The Nearly Alfa - Part 2

Once again, the control of Alfa Romeo by the state organisation, Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale – IRI – through its finanziaria, (financial entity), Finmeccanica, would be highly influential.  Not for the first time, the managements of Alfa Romeo and Autodelta were compelled to make decisions constrained by directives formulated on the basis of political expediency rather than engineering savvy.  Responding to recurrent government diktaks seeking to promote the use/consumption of Italian-made products, Finmeccanica ‘s nose intruded into the 890 engine project, stipulating that its turbochargers must be locally-sourced.  Accordingly, the KKKs were soon replaced by units made by the Alfa Romeo aeronautical manufacturing subsidiary, Avio.  Unfortunately, the performance and reliability of these was clearly inferior to the German blowers.  At this stage of the 890’s development, the induction characteristics were rendered furthermore problematic by the difficulty found in the setting up of eight individual Weber carburettors.  The latter issue was not resolved for almost a year – when a mechanical fuel injection system made by SPICA to Autodelta-dictated, 890-specific, parameters became available.  In the early days of the 183T, engine and turbocharger failures were not uncommon and were largely attributable to inconsistent running conditions, often stemming from fuel mixture anomalies.  However, while an 890 was running it was capable of 620 bhp at 11,000 rpm, competitive in simple power output terms.

Design, construction and development of the chassis was more straightforward.  Gerard Ducarouge, having been – somewhat unaccountably – sacked by Ligier, had joined Autodelta in August ’81.  His expertise was seen to benefit the team very swiftly, some perceiving the improved results achieved by Giacomelli with the 179C at the season’s last two championship rounds – 4^th in Canada and 3^rd at Las Vagas - as courtesy of the Frenchman.  More significantly, his design of a new car for the ’82 season demonstrated a capability for Autodelta to more readily adopt innovative technology.  Thus, the 182 was an early example of a Formula 1 car featuring a carbon fibre chassis.  In fact, as the new season got underway, only the McLaren MP4/1 was similarly constructed.  The 182 tubs were the work of pioneer of the material, Roger Sloman, at his Derby-based company, Advanced Composites.  Sloman recalled:

Chiti ordered a dozen chassis.  We must have only built five or six.  Within given external and some internal dimensions, how it was designed and built was up to us.  We used two female moulds, a top and a bottom half.  I guess it’s how everybody does it now.  Because you are forcing the weave into the corners, it can’t crease.  It’s better structurally and aesthetically.  Our Alfa 182 was beautiful and I was really proud of it – and disappointed when they decided to fit bodywork over the front end.  From the engine mounts to the front suspension, all along the cockpit top, there was a solid strap of unidirectional Kevlar that would basically hold the car together in a big accident; two very strong ‘ropes’ preventing the relatively fragile honeycomb skin from tearing in an accident.

182 carbon fibre monocoque

In addition to improved strength and stiffness attributes, this fabrication method resulted in a 40% weight saving .  The 182 chassis proved in need of little alteration/updating through the racing season and thus served as a good basis for the design of a turbo-powered replacement for ’83.  But while these practical matters were being progressed, the Alfa Romeo/Autodelta political milieu in which trouble had been simmering for long enough, now became comprehensively disrupted.  Finmeccanica and Masecessi himself had reached their limit of patience with Autodelta’s unfortunate cocktail of costs-generation coupled with sporting under-achievement.  The ’82 season had been yet another winless one, with de Cesaris and Giacomelli accumulating a meagre total of 7 World Championship points; in the Constructors’ table Alfa Romeo took 10^th place, (of 14).  In essence Masecessi wanted simply to divest Alfa Romeo of the ongoing cost and negative marketing effects of the Formula 1 programme.  He was however minded to try and achieve some return on the investment that had been made in the 890 engine and thus supplies of the unit were offered to several competitor teams which were still reliant upon the normally aspirated Cosworth engine.  When this initiative came to nothing and Masecessi felt out of options, a deus ex machina in human form intervened.  This was Nicolò di San Germano, an executive at Philip Morris who had been charged with managing the firm’s Marlboro brand sponsorship of the Alfa Romeo F1 team.  (More recently, di San Germano has been well known for founding the H2O Racing powerboat sport organisation).

Di San Germano brokered an arrangement whereby Masecessi handed over the F1 set-up to Giampaolo Pavanello’s Euroracing enterprise.  Based initially at Limbiate, midway between Milan and Como, the team had become high achieving in the late ‘70s, winning the Italian F3 championship in ’77, (Ghinzani).  The same driver repeated this feat in ’79, in a March-Alfa.  The team won the European title in ’80 (Alboreto) and ’81 (Baldi).  For ’82 the team fielded its own March-based chassis and continued its run of title victories, that season with Larrauri driving.  That was a high point, with Pirro in the second car being championship runner up and Euroracing winning two thirds of the rounds.  Despite these positives, entrusting the Alfa Romeo marque’s F1 future to an organisation with no previous experience in the category was certainly a high risk strategy.  Perhaps there was some genuine belief that the arrangement could be successful considering how well Euroracing had done in F3, but more likely it would enable Alfa Romeo to distance itself from any ongoing lack of glory.  Whatever the merits of the arrangement from a corporate perspective, the resultant personal chemistry was far from benign.  Ducarouge saw Pavenello as a minor player, adept only with the technical demands of the junior formulae.  Chiti, already feeling undervalued and undermined by Masecessi, had resented the ‘imposition’ on him of Ducarouge, and he did not get on with the Frenchman in simple human relationship terms.  Furthermore, Chiti had little respect for the Euroracing boss, thinking his own experience and achievements far superior to Pavenello’s.  Carlo, after all had been a major figure at Ferrari and ATS, had established and grown Autodelta, where he had designed and developed the World Championship-winning Tipo 33 and he had led the Formula 1 programme for over a decade.  What he said at the presentation of the 183T in February ’83 was highly instructive – he was most emphatic in declaring that Euroracing would not be running Alfa Romeo cars, but Alfa Romeo engines in Euroracing cars.  He indicated that the team had been supplied (rented) sixteen 890 units already, with a further four to come.  This presaged the focus of Autodelta’s F1 future in ’84 and beyond according to Chiti’s vision whereby supply of the 890 on a rental basis would be offered to several teams, including Osella, already an ’83 season customer with the V12.  But yet more of a shake-up was already planned above Chiti’s head, including a change of premises.  And although physical relocation of the team to Euroracing’s new base at Senago would spell the end of Autodelta and its Settimo Milanese premises, Chiti, himself, was to hang on until October of ‘84.

Left to right: Ducarouge, Chiti, Pavenello.

In amongst all these unsettling developments, there was a new car to be further tested and improved. The 183T was another Ducarouge/Tollentino design. Also as in ’82, the #22 car would be in the hands of de Cesaris, but his new teammate was Mauro Baldi, who had displaced Bruno Giacomelli in the #23 car. Baldi had shown his ability with the F3 championship win for Euroracing in ’81 and he had accrued a season of F1 experience in ’82 with Arrows. Both drivers were getting acquainted with the 890 engine in testing at the Paul Ricard circuit, Le Castellet, in December ’82. At this point the interim 182T was carrying the new power unit and in addition to running reliably, (de Cesaris covered 510 kms on 15th and 16th December with no significant engine problems), surprised many by also being quick – de Cesaris recording a best lap of 1:43.10. For comparison, Patrick Tambay’s Ferrari 126C2: 1:39.68; Eddie Cheever’s Renault RE30: 1:42.75; Nelson Piquet’s Brabham BT52: 1:41.80, (GP circuit).

182T at Monza, September '82

At Le Castellet in January ’83, the 182T was again boosting confidence in the new team.  Indeed, Autosport reported in its 3^rd February issue: ‘Alfa Romeo continued to dominate testing at Paul Ricard last week.’  De Cesaris’s best had been 1:03.55, with Baldi quite close on 1:05.25: Arnoux was unable to better 1:05:07 in his Ferrari. (short circuit times).  Ducarouge subsequently said that he believed an even quicker time would have been possible had the new SPICA fuel injection system not proven intermittently problematic.

 

There was a Press presentation of the 183T on 14^th February and some subsequent initial running at the Alfa Romeo proving ground at Balocco.  Given that the 182T had been performing well at Ricard and its replacement was 30 kgs lighter, there was an upbeat buzz around the team and the new car, though there was one reservation in that it had not been possible to carry out any wind tunnel testing.  The cars were in Rio in time for pre-race testing, beginning 4^th March.  As at Le Castellet, the pace was good and some reports indicated that the 183T in de Cesaris’s hands was the fastest car present.  It was certainly a front-runner, along with, surprisingly, the Toleman TG183 of Derek Warwick.

183T as presented at Balocco, February '83.

Thus the Marlboro Alfa Romeo team arrived at Rio, for the Brazilian Grand Prix, in mid-March ‘83 for the opening round of the World Championship with an expectation of genuine competitiveness.  However, the stipulation that Italian-made turbos must replace the KKKs had by then been confirmed by a press release which announced that Avio units would feature on the 890 engine for the ’83 season.  That this was a decidedly negative development was soon confirmed by the performance of the cars in practice at the Jacarepaguá track – two laps appeared to be the maximum they could run before a turbo failure intervened!  If that wasn’t bad enough, de Cesaris then failed to comply with an instruction to take the car to a routine weight check.  It was a process newly beefed up to better police compliance with the minimum weight stipulation of 540 kg.  Furthermore, the FIA had made it clear that disqualification would be invoked if any driver ignored a signal to pull into the weighing bay.  And this is just what de Cesaris did.  As a result, he was unable to continue to the conclusion of the final qualifying session.  So Baldi was carrying considerable responsibility as the relatively inexperienced sole representative of the Alfa Romeo marque.  He made no friends early in the race by running into Alboreto’s Tyrrell, (causing its retirement a few laps later), but did manage good pace, maintaining 6^th place in front of Warwick’s Toleman and Lauda’s McLaren.  But that order was the result of conspicuously blocking driving on Baldi’s part and when Warwick allowed Lauda past to see if he could get ahead, though Niki managed that, the Alfa collected the Toleman.  Warwick was able to continue, but Baldi was not, retiring the 183T with suspension damage.

De Cesaris in Brazil, March '83.

Round 2 was the U.S. West Grand Prix, held at Long Beach at the end of March.  This proved to be a curious affair, tyres being the key for success – those running on Michelins being at a considerable advantage to the Goodyear-shod competitors.  One such was John Watson and he took his McLaren all the way from 22^nd on the grid to race victory.  The Alfas were also on the French rubber, but it provided them with none of the magic apparently benefitting Watson.  De Cesaris, who had been on pole and led the race here 12 months previously, experienced no wonder-comeback from the ignominy of the Brazil disqualification – in practice he was no better than 19^th fastest, (with Baldi 21^st), engine power being again limited by the performance of the Avio turbo units.  The car did however keep going until gearbox problems caused retirement just past half distance.  Baldi had been into the wall and out on lap 27.

 

At this point, Euroracing showed some initiative and quietly made a deal to purchase four KKK units from a U.S. Porsche team.  The physical manufacturer identification and individual unit inscriptions were removed and the turbochargers fitted as replacements for the Avios on both cars, which then went to Le Castellet for the French Grand Prix.  Another improvement introduced at this event was the incorporation of quick action refuelling fillers similar to a modification seen on the Renault RE40.  With the refuelling race plan pioneered by Brabham having by now proven the best way to cover a Grand Prix distance at optimum speed, this was very welcome, especially taking account of the 890’s prolific thirst for fuel, (though on race day the team decided to run this race conventionally).  Whatever these developments promised in theory, the reality of de Cesaris’s fastest time in the first day’s practice was a pleasant surprise.  What was not though was -  a French expression especially relevant here – a déjà vu echo of the Brazil disqualification.  That excellent Friday performance was lost because the time was deleted when de Cesaris’s car was found in scrutineering to have empty fire extinguishers.  Andrea was half a second slower on the following day, good enough only for 7^th on the grid, while Baldi almost matched that time and took 8^th.  This encouraging performance of the #23 car was soon undermined in the race, it being struck from behind by Watson’s McLaren on lap 1.  De Cesaris ran in the top ten until he pitted with gear selection issues.  This lost him 4 laps and though he did run to the end of the race, he was classified down in 12^th place.  Baldi again retired after contact with Winkelhock’s ATS caused him to run off the circuit after 28 laps.

De Cesaris at Le Castellet.

Despite all the positive performance effects Ducarouge’s contributions had delivered, his 19 months with Autodelta/Euroracing had seen numerous interpersonal disagreements.  Chiti resented the Frenchman’s presence, seeing him as a threat to his status as the guru on all technical matters and likely to displace him eventually as the company’s head.  Ducarouge, very strong on chassis detailing, considered that Chiti should confine himself to issues around the powertrain, though he was not convinced that Carlo’s engines reflected correct contemporary design principles.  Pavenello apparently regarded Ducarouge’s experience as dangerous for himself, given his own relatively inadequate technical accomplishments, especially at the sport’s pinnacle.  Further conflicts arose over Ducarouge’s regular demands for increases in budget provisions in order to develop the cars to higher levels of competitiveness.  Thus the management, from Chiti/Pavenello upwards, saw the Le Castellet disqualification as an opportunity to attribute blame to Ducarouge and justification for his immediate dismissal.  This was not only unfair, as really the guilt belonged with the driver, but also a strategic blunder as Ducarouge’s flair and expertise remained the team’s best asset in striving for better results.  That this was the case was subsequently proven by what he achieved at the team to which he swiftly moved – Lotus.  His ’83 Lotus 94T began a revival of the team’s fortunes.  Two years later his 97T took Ayrton Senna to his very first F1 victory and in the season ’85-’87 Ducarouge’s designs scored seven Grand Prix victories.

 

For the next round, the San Marino Grand Prix, at Imola, Avio turbochargers were apparently back on the engines, at least according to Motor Sport magazine’s Denis Jenkinson, though he often got things wrong.  It’s possible that what he reported as seeing on the 183Ts as ‘units being made by Alfa Romeo themselves,’ were the debadged KKKs.  But maybe he was right because practice was conducted around the need for recurring fault diagnoses and rectifications in order to keep the cars running and with something near power competitiveness.  Actually, the cars were relatively quick on the first day of practice, placing 6^th and 7^th.  However, on race day, de Cesaris managed to roll his car during the warm-up session.  Surprisingly, damage was limited and repairs were completed in time for the race start.  This was a particular focus for the team as it hoped that the 183Ts would be fast-starting and nimble in the initial stages as they would be less heavy with petrol, refuelling being planned for introduction at this event.  Once things had settled down, they were pleased to see that their expectations had not been unrealistic for de Cesaris was running in 5^th and by half distance he was up to 4^th.  But . . . perhaps refuelling and Alfa Romeo pit work were not so compatible?  De Cesaris missed his box slot and there was a substantial loss of time.  20 laps later and he was out, with engine failure.  Baldi’s race concluded in similar fashion.

 

At the Monaco Grand Prix, Saturday practice and qualifying was disrupted by rain, so Thursday times determined the grid order – 7^th for de Cesaris, 13^th for Baldi.  An oil leak developed on de Cesaris’s car during the warm up session, so the Euroracing pit was far from calm and orderly as the cars were prepared for the start.  Once the race was underway the rain which had been on and off up to then stopped and as the track dried many runners were disadvantaged by having started on rain tyres and wet chassis settings.  De Cesaris retired with gearbox problems after only 13 of the 76 laps, but Baldi at least managed to finish 6^th and take a single World Championship point - his first for the team.

 

According to an ex-Euroracing engineer with whom I have recently been in touch, KKK turbos remained on the cars for the San Marino and Monaco Grands Prix.  His further recollection is that a reversion to Avios had subsequently been made in time for the cars’ preparation for the next event.  This might be inferred from the comments made at Spa by both Denis Jenkinson in his Motor Sport report: ‘new turbines in the turbo compressors continuing to give a noticeable increase in reliability;’  and Nigel Roebuck in his for Autosport: ‘Alfa Romeo now has the facility to turn up the boost without problem, claiming that 670 bhp is available for qualifying, 640 for the race.’  From these remarks it’s reasonable to conclude that – perhaps under vigorous urging from top management at Finmeccanica/Alfa Romeo as a response to corporate embarrassment over the clandestine use of the KKKs – Avio had made a concerted effort to improve the performance/efficiency of its units.

De Cesaris at Monaco

Disappointing though Monaco had been for de Cesaris, the showing at Spa for the Belgian Grand Prix proved to be his and the team’s best of the season.  In pre-race testing at the circuit, de Cesaris had posted the fastest time, and the car’s suitability there was confirmed in morning practice by again being top of the timings table.  After lunch and under official timing, #22 was 3^rd fastest, with Baldi’s #23, 12^th – a performance he could probably have bettered but for an engine blow-up.  These became the race grid positions when the Saturday sessions were washed out, rain falling throughout the day.  Roebuck observed: : ‘Andrea, disappointed that pole position had eluded him, was nevertheless delighted with the balance of his car through the very fast corners, if less enthusiastic about its agility in the slower ones.’  The race start was aborted as Marc Surer’s Arrows was stranded.  However, in the few moments the front of the grid thought it was ‘go,’ de Cesaris shot past Prost and Tambay, and into the lead.  Roebuck described the following events thus (extracts from his full report):

At the second attempt all was well, and we beheld the extraordinary spectacle of de Cesaris apparently squeezing in the sides of his Alfa to get between Prost’s Renault and Tambay’s Ferrari.  The Italian V8 gets off the line like no other turbocharged car, and one rather had the impression of a jet, thrust built up, then brakes released.  The Alfa scythed between the front row cars as if its throttle was jammed open, and it was good that the gap was wider than it seemed.~~~~~~~~~~ Down to La Source, de Cesaris was an undisputed leader.~~~~~~~~~~(At the end of lap 1) Andrea, belying his hard-won reputation, was driving the Alfa beautifully, with smoothness and precision, the car’s truly awesome horsepower slinging it from the corners visibly faster than anything else in the race.  The new turbocharger units have certainly improved the car’s competitiveness.  But how much boost was de Cesaris running?  We wondered that.~~~~~~~~~~While #22 charged along in the lead, however, its sister car was in the pits after only four laps.  Alfa Romeo is by far the most secretive team in Grand Prix racing, and their explanation  (not always given) after the race was that Baldi’s throttle cable had broken.~~~~~~~~~~After five laps it was clear that no one could live with the sheer pace of de Cesaris’s leading Alfa.~~~~~~~~~~At six laps de Cesaris had extended his lead to three seconds.~~~~~~~~~~De Cesaris completed 10 laps, quarter-distance, with almost five seconds lead over Prost.~~~~~~~~~~(at 19 laps) De Cesaris made his planned pit stop, but the Alfa mechanics made a mess of it, particularly those changing the left rear tyre.  The Alfa had led by seven seconds before its stop, but it was stationary for 25.33 seconds, 10 seconds above par.  Andrea had to start the hard work all over again.~~~~~~~~~~(lap 24) Prost was left with a 10 second lead over the hard-charging de Cesaris.~~~~~~~~~~(after 25 laps) The Alfa was missing, and soon the news came in that de Cesaris had pulled off with engine failure on the climb to Les Combes.  For many laps the car had been puffing smoke with every gear change, but its pace had been unaffected.  Had it overheated during the tardy pit stop?  No one at Alfa Romeo was saying, but it was desperately sad for Andrea, who had driven beautifully.

De Cesaris’s, and the team’s, disappointment was immense, but there was much to take as positive from the weekend, including fastest lap at 2:07.5, as he chased Prost after the pitstop.

De Cesaris leading at Sps.

In between the Belgian race and the next, the U.S. Detroit Grand Prix, improvements to the 890’s cylinder heads and suspension geometry/ride height were finalised.  The value of these changes was not immediately clear in practice/qualifying for the ‘Motor City’ street race, de Cesaris securing 8^th on the grid, Baldi a disappointing 25^th.  After causing an aborted start to the race, de Cesaris’s fortunes then temporarily looked up as he ran in 3^rd in the early stages.  However, turbo trouble set in, and, with reduced boost, he lost places and eventually had to retire the car on lap 34 shortly after the routine pit stop.  The reliability of the turbochargers was once again a very significant cause for concern.

Next up was the Canadian Grand Prix at Montreal.  The opening practice session did not provide much in the way of inspiration for the team, de Cesaris’s 183T suffering a spectacular engine blow up.  Later, the car had a turbo failure and consequent fire, though this at least excused him from a weight check (!) which had just been called for.  In amongst these vicissitudes de Cesaris qualified 8^th but Baldi was all the way down in 26^th.  In the race de Cesaris maintained 7^th in the opening stages but eventually had to give way to Rosberg’s normally aspirated Williams after they had had a coming together on lap 11, then fading further as his 890 V8 was running hot and losing power, leading by lap 42 to failure and retirement.  Baldi was the last classified finisher in 10^th place, 3 laps down on Arnoux’s winning Ferrari.

 

With in-race refuelling now well established as the preferred run plan, a ‘B’ specification 183 had been developed in time for the British Grand Prix at Silverstone.  This featured a monocoque of reduced size to take advantage of the opportunity to carry a smaller fuel tank.  Aerodynamic advantages were also expected as the chassis/body height was also decreased, allowing a better airflow to the rear wing surface.  In practice, however, the new cars were found to be no quicker than the original examples had been in previous test running at the circuit.  De Cesaris was able to qualify his car only 11^th and Baldi was 13^th.  Disappointing as these grid positions were, what was even more so was that de Cesaris’s time was 2.5 seconds slower than Arnoux’s pole effort.  His and Tambay’s Ferraris locked out the front row and were clearly dominant.  With front-running retirements, de Cesaris moved up as high as 4^th at one stage, but once again was the victim of a sloppy pit crew which he then compounded by stalling the engine and thus being delayed enough to drop back to 12^th.  He recovered to the extent of an 8^th place finish, unusually in this instance, behind Baldi, who was 7^th.

Left: 183T; right 183TB ('lowline').

The Ferraris were again the cars to beat at the next round, the German Grand Prix at Hockenheim.  De Cesaris was the closest to doing that in qualifying, though he was nearly 1.5 seconds off Tambay’s pole time.  Baldi managed 7^th.  The 183Ts seemed to be benefiting from better engine power derived from further turbo specification upgrades.  In the race de Cesaris was initially displaced by both Brabhams and both Renaults.  In the latter stages, Cheever’s Renault and then Piquet’s BMW failed, leaving de Cesaris in 2^nd, in which position he finished the race, though at reduced speed on the final lap as the 890 V8 had developed a rather ominous, abnormal noise.  Baldi’s car, however, was subject to a turbo failure and was retired just after half distance. 

Moving on to the Osterreichring for the Austrian Grand Prix, the team was in confident mood thanks to de Cesaris’s excellent result at Hockenheim.  This soon dissipated when de Cesaris’s engine blew up during practice.  With much track time lost while the necessary change was made, Andrea had to see his teammate outqualify him – Baldi was 9^th, de Cesaris, 11^th.  And, come race day, de Cesaris might well have felt that the gods were getting-even in response to his good fortune in Germany.  Firstly, his engine blew up during the warm-up session.  And although the team managed to get yet another installed for the race start, the particular unit was even worse than normal, fuel consumption-wise.  Thus, when the routine re-fuelling stop had to be delayed because of pit road congestion, the car ran out of fuel whilst going well in 4^th place.  Baldi had been out earlier, at just quarter distance, an engine oil leak being determined as terminal.

 

Perhaps the frustrations in Austria were the cause of de Cesaris’s grumpy disposition in practice for the Dutch Grand Prix at Zandvoort – but, whatever its origins, the on-running disputes he had with Riccardo Patrese proved a distraction and he and the car were probably capable of better than the 8^th fastest time he eventually recorded.  But his engine had also again given trouble, restricting the number of laps he was able to complete.  Baldi was 12^th.  As for the race, it was an early exit – after just 5 laps – for de Cesaris, with another engine failure.  Baldi, on the other hand, took his car to 5^th, his best result of the season. 

Prior to the Italian Grand Prix, tyre testing at the Monza circuit had seen de Cesaris once again setting the pace in the 183TB.  He continued to do so in first practice but was able to qualify for the race only in 6^th place after experiencing an engine failure.  Baldi had a turbocharger break and could do no better than10^th.  Both cars seemed to be lacking optimum straight line top speed, so important at Monza.  De Cesaris started the race strongly, lining up on lap 2 to overtake Tambay for 5^th, but the Ferrari forced the Alfa wide and its race was done, stranded in the run-off area.  Baldi’s car was also a very early retirement, limping into the pits on lap 5 with a badly smoking, failed turbocharger.

De Cesaris at Monza.

A ’European’ Grand Prix was run at Brands Hatch, England, in late September.  In pre-race tyre testing there the 183TB had displayed notably improved balance and grip.  However, back again for race practice, de Cesaris considered the driveability of the car less good, both in terms of handling and throttle response, wastegate revisions having apparently not improved turbo lag.  Whether these factors – or just a driving error – were to blame, de Cesaris had a substantial off on the first day of practice and after the car’s repair found himself dissatisfied with the engine’s performance.  Trying the spare car did not prove to be particularly effective as he was unable to qualify better than 14^th and only just a little quicker and one place forward of Baldi.  Finding the car much more to his liking on race day, de Cesaris worked up the field, and as the finish approached, he was firmly established in the points-scoring positions, eventually crossing the line in 4^th and thus an encouraging performance and only his fourth finish of the season to date.  Baldi made it only to half-distance before pulling out with a clutch failure.

Baldi at Brands Hatch.

The final round of the World Championship – the South African Grand Prix - was held at Kyalami.  De Cesaris and Baldi qualified 9^th and 17^th respectively.  De Cesaris made another of his lightning starts, up to 5^th by the end pf lap 1.  He maintained good pace throughout and was 4^th until near the end, but then, with Lauda retiring and Piquet going very cautiously in order to ensure his World Championship victory, #22 was 2^nd at flag fall.  Baldi had retired after just 5 laps with an engine failure.

 

So the season ended on something of a high, if not a vertiginous one.  De Cesaris had accumulated 15 points, for 8^th place in the drivers’ World Championship.  Baldi’s total was 3, 16^th.  Alfa Romeo stood 6^th in the constructors’ World Championship.  And that was it.  De Cesaris and Baldi were moving on, as was Marlboro.  Riccardo Patrese and Eddie Cheever, replacing the Italian drivers, proved mediocre at best in the following season, though they did not have a good car in the 184T, itself a compromise design as a result of the reduced fuel allowance introduced in the regulations for ’84.  The car, a development of the 183, was credited to Tollentino, featured a new, very distinctive Benetton livery, (the team’s new main sponsor), but little else of note.  The 185 was the designation for the following season, at the end of which Alfa Romeo announced its withdrawal as a F1 car constructor.  As an ending, this was somewhat less illustrious than that seen in 1951 when the 159 had retired gracefully as the World Championship-winning car.

De Cesaris leads at Spa.

Andrea - What If? Part 2

After two years in Formula 3, it was important for Andrea to sustain momentum in his career by moving up to Formula 2 full time.  This he was able to achieve with the help of his Marlboro sponsorship and positive discussions with Ron Dennis.  Ron had founded his team, Project 4, in 1976, and it had run Chico Serra in 1979.  It had greater experience in F2 and put a lot of focus on this category for 1980, fielding March 802-BMWs for Andrea and Serra in the European series.  The first race of the new season was at Thruxton, in April, and Andrea outpaced Serra to finish third. The championship was comprised of 12 races, of which Andrea was entered in all but one.  He won the penultimate round in August at Misano, and ranked fifth in the championship.  That he did not appear at the final round and perhaps improve his position to fourth was due to the highly significant opportunity then afforded to him through the Marlboro connection.  1980 had been a fraught year for Alfa Romeo’s Autodelta team, headed by Carlo Chiti.  The flat 12 177 had proved uncompetitive and had been entered only intermittently.  The replacement, 179, with V-form engine, had been subject to reliability problems.  Off the circuit, there were concerns that the powerful unions in the Factory should not be alienated by any perceived lack of commitment to number two driver, Bruno Giacomelli.  The new driver, Patrick Depailler, brought in to spearhead the team’s endeavours, though brimming with confidence and ability, was found to be struggling as he had not fully recovered from a hang-gliding accident.  Then, just as he appeared to be finding his form, he was killed in a testing accident at Hockenheim.  At this point, Marlboro, naturally concerned to ensure return from its investment, (with substantial sponsorship payments to the team), overruled Chiti, who was inclined to recall the veteran Vittorio Brambilla. The tobacco manufacturer insisted on the vacant driver’s seat being taken by ‘their’ Andrea de Cesaris – the expectation being that by dint of his youth, much in contrast with Brambilla, he would be the more likely front runner.

In March 802 at Thruxton, 1980

Thus, Andrea was in Montreal in late September for round 13 of the Formula 1 World Championship.  Given his relative lack of experience, Andrea needed all the track time he could get.  So, the prevailing weather for the opening practice session was particularly unwelcome in the Alfa Romeo pit – it was raining cats and dogs, deterring even some of the most long-served of drivers from venturing out onto the circuit. Conditions did improve later, (and on the following day), but for a debutant they remained decidedly ‘tricky.’  It was therefore all the more to Andrea’s credit that he qualified in eighth, in front of some of F1’s then-established front line contenders, including Patrese, Prost, Villeneuve and Arnoux.  It was an encouraging situation for the team, as Bruno was fourth, half a second quicker than Andrea. But hardly had the race got underway than a big accident occurred, bringing out the red flag.  The restart was delayed for an hour – another very challenging and nerve jangling circumstance for a young driver in his very first Grand Prix.  However, Andrea handled the race resumption without difficulty and appeared to have settled well, only for engine trouble to intervene on lap 8, necessitating his retirement.  The sense of anti-climax and frustration experienced by Andrea in Montreal can only be imagined. Meanwhile, Giacomelli – who was never bestowed with a shunt-referencing nickname – crashed out when he misjudged an attempted overtake of Didier Pironi.

At Circuit Île Notre-Dame, Montreal for the Canadian Grand Prix, 1980

The final round of the championship, the U.S. Grand Prix, was run at Watkins Glen on 5^th October.  The turn of speed shown by the Alfa 179s in Canada was maintained at the Glen, with Giacomelli taking pole and Andrea tenth.  On the race’s opening lap Andrea was pushed onto the grass, losing several places.  Reacting to this, Andrea was probably trying too hard when his 179 struck Derek Daly’s Tyrrell and sustained retirement-inducing damage on the third lap.  So, Andrea’s brief encounter with the Grand Prix scene ended in disappointment, though promise for future success was shown by the speed he had been able to show in both practice/qualifying and the races.  With the future in mind, it is germane at this point to say that several writers have observed that Ron Dennis came to be averse to running Italians in his cars, usually adding that this stemmed from his experience with Andrea in 1981.  His adoption of Andrea for the new season was probably not wholehearted from the outset.  With the merger of his Project 4 team with McLaren being a risky enterprise, pragmatic Ron needed to be especially closely compliant with the sponsor’s wishes, and Marlboro was keen to see Andrea in an M29. 

Speaking in 2012, Andrea reflected: 

I don’t think Ron ever treated me fairly. I had the old car, (M29), and very little testing - just 20 laps at Silverstone before my first Grand Prix with them.  Crazy.  I had connections with Marlboro at a time when Ron Dennis wanted the company to continue its sponsorship.  He was taking over from Teddy Mayer, and McLaren had been performing badly under Teddy. Ron needed good sponsorship, because he was building the first carbon-fibre chassis with John Barnard. So yes, he gave me a chance because I was important to Marlboro and Marlboro was important to him. I’d driven for Ron in F2, so he knew I could be quick. 

Ron and Andrea avoiding eye contact!

Andrea was teamed at McLaren with the Belfast-born John Watson, who had first driven a Formula 1 car in 1973. Broadly, in terms of experience, John was ten years ahead of Andrea.  This was evidenced by their comparative qualifying performances – John’s average being ninth, whereas Andrea’s was fifteenth, but it is notable that John was provided with the new MP4 from the 3^rd race, Andrea having to wait until the 6^th for the innovative and potentially far superior John Barnard-designed model.  As for the races, Andrea’s best result was sixth place in San Marino.  Any hope of a good championship placing was undermined by the numerous DNFs – 9 – but of these, only 3 can be attributed unequivocally to fault on Andrea’s part.  On the other hand, Watson made a mistake and had a colossal accident at Monza, the common wisdom being that his life was preserved only by the immense strength of the revolutionary carbon fibre monocoque construction of the MP4.

Andrea, #8, and team-mate Watson, #7, take to the grass at the Brazil Grand Prix, 1981

Further analysis of available data and contemporary reports shows that specific own-fault accidents/beaching spins by Andrea amounted to 10 in practice/qualifying/racing in the season’s 15 Grands Prix.  I would not dispute the previously quoted figure of 19+ since some reports refer to ‘multiple’ incidents/spins/offs, etc.  But for added insight, another driver’s 1981 is worth considering and comparing with that of Andrea’s.  Like many others, I greatly enjoyed seeing Gilles Villeneuve’s exploits on track in Ferraris which were often not exactly au-point chassis/handling-wise.  His chutzpah will remain in the collective memory for as long as the sport is ongoing.  However, in 1981 he too did a fair amount of spinning and shunting, just like Andrea, Gilles’s ‘score’ being 13.  An enthusiastic advocate for the man in the Ferrari #27 was Denis Jenkinson, the Continental Correspondent of Motor Sport magazine.  Conversely, that he formed a dim view of Andrea’s qualities from an early date is evidenced by the prejudicial comments/turns of phrase that frequently featured in his articles, e.g. (Argentina) – ‘Andrea de Cesaris spent most of his time spinning his older McLaren M29F.’  (Holland) ‘Andrea de Cesaris  . . . who had continuously crashed their (McLaren’s) cars throughout the season.’  (Italy) ‘de Cesaris, the Italian with the funny eyes actually keeping his car on the track this time.’  Contrast this approach to how Jenkinson generally wrote in admiration and affection about Giles Villeneuve. 

Fortunately, Marlboro had financially supported both the McLaren and Alfa Romeo Formula One campaigns in 1981 and was happy enough to continue this aspect of its marketing strategy for 1982.  With Nikki Lauda eager to join McLaren for the new season, Marlboro was once again instrumental in facilitating a move for Andrea back to Alfa Romeo where a seat had become vacant as a consequence of Mario Andretti’s retirement from Grand Prix racing.  So, Andrea returned to a team that he considered genuinely supportive, and once again was alongside Bruno Giacomelli.  They got on well, and among many complimentary things Bruno said about Andrea was that he was ‘very correct and honest,’ and that he was ‘not too proud to say when he was wrong.’  Their friendship was tested several times in 1982, notably at the Austrian Grand Prix when their cars collided at the start of the race, but the conciliatory nature of both men enabled them to resolve disputes relatively quickly and amicably – something many teammates struggle to achieve, given that if the man in the same machine as yourself is quicker, you can’t blame your car - he is your most direct competitor, the yardstick against which you must measure your own performance.

Andrea and Bruno at the presentation of the Alfa 182

The 1982 season was a controversial one.  It began with a drivers’ strike, ostensibly over new ‘superlicence’ stipulations proposed by FISA – a reflection of the continuing dispute between the ‘manufacturer’ teams, aligned with the FISA governing body and the ‘garagistas,’ members of FOCA, such as Williams, McLaren and Brabham.  The conflict by 1982 had much to do with the FOCA teams feeling at a disadvantage against the turbo-engined cars of the manufacturers.  A work-around, enabling their cars to run out on the circuit at reduced weight, compounded the situation and when ruled ‘illegal’ by FISA, led to a boycott of the San Marino Grand Prix by most of the FOCA members.  Meanwhile safety re-emerged as a major concern in the wake of the death at Zolder of the much-loved Gilles Villeneuve, (and of novice, Riccardo Paletti, in Canada).  Moreover, to confirm the season’s peculiarity, the Championship went to Keke Rosberg, despite his haul of wins being just one. 

Early in the year Alfa Romeo could be hopeful – an improved V12 car, the 182, had been developed and was ready for introduction at the second race, in Brazil.  At the same time, work was progressing on a new V8 turbo engine.  But at round 1, the 179s of Andrea and Bruno were not competitive, finishing thirteenth and eleventh respectively.  Andrea figured much more prominently in Brazil in the new car but was forced to retire when the undertray was dislodged.  Then came Long Beach.  A memorable event as Andrea snatched pole position – at that point the youngest ever driver to start at the head of a Grand Prix – and initially led the race in authoritative style.  Eventually outfoxed by the vastly more experienced Nikki Lauda, Andrea maintained second place for a while until he was distracted by deteriorating brakes and a supposed rear suspension failure, and lost control.  The damage sustained was sufficient to dictate Andrea’s retirement.

Pole position in the 182 for the U.S.West Grand Prix at Long Beach, April 1982

Andrea’s season was largely undermined by the 182’s unreliability.  Though his average qualifying position was eighth and at tracks to which the car was suited, he could race in the top 6, he failed to finish in 10 of the 16 events, of which 4 could be considered the result of own-fault accidents.  This would compare with several other drivers’ records – Rene Arnoux’s ‘score’ for example being 3 - once again giving the lie to the lazy ‘deCrasheris’ slur. 

Part 3 (next post) covers Andrea's 1983 season and presents the arguments for his potential as a World Champion