‘79 season.  Chiti obliged, and the V12 BT48 debuted at the Argentine Grand Prix in January ‘79.  Murray felt that the inconsistency of the new engine’s specification – especially heads/camshafts – and its build quality, was worse than he had seen with the flat 12.  He became increasingly unhappy with the partnership, culminating in a switch to Cosworth DFV power for the final two World Championship rounds.

Brabham BT48, 1979. (Carlo Chiti is standing on the right)

While the Brabham team was wrestling with the BT45, Alfa Romeo President, Ettore Massacesi, gave the go-ahead for the creation of an all-Alfa F1 car.  This was announced to the public early in ‘78 and the first prototype was under testing by the summer.  After a long period in which there had been considerable resistance to such an idea within Arese and at Finmeccanica, (the state-created financial entity which ‘owned’ Alfa Romeo), once a running car could be observed, a wave of exaggerated enthusiasm took over, and an increasing number of internal advocates became besotted with the idea that the car could be debuted at that year’s Italian Grand Prix.  But this plan was scuttled in the wake of a test at the Paul Ricard circuit by Lauda in August.  His opinion was that the car was nowhere near ready for competition and an attempt to race it at Monza would probably result in embarrassment for the team and the corporate management.  So, for the remainder of ‘78, the 177 ran only in test sessions, with the driving shared by Bruno Giacomelli and Vittorio Brambilla.  Not until the following May was it deemed worthy of a race entry – to the Belgian Grand Prix at Zolder.  Giacomelli’s reasonable qualifying performance and race pace prior to a collision-prompted retirement provided encouragement.  The results of further outings were however relatively disappointing, though no surprise to the Autodelta team -  for, as soon as it was operating in the F1 race environment, the team had seen that an updated car with the new V12 engine was required as a matter of urgency.  Chiti - at this time assisted by Robert Choulet - was good at producing new designs and building prototypes within exceptionally short timescales and he did this again, surprising everyone by fielding the first 179 at September’s Italian Grand Prix at Monza.  Giacomelli qualified the new car 18^th and ran well in the race until retirement after a mistake and off-circuit excursion at Ascari.

177 with Bruno Giacomelli in the car and Vittorio Brambilla on the sidepod

Despite a positive start for the 179 in the latter part of the ‘79 season, the viability of the team was questionable as the new year dawned.  With Alfa Romeo’s lack of profitability, the justification for spending on the F1 programme was frequently and vigorously challenged and Massacesi had to be at his most resilient.  His saving grace arrived however in the form of substantial sponsorship funds from Phillip Morris to promote its Marlboro cigarette brand on the cars.  For ‘80 Giacomelli was partnered with Patrick Depailler, Brambilla fulfilling a testing role.  There were good showings at Argentina and Long Beach and at Watkins Glen where Giacomelli was on pole and led the race, but the season was marred by the loss of Depailler, killed while testing at Hockenheim.  For the following season Giacomelli was joined by Mario Andretti, who took 4^th place at Long Beach.  Though the team had a better car in the 179C and D versions, benefitting from input from Gerard Ducarouge, who had joined from Ligier, the only other highlights were Giacomelli’s 4^th and 3^rd at Montreal and Las Vegas, respectively.  1982 saw Andrea de Cesaris replacing Andretti and quickly proving his potential with pole and a spell leading at Long Beach.  Ducarouge’s value was fully confirmed by the superiority of his new car, the 182, in comparison with the 179.  He was assisted in the design of the 182 by Mario Tollentino.  The 177/179/182 era can be summed up as follows: Starts: 99; Wins 0; Podiums 3; Poles: 2; World Championship points – ’79 = 0; ’80 = 4; ’81 = 10; ’82 = 7.

Andrea de Cesaris in the 182 at Monaco, 1982 - classified 3rd 

In July ‘79, While Bruno Giacomelli was struggling to get the 177 round to a 17^th place finish at Dijon, Jean-Pierre Jabouille was taking the chequered flag and celebrating the first Grand Prix victory for a turbocharged car.  His Renault RS10 was a development of the RS01.  That car, pioneering the use of a 1.5 litre turbocharged engine in place of the 3 litre, normally aspirated type, had been first entered to a Grand Prix just two seasons previously.  Thus, another new era was ushered in – the 1.5 litre/turbocharged format would hold sway in the sport’s pinnacle category for the next nine seasons.  Chiti was not slow in recognising the significance of the Renault innovation and began work on a forced induction engine as ‘79 drew to a close.  Given that Jabouille and teammate Rene Arnoux had claimed pole in four of the seven remaining rounds of the ’79 championship, it was no surprise that Chiti was on the task with some urgency, but few would have expected that he’d chose the V8 format.  Many would argue that simplicity of the fundamentals was a key success feature in Formula 1 while forced induction was the source of high power outputs.  This was most obviously demonstrated by the BMW 4 cylinder M12/13, based on the stock M10 which had powered the 2002.  According to some claims, this engine was capable in qualifying tune of generating over 1,200 bhp, enough to power Nelson Piquet’s Brabham BT52 to World Championship victory in ‘83.  Its performance in ‘84 enabled him to record the pole lap at nine of the season’s Grands Prix.  That said, the most obvious configuration for the formula was a V6.  This is what Renault had decided upon for its pioneering EF1 engine.  And it was the layout that featured in the turbocharged engines that were then developed by Ferrari, Honda, Porsche (TAG), Cosworth and Motori-Moderni.  Other than Alfa Romeo and BMW, only Hart tried something different, with its in-line 4.  Considerations of the size and weight of a V6 were seen as highly favourable by designers, especially in regard to packaging within the chassis of the power unit and transmission/ancillaries.
 
Ever since the recognition of the importance of aerodynamics and the exploitation of ground effects and the consequent greater difficulty in close-following/overtaking in Formula 1, designers had been obliged to look for ways in which marginal performance advantages relevant to specific aspects of driveability - aside from out-and-out power – could be created.  A very notable example is the capability of a car to pick up engine and road speed as it exits a slow speed corner.  This became a particular focus of attention given that turbo lag was a negative feature of the cohort of new engines appearing in Formula 1.  Whilst this would be addressed successfully over time by engine management/software developments – and, ultimately, the use of ERS energy in today’s hybrid powertrains – in the early ‘80s the most realistic approach was to optimise the basic responsiveness of the reciprocating componentry.  This was indeed the determining objective which led to Chiti’s decision to pursue a V8 solution.  Crucially, the smaller mass and weight of the pistons/conrods and various rotating parts would allow them to be accelerated more rapidly than those of a six – or four – cylinder engine.  A notable example of the principle’s value would be seen at the ’83 Belgian Grand Prix – as Nigel Roebuck, in observing the race start and reporting for Autosport magazine, wrote: ‘The Italian V8 gets off the line like no other turbocharged car . . .’  Chiti’s confidence in the value of this characteristic was bolstered by his previous personal experience in designing the ATS and Alfa Romeo Tipo 33 V8s.  Additionally, he believed in the basic principle that, all things being equal, a V8 would always have a better ultimate power potential vis-à-vis that of a V6.  Conventional wisdom would balance that with the generally accepted fact that a V6 would have a fuel consumption advantage, and this would be of notable significance in regard to Chiti’s V8.
 
Anyone believing that on a quasi-DNA basis a marque can tend to repetitively manufacture products with distinctive engineering characteristics – good or bad – might well cite the fuel consumption deficiency of Alfa Romeo racing engines as a classic example.  In the late stages of the 158/159 models’ working life, the one thing that might have derailed their run of success was the raging thirst of the supercharged 8 cylinder engine.  Despite needing a gallon of Shell Dynamin for every 1–2 miles covered, the 158 and 159 in ‘50 and ‘51 respectively managed to win 10 of the 15 Grands Prix and the Championship for both seasons.  Not bad, considering that because of the volume of fuel needing to be carried/used, the design and weight of the cars were compromised and significant time was lost on-track for ‘extra’ refuelling stops.  Another example of this weakness was seen in the flat 12 initially developed for the Tipo 33 TT12 and, as recounted above, subsequently deployed in the late ‘70s Brabham F1 cars.  Gordon Murray lamented that whilst the Cosworth-powered cars needed 40 gallon tanks and would do a Grand Prix on 36-37 gallons, a 45 gallon tank was required for the Alfa engine. So when early test running of Chiti’s V8 for the ‘80s - designated ‘890’ – showed that its fuel efficiency would not be a strong point, this was not a dramatic surprise.  Indeed, Chiti himself, in stating that a turbocharged engine of this type/size could be expected to consume 11% more fuel than a normally aspirated unit, was apparently content with the situation, given that in a further comparison of the two engine types, the forced induction example would deliver 16% more power.  His confidence was also probably buoyed by the notion that a post-launch water injection development programme might well be able to achieve efficiency gains of real substance as had been seen with such a project carried out at Autodelta on the GTA touring car in the late ‘60s.  Nevertheless, a major influencing factor in the design of the 183T was the need for it to accommodate a 250 litres (55 gallon) fuel tank.

Alfa Romeo 890 engine

The questions of power unit configuration and fuel consumption were engineering-centred matters, largely within the control of Carlo Chiti.  There was one further factor which very significantly affected the initial development of the engine and its potential competitiveness in its first season of racing.  This was the sourcing and the specification of the turbochargers, and this issue had as much to do with politics as it did with engineering.  The engineering aspect was well covered – Autodelta had recently developed a single turbocharger version of the Alfetta GTV 2000 and built 400 for Group 4 homologation purposes.  In line with the then current norm, Chiti had opted for Kulne Kopp Kausch (KKK) turbochargers manufactured in Frankenthal, near Mannheim, Germany.  So it was unremarkable that Chiti’s new V8 wore KKKs as testing got underway.  But, whereas the Alfetta GTV 2000 Turbodelta project had been of some interest throughout the motor sport industry/community, Formula 1 represented a very much higher profile/general newsworthiness activity.  Consequently, intervention from far above Chiti’s head was soon being visited on the team at work in Settimo Milanese.

Part 2 will cover the development phase with the interim 182T, design/technical details of the 183T and its initial development and pre-season testing, followed by a race-by-race account of the car's further development and performances through the 1983 F1 season. 

l'Alfa Vince!

When I was visiting the Alfa Romeo headquarters at Arese in the early eighties, meetings were often disrupted by the noise and general disruption caused by workforce demonstrations which spilled out of the factory premises and into the office complex.  At that time, the place was a hotbed of political strife.  Often, I found myself lamenting the fact that considerable energy could be found for such activities, while apathy and a lack of dedication underlay so much of the poor quality that characterised the products these same people were helping stagger along the production lines.  But this was nothing new – Alfa Romeo had long been ‘state owned’ and able to function aloof from the commercial/economic principles that ensure that most companies manage their employees such that good order is maintained and a profitable operation enabled.

Fig.1. Political daubs on the Autodelta yard walls. Courtesy Robert Little

In the wake of WWI, Italy could not escape the Europe-wide economic crisis that saw crippling currency devaluations and raging inflation.  Things came to a head for Alfa Romeo in 1921 when its majority shareholder, Banco Nazionale di Sconto, collapsed.  It was however saved by absorption into a state institution, ‘IRI,’ which had been created by the Italian government.  Under this ‘ownership’ Alfa Romeo prospered through the twenties, thirties and forties, achieving success both in commercial car-building and motor sport terms .  However, in 1948, a new – though still basically state-governed – regime was introduced, leaving the company under direction from an organisation named Finmeccanica.  Resentment by the Alfa Romeo management of this arrangement ebbed and flowed over time, the main point of contention being Finmeccanica’s ability to interfere with production and the models programme strategies.  Almost as unwelcome was intrusion into the selection/appointment of senior leadership personnel.  Notwithstanding this latter point, the appointment of Giuseppe Luraghi as Alfa Romeo’s CEO in December 1960 was positive in that he championed the development of the Giulia models and the return to motor sport participation, including the establishment of Autodelta.  Also, he oversaw the move from Portello to Arese and the planning for the Alfasud project.  But within Finmeccanica and the government’s Economic Planning function, an arch economically conservative/anti-motor sport culture was maintained.  Consequently, as the seventies got underway, Luraghi was put under considerable pressure.  He was urged to abandon a plan to upgrade the Arese factory, to stop spending on motor sport and to abolish Autodelta.  The political climate featured a strong hard left element whereby the northern industrial area was represented as being a centre of capitalist greed which prospered at the expense of other regions – especially the South.  To address this, a plan was promoted to move a large proportion of vehicle production from Arese to a new site in Avellino, not so far from the new Alfasud plant at Pomigliano d'Arco.  All of this left Carlo Chiti, Autodelta itself, and the 33 programme in a notably insecure situation.

 

However, on-track, things were to prove a little more favourable for the team. The 12 cylinder 33 would start the 1974 World Championship quest with a 1-2-3 at Monza, though the rest of the season would be dominated by Matra.  Autodelta responded early on by deciding to dedicate most of the season to development of the car for an all-out championship onslaught in 1975, all the more attractive since there would be little Group 5 competition, (Matra having withdrawn), and  Porsche being focused on the GT category. 

Fig.2. T-33/TT/12 of Merzario/Andretti winning 1974 Monza 1000 kms. Courtesy Luciano Pasonni

Late 1971 had seen the introduction of the T-33/TT/3.  The TT designation stemmed from the chassis being constructed as a ‘'Telaio Tubolare,’ a development away from the monocoque format T-33/3 which had begun testing in winter 1968-69.  In parallel, Chiti designed and began the building of a new 3 litre 180° V12, intended for both sportscar and Formula 1 use.  To carry this engine, a tubular chassis based on the T-33/TT/3’s was built, and the resulting car began testing as 1973 dawned.  It should have been sooner, but various delays were experienced, much of the trouble being attributable to the political milieu and Luraghi’s and Autodelta’s consequent uncertain situation.

Fig.3. T-33/TT/3 #010. Courtesy Supercar Nostalgia/William I’Anson Ltd

Fig.4. 33 3.0 180° V12 engine. Courtesy of Robert Little

‘Uncertainty’ soon gave way to deterioration.  Chiti had enjoyed considerable autonomy in Luraghi’s regime.  He believed that a free rein was essential to him if he was to design/develop engines and chassis which he considered were beyond the understanding of administrators, finance people and even the production car engineers.  But as the Spring arrived and testing opportunities arose, Chiti sensed that his Luraghi-bestowed ‘protection’ was diminishing, while the negative communications originating from Finmeccanica demanding reduced costs/better results grew in frequency and intensity.  Nevertheless, when Chiti was able to stand trackside and just concentrate on how the new car was going, he could feel more sanguine.  Rolf Stommelen was able in March to break the track record at Paul Ricard and the following month the same feat was achieved at Monza in practice for the 1000 kms.  Unaccountably – though ‘officially’ ascribed to problems with parts suppliers – no TT/12s were run in the race.  Eventually, the new car’s race debut occurred at the Targa Florio, the historic race in its final full bloodied iteration.  With Stommelen and de Adamich aboard, the TT/12 was satisfyingly fast, taking a clear lead, and looking certain to be a winner at its first attempt, until . . . de Adamich was hit by a Lancia Fulvia and suffered retirement-enforcing suspension damage.

Fig.5. T-33/TT/12 at Balocco, Facetti at the wheel. Courtesy Alfa Romeo Auto Storico

Despite the signs that the TT/12 could be a really successful car, it was at this point that further pressure was exerted on Luraghi not only in regard to the main production organisation but also in the form of a challenge to the continuance of works motor sport involvement.  This situation seemed to affect the programme of race entries for the remainder of the season – just a single car at Zeltweg and non-entry for Watkins Glen and Kyalami.  But behind the scenes, engine development involving the cylinder heads enabled a useful power increase, proven by on-track performance in early winter testing at Vallelunga in the hands of newly-recruited driver Arturo Merzario.

 

By January 1974, Luraghi had finally had enough and he resigned.  The question of who should replace him as CEO immediately became a matter more conditioned by political bias than by the leadership, technical and commercial qualifications of the candidates.  With disagreement between the Christian Democrat and the Socialist factions unresolved, this important decision was fudged, a temporary incumbent being appointed.  This was Ermanno Guani, considered by many to be simply a puppet under the direction of IRI/Finmeccanica.  (Under Guani, a new Managing Director, Adolfo Bardini was appointed).  But at least there was no sudden termination of the racing programme or severe sanctions applied to Autodelta’s budgets/headcount.  Accordingly, testing for the new season began in February.  At this point there was some optimism resulting from Ferrari’s withdrawal, leaving Matra as the only serious opposition to Alfa Romeo’s quest for a World Championship.  After seeing some encouraging pace from Merzario at Monza, Autodelta sent two TT/12s to France for the Le Mans test in March.  The cars topped the timesheets, with Merzario 4.5 seconds quicker that the third placed, fastest, of the Matra MS670Bs.  Things got even better at the Monza 1000 kms, where the TT/12s were 1-2-3, led home by the car driven by Merzario and Mario Andretti.  Chiti was quoted as saying, ‘This was the greatest victory of my career.’  He was all the more disappointed – and bewildered – by the instruction from Bardini that no cars be sent to the next Championship round, at Spa.  Though participation was allowed for the following race, at the Nurburgring, the Monza magic had somehow been misplaced and only a second place could be achieved, leaving Matra by now well ahead in terms of championship points.  But though a determined effort could perhaps have allowed Alfa Romeo to close the gap and vie for the Championship, its own management decreed the opposite stance by instructing Autodelta to withdraw the Le Mans entries.  Thus, with the French team maintaining good performances and points scores in the remaining races, Matra-Simca finished the season as the champion constructor for the second successive year.  It then promptly announced that it would not contest a 1975 campaign.  At Arese the management was of like mind.  Costs were the dominant consideration and few of the senior figures believed in the positive link between motor sport participation and incremental sales, let alone the intrinsic spiritual value of the activity for a marque renowned for its sporting history.

Fig.6. At Monza prior to the 1-2-3 triumph, April 1974.  Chiti stands next to the car’s right hand side,

 with drivers, Brambilla, de Adamich, Zeccoli, Stommelen and Merzario behind it. Courtesy Alfa Romeo Auto Storico

Except . . . that autumn Guani was displaced by Gaetano Cortesi, an IRI-favoured executive.  As he settled into the CEO role at Alfa Romeo over the winter, signals began to emerge from his office which suggested that at least in 1975 there would be a racing programme for Autodelta to run.  Early in the New Year this became more likely when an agreement was reached with Willi Kauhsen to become involved in running the cars.  Most importantly for Cortesi in supporting his efforts to promote a less costs-obsessed culture in Arese, the German would bring with him a sizeable sponsorship budget which he had secured through associations formed in his previous role as a high profile works driver and entrant of factory-supported Porsches.  His expertise and experience went beyond endurance racing with his involvement in the 917 Can-Am and Interserie campaigns.

Fig.7. Chiti with Gaetano Cortesi. Courtesy Alfa Romeo Auto Storico

On paper the Championship prospects for Alfa Romeo in early 1975 were better than they had been for several years.  With Matra and Ferrari out of the way, the competition was relatively less intimidating.  Alpine Renault and Ligier both intended to run, but with cars less capable than the well-developed 12 cylinder MS670s of the compatriot Matra marque.  True, Porsche also had an updated, turbocharged 908 ready for action, but the 908/3 had performed poorly in 1974 and the new 2142 cc engine did not confer on the car a top speed capability equal to that enjoyed by the TT/12 and Alpine A442.  On the other hand, a substantial development programme enabled Autodelta to improve the TT/12’s chassis – especially the brakes and by the accommodation of wider tyres. And, making use of the Kauhsen sponsorship, the driver team was consolidated, with contracts for Merzario and Derek Bell; further agreements for some events were also made with Jacky Ickx, Jacques Laffite, Jochen Mass,  Mario Andretti, Henri Pescarolo and Nino Vaccarella.  The cars began the campaign with a red livery dominated by the team name initials in a white, huge size font, WKRT, on the front and on the rear wing. 

The promise was looking likely to be fulfilled when Merzario took pole position at the opening Championship round at Mugello.  However, brake problems delayed the car and allowed an Alpine victory, the Alfas finishing 2^nd and 3^rd.  Although that in itself was not a bad outcome, the post race atmosphere was clouded as a result of Merzario and Kauhsen not getting on.  Indeed, Willi’s involvement at this point was not especially positive since Chiti too harboured some resentment, feeling his ultimate authority was being challenged by the German.  Much of the problem stemmed from Kauhsen’s view that Merzario was ‘trouble’ and would not be in the team if he had his way.  But, when the next race – at Dijon – resulted in a morale-boosting Alfa win thanks to a very strong performance by Arturo, harmony began to set in. 

But, as confidence that this would be the Championship year grew at Autodelta, a new competitor emerged – the Gulf GR7 – and immediately proved itself by recording the fastest time in testing for the next round at Monza.  In the race itself, Merzario put in another robust performance, defeating the 908/3 pairing of Reinhold Jost/Mario Casoni and Larrousse/Jabouille’s Alpine; the Mass/Schenken Gulf suffered transmission problems and was classified in a lowly 20^th place.  At Spa, the TT/12s were 1^st and 2^nd, driven by Bell/Pescorolo and Merzario/Ickx, respectively.  Another 1-2 followed at the Coppa Florio, Enna, Merzario/Mass being first across the line this time. The Gelo Racing Team-entered Mirage came back into play at the Nurburgring, running not far behind, but Merzario/Laffite still managed to take the victory from Howden Ganley/Schenken with a margin of 40 seconds.  It was Bell/Pescorolo’s turn to win at Zeltweg, with Merzario/Vittorio Brambilla second.  The season concluded at Watkins Glen with a repeat win for Bell/Pescorolo, Merzario/Andretti in second. 

The success that 1975 proved to be stemmed from several factors.  The involvement of Kauhsen was certainly important, though the value of his sponsorship was more in terms of its existence providing a means of countering the economic hawks within IRI and Alfa Romeo, it being implied that much of the spending burden had been transferred out of house.  Perhaps there were some clever presentations of figures by the pro-racing/Autodelta players since, in reality the WKRT contribution amounted to only 35% of the World Championship budget.  Any illusory enhanced portrayal of the arrangement would no doubt have been supported and facilitated by Gaetano Cortesi.  Indeed, the new Alfa Romeo boss’s favourable disposition did much to ensure that Autodelta, Chiti in particular, enjoyed a period of reduced top-echelon management pressure, enabling it to function better in engineering terms as a developer of the car.  And the developments introduced during the season were largely successful.  As mentioned above, chassis/brakes improvements enhanced the TT/12’s competitiveness, as did an upping of engine power output to 500 bhp, (a 6% increase over the original rating).  Numerous detail changes were made to the bodywork of the T-33/TT/12, helping both airflows to the engine and brakes and the car’s aerodynamic efficiency both in drag reduction and downforce generating terms.  And, although he didn’t quite make a significant mark in Formula One, Arturo Merzario’s contribution to the Alfa Romeo Championship win is perhaps underrated.  Highly respected by hard task master, Carlo Abarth, ‘Little Art’ gained a lot of specific expertise at the beginning of his career in a test driver role at Corso Marche.  At Autodelta he remained always ready to put in test mileage and was able to give good, constructive feedback which was a positively enabling factor in the development process.  This attribute was probably as important for the success of the campaign as his four race victories.  Commercial developments also were important in sustaining the Championship campaign.  In May the cars appeared at Spa with a new livery for the Campari drinks maker, reflecting a useful sponsorship addition to the racing budget.  The following month, appropriately at the Nurburgring, the name of the sausage manufacturer, Redlefsen, was writ large on the 33s.

Fig.8. 1975: Top left, Jacky Ickx at Spa; right: Jochen Mass at the Nurburgring; bottom: Zeltweg.

 Courtesy Alfa Romeo Auto Storico

One week after the Watkins Glen victory, the now-non Championship Targa Florio, run two months later than had been the custom when the event was in its pomp, provided a further and concluding celebratory victory for the T-33/TT/12.  Merzario was paired with Targa specialist-supreme, Nino Vaccarella, and they had no difficulty in winning the race by the large margin of 19 minutes from a Chevron B26.

Fig.9. 1975 Targa Florio podium; Left to right: Merzario, Vaccarella, Chiti. 

Courtesy Alfa Romeo Auto Storico

As the summer gave way to autumn, the focus passed from the 33 to the utilisation of the 12 cylinder engine in a new partnership with Motor Racing Developments, (Bernie Ecclestone’s Brabham Formula One team).  The BT45 chassis designed by MRD’s Gordon Murray was ready for track testing by Carlos Reutemann in mid-October.  Thus, Alfa Romeo became involved in Grand Prix racing again for the first time since the (second) Championship-winning year of 1951.  This would give rise to a further two new engines – a V12 and a turbocharged V8 – before ending in 1988, with little success achieved, when the V8 was dropped after 3 seasons’ use by the Osella team.

Fig.10. One-off TT12 coupe – with V8 engine – for the Tour of Italy, 1975. Courtesy Alfa Romeo Auto Storico

Without any clear conviction, Alfa Romeo did decide to develop a version of the 33 for the newly-redefined Group 6 introduced in 1976.  On paper this appeared to be specified in stark contradiction to the principles that had made the TT/12 so dominant in 1975: the tubular chassis was to be replaced with a monocoque and the 3.0 litre capacity/natural aspiration, (which helped ensure good reliability) of the engine was due to be replaced by a 2140 cc version with twin turbocharged induction.  The race debut of the car, originally referred to as 33TS12, subsequently, SC12, was delayed, in a manner precursory to the saga of the Formula 1 890T engine in 1982-3, by difficulties over the sourcing of the turbocharger units.  Eventually, some appearances were made, and there were interludes of encouraging pace, but 1976 was really a blank year for Alfa Romeo in terms of sports cars racing.  1977 was certainly different, even if the scale of the success attained was limited.  Using the normally aspirated SC12, the team won all 8 rounds of The World Sportscar Championship.  This, however, was open only to Group 6 cars and was not the FIA’s premier competition for such machinery – that distinction being reserved for The World Championship for Makes, won in dominant fashion by Porsche with its phenomenal 936 model.  The turbocharged car ran in the hands of Merzario at the end of the season in Austria, but was outpaced there by Brambilla’s atmo SC12.  Perhaps just to ensure that the turbo SC12 would never emulate the glories racked up by the 3.0 version, the FIA announced that Group 6 was to be abolished as from 1978.

Fig.11. 1977 Alfa 33 SC12. Courtesy of Wouter Melissen

So, Alfa Romeo’s foremost motor sport role in the New Year was as the ongoing engine supplier to the Brabham team.  But this arrangement was about to change too because Brabham needed a narrower unit to enable the construction of a new chassis which could exploit the fast-developing principles of ground effects.  In response, Chiti had a 60° V12 design under way in October.  Behind the scenes, Chiti had also been at work for some time on the design of a chassis to be powered initially by his 180° V12 cylinder engine and with which to race in Formula 1 as an Alfa Romeo.  The car was ready to begin testing by mid-year and there was hope that it could make its race debut at Monza in September.  That proved to be over ambitious, and it was not until May 1979 that it was seen at a Grand Prix.  Regrettably, what happened over the following six seasons was never anywhere near as uplifting as what had been achieved with the T-33/TT/12.