The One and Only - Part 2

 

Nevertheless, the team had not forgotten the vision that informed the earliest days of the project – a car primarily for race participation, fast and nimble enough to compete in Groups 4 and 5 and to score victories over the cars from the Zuffenhausen works of a formidable rival. So some refocus as regards the chassis/body was required. First and foremost, this sought lighter weight and reduced mass. Consequently, Lamborghini was instructed to make the body in GRP and mount it on a tubular spaceframe chassis, allowing the car’s unladen weight to be around 1,300 Kg in road trim and little more than 1,000 Kg as prepared for the track. The new format also embodied reduced dimensions for both the wheelbase and overall length in the interests of better handling characteristics. Recognising the value of drawing on very specific expertise and to achieve best possible speed in the project’s development and subsequent vehicle build process, a supplier nexus was determined – body component panels from the company, Trasformazione Italiana Resina, located 50 km west of Sant’Agata at Reggio Emilia; chassis from Modena-based Marchesi & C.; chassis/body assembly at Italdesign.

Chassis frame made by Machesi.  Courtesy MenudeiMotori

Complying with the updated specification, Lamborghini initially made good progress, producing a prototype in little more than 6 months.  It was shown to the BMW Board in early May ’77 and well received.  The evaluation was enhanced by the availability for viewing of cars considered likely to be ‘the opposition,’ De Tomaso Pantera, Maserati Merak and, inevitably, a turbocharged 911.  Hearing that the BMW people perceived ‘their’ car to be superior to these competitors, the Lamborghini team could be justified in feeling pleased with its efforts.  However, back inside the Sant’Agata factory, the mood was much less upbeat since the company’s financial fitness had been continuing to deteriorate.  Cashflow was especially poor and this militated against steady, revenue earning production.  So, though there was customer demand for the Countach and Jarama models, sales rates were constricted and income lost.  With the receipts from BMW channelled to product development, Rossetti and Leimer sought to boost revenue by contracting to build an off-road vehicle for American maker, Mobility Technology International, which had been commissioned to supply it to the U.S. Military.  From the outset of the project however, there was trouble – named the Cheetah, rights to the design were contested by Ford and this led to a litigation.  Consequently, by the time the vehicle was ready for debut in ’77, Lamborghini’s confidence in the project as a ‘lifesaver’ had already been eroded.  Though no surprise, BMW’s decision to cancel its contract with Lamborghini in April ‘78 for a second time was a further major blow.  Efforts to sell Automobili Lamborghini as a going concern were unsuccessful and by legal compulsion the business was declared bankrupt in August ’78, one month after a prototype M1 had been shown to the press in Munich at the Olympic Park  Also announced at this time, at Hockenheim, was BMW’s intention to institute a ‘Procar’ racing series in ’79.  A follow-up announcement was made in October ’78 outlining plans for the supply of Group 4 specification M1s to private entrants, it having been established that such cars would be allowed to run in German national events.  Preparation of these cars was to be entrusted to Ron Dennis’s junior formulae team, Project Four, and to Osella Engineering, inheritor of the Abarth works operation after the Fiat takeover in ’71.

’78 M1 prototype.  Courtesy Hans Lehmann

At the point of the Lamborghini contract lapse, seven pre-production M1s were under construction. Not enough had yet been learnt with these to enable the formulation of a revised series production plan/timeframe. The project was under huge pressure given the Group 4/5 racing aspirations and related homologation requirements. This would all come to nothing if 400 units could not be manufactured. Thus, the BMW M team needed to, and did, act swiftly and effectively. Firstly, influence was brought to bear such that a number of Lamborghini employees collaborated to found a new business, ItalEngineering. Its purpose was to improve/maintain relationships and working practices between the various specialist businesses already involved in the project. A key executive of ItalEngineering was Marco Raimondi whose primary responsibility was liaison/co-ordination over the wide range of technical aspects.

Left - Marco Raimondi (ItalEngineering) with (right) Dott Franco Baraldini (Lamborghini)

In addition to the design/styling work already undertaken by Italdesign, Giugiaro’s company was delegated to paint/finish the tubular chassis frames. The body panels, glass and interior trim was then assembled on the chassis frame and the completed shell painted. The wiring loom was subsequently fitted prior to the partially complete vehicle passing into the care of Karosserie Baur at Stuttgart. At Baur the remainder of the mechanical, electrical and trim equipment was installed. This stage was found to be problematic as Baur reported that because of dimensional inconsistencies and resultant fit issues, it needed substantially more time than had been agreed in order to complete its work. Thus a further delay occurred and the cost of production was further escalated. However, on completion, the cars were shipped to Munich for testing/final inspection at the factory. Despite the issues at Baur, the race car preparation programme was implemented in time for the ’79 season. But, though it had originally envisaged participation in Group 5, (Special Production cars), BMW feared a lack of competitiveness against other makers now deploying turbocharged cars. Consequently, the M1 became destined to race in the less prestigious Group 4, (Special Grand Touring cars), category.

Body panels being fitted to the chassis frame.  Courtesy 2020 BMW M1 Club e.V.

Its development supervised by Rosche, a /1, Group 4-compliant version of the M88 engine was soon running and proving effective. With a 470 bhp output, it was considerably more powerful than the standard M1 unit. As regards the chassis, suspension, steering and brake components were replaced with race-specification items, while the removal of non-essential items allowed a reduction of the kerb weight down to 1,020 Kg. Wheel widths were increased front and rear, and accommodating arch extensions applied to the bodywork. The aerodynamics were improved by the addition of a large rear wing and front spoiler. By contractual agreement, all the cars were equipped with Goodyear tyres. Eventually, 54 Group 4 M1s were built.

Three months on from the press presentation, a public launch was effected at the Paris Motor Show. Just two months beyond that, in January ’79, the first deliveries were being made to customers. By then the reality of the car’s gestation troubles and the complexity of its revised manufacturing process were reflected in the asking price – around DM 110,000. That made for a car very much more expensive than competing products such as Porsche’s 911 Turbo. Unsurprisingly, customer demand was below expectations and it quickly became necessary to discreetly offer discounts and incentives such as ‘free’ options.

Paris Motor Show, October ’78.  Courtesy Gilbert Uzan

The racing strand of the M1 project continued to progress more positively. A car in race specification emerged in December ’78. During testing, the top speed capability was found to be 193 mph with 0-60 mph achievable in just over 4 seconds. The development work went well enough to allow for a Group 4 race debut in the hands of Marc Surer at the DRM Nürburgring Eifelrennen in late April ’79. Classified 9th overall and first in class in the Rennsport Trophae (Division 1) race, it was a largely successful first showing, though Surer’s progress had been hampered by engine trouble in the latter stages.

Procar chassis# 4301063, winner Nurburgring, April ’79.  Courtesy Wolfgang Clemens

Both road and race versions counted towards the homologation target of 400 units, though, as mentioned above, it had been seen in ‘78 that the quota would not be achievable in time for the ’79 season. Neerpasch had thought around this problem and come up with the idea of a racing format not constricted by the sport’s governing body’s (FIA) regulations. Making use of their existing good rapport from the F3 engine supply programme, Neerpasch engaged Max Mosely’s interest in the creation of a GT series to be run as support races to Formula 1 Grand Prix events. Mosely in turn enlisted Bernie Ecclestone as an advocate, enabling rapid progress on the scheme’s implementation. With support from the F1 constructors, a Procar Association was set up and agreement reached for races to be run at the European Grands Prix. It was envisaged that each race would be contested by 20 cars, 5 to be entered by the BMW factory and the remaining 15 by a variety of teams, including Project Four Racing, Osella, Schnitzer Motorsport, Eggenberger Racing, GS Tuning, Tom Walkinshaw Racing, Team Konrad and Ecurie Arvor. With this number of cars, it was decided to entrust some preparation also to BS Fabrications, a Luton-based business familiar to Ecclestone and through which he promoted Nelson Piquet’s driving career. Sales to the teams were based on the price of a Procar being $60,000.

The competition format encompassed a two day event on the Friday and Saturday of each Grand Prix – practice on the Friday, race on the Saturday. The BMW factory team on each occasion would comprise the 5 drivers fastest in Formula 1 practice and, irrespective of Procar practice times, they would be assigned the first five grid slots. Series points/prize sums were awarded as below:

The series rounds for ’79 were to be held at the following Grands Prix:

The series championship would be taken by the highest points scorer over the 8 rounds, a M1 being their principal reward for the feat, with other BMW models to be gifted to the other five drivers finishing in the first six places in the season-end standings table. 

The teams entering cars in the series were: BMW Motorsport, Project Four Racing, Franz Konrad Racing, Osella Squadra Corse, Schutz Racing, Eggenberger Motorsport, BMW Italia, Alimpo Sport, GS Team, Manfred Cassani, BMW Schweiz, Brun Motorsport, Heidigger Racing Team, Ecurie Automobile Arvor, Memphis Team International, Team Krebs, Team Winkelhock, Toleman Group Motorsport and Tom Walkinshaw Racing.

Over the eight events in the ’79 season, a total of 29 drivers took part – Toine Hezemans did seven, Stuck, Regazzoni and Helmut Kelleners, six, Niki Lauda, five. De Angelis, Fittipaldi. Beltoise, Mass, Konrad, Brun, Reutemann, Cheever, Needell, Jarier, Hotz and ‘Winter’ each did just one. Winners were: Belgium, de Angelis; Monaco, Lauda; France, Piquet; UK, Lauda; Germany, Lauda; Austria, Laffite; Netherlands, Stuck; Italy, Stuck. The top three in the Championship’s closing standings were, 1st Lauda, (78 points); 2nd Stuck (73 points); 3rd Regazzoni (61 points). Both Lauda and Stuck were presented with a M1 road car, Regazzoni and Hottinger with BMW 528s, and Hezemans and Piquet with BMW 323is.

Procar race, Hockenheim, July ’79.  Courtesy 2020 BMW M1 Club e.V

The season had seen some hard racing with consequent spats and shunts, raising the profile and perceived entertainment value of the series.  With some instances of lesser-known drivers, (notably Markus Höttinger, for example) out-performing top line Grand Prix stars, there was speculation that the cars were far from being all of equivalent specification/competitive set-up.  Unsurprisingly, it wasn’t long before the ‘private’ teams began to complain that the ‘factory’ cars had a power advantage.  In response, a revs limit increase was sanctioned – going from the previously-specified 8,500 to 9,200.  Disquiet rumbled on however, and at the German event it was openly suggested that winner, Lauda’s, car was ‘special,’ in response to which ‘The Rat  said: “Nonsense, after the race at Silverstone my car windows were cleaned and the car was brought to Hockenheim. The cars are all equally fast.  If at all, you can only make a difference with the tyres. Although they are all the same, there are small differences and if you are lucky enough to find a set of tyres that are a bit faster, because they are simply made that way, then you can drive faster.”

Procar race, Zeltweg, August ’79.  Courtesy 2020 BMW M1 Club e.V.

Lauda, Stuck and Regazzoni arrived at the final race, at Monza, all in the running to take the championship.  Stuck, though classified as a ‘private’ driver had proven the series meister, especially in the later races, though Lauda was very nearly as quick and with consistency had racked up points on occasions when Stuck had suffered a DNF.  At Monza, Stuck won with a 20 seconds advantage over Lauda, with the remarkable Höttinger in 3^rd.  It made for a close finish to the championship, but was clear enough given Lauda’s 5 points advantage. 

’79 Procar champion, Niki Lauda with M1, German Grand Prix, ’08.  Courtesy BMW Group

There was an additional Procar race, run at Donington Pak in June, as a part of a meeting commemorating Gunnar Nilsson.  It was won by Nelson Piquet, but no championship points were awarded for this event. 

It was generally agreed that Procar had in ’79 fulfilled BMW’s ambitions and was widely regarded as a properly competitive series, not just a demonstration exercise run for marketing purposes.  In helping to consolidate BMW’s standing as a major player in global motorsport, it provided encouragement to the management in the Four Cylinder Tower to rekindle the company’s F1 aspirations.  Somewhat ironically, as a consequence, BMW itself ceded ‘ownership’ of the Procar series to the Formula One Constructors Association in order to focus effort and resources on a F1 engine programme.  At the same time, it was decided to entrust all the preparation of the ‘works’ M1s (i.e. those allocated to the F1 drivers) to BS Fabrications for the ’80 season.  Also revised for ’80 was the qualifying format by the removal of the privileged pre-determined starting grid positions allocated to the Grand Prix drivers. 

While the primary focus in ’79 was on the Procar series, wider utilisation of the race version M1 evolved with success.  Four years previously, French entrepreneur and amateur racing driver, Hervé Poulain had successfully proposed and implemented the ‘Art Car’ programme, in which contemporary artists were commissioned to apply a ‘livery’ to various BMW models destined to compete in the 24 Hours of Le Mans events.  The ’75 entry was a BMW 3.0 CSL painted by Alexander Calder and driven by Poulain, Sam Posy and Jean Guichet.  For ’79, an M1 with decoration by Andy Warhol was entered.  Group 4 compliant and in the IMSA GTX .25+ class, it was taken to 6^th overall, 2^nd in class by drivers, Poulain, Marcel Mignot and Manfred Winklelhock.

BMW M1 of Hervé Poulain, Le Mans, ’79.  Courtesy Classic and Vintage BMW

At National level, no M1s were ready to compete in the Deutsche Rennsport Meisterschaft, (Rennsport Trophäe,  Group 4 Division 1), until the fourth round at Salzburg in May.  In the eight remaining races of the season there were intermittent entries for Stuck, Lauda, Regazzoni, Jochen Mass, Franz Konrad, Wolfgang Schütz, Ralf-Dieter Schreiber, Walter Brun, Markus Höttinger and Lili Reisenbichler.  Class wins were achieved by Stuck (twice), Schütz (twice) and Mass.

BMW M1 of Niki Lauda, Norisring, DRM, June ’79.  Courtesy Harry Maurer

For ’80, a calendar of nine races was announced, including two UK races and three in Germany:

New teams for the season were: BMW Nederland, Schnitzer Motorsport, Sauber Motorsport, Team Merzario, Kannacher GT Racing, Team Austria, Team Lepitre, Ralf-Dieter Schreiber, Racing Team Jurgensen and Peter Oberdorfer.  No less than 40 drivers took part, though 17 entered only a single event. 

These five F1 drivers competed in both Procar seasons; left to right: Laffite, Pironi,, Jones, Piquet, Reutemann.  Courtesy Motorsport.com

The opening race at Donington showed that the revision of the qualifying rules was capable of causing quite a shake up in the relative competitiveness of the F1 drivers, with several strong performances from the ‘private’ drivers contributing to a close fought and incident-packed event won by Jan Lammers.

Winning Procar of Jan Lammers, April ’80, Donington Park.  Courtesy 2020 BMW M1 Club e.V

At the second round, the peculiar nature of the AVUS circuit, with its exceptionally long straights, brought the engine revs limit back under scrutiny. Although a maximum of 8,700 was again recommended in the interests of reliability, there was plenty of enthusiasm for going to 9,000-9,300.  Hans-Geog Bürger’s GS-entered car won the pole with 8,700 set, though other drivers claimed they were not competitive if restricted to less than 9,000.  However, the main talking point at the race’s conclusion was the performance of the Cassani driver, Manfred Schurti who beat Lammers to the win by six seconds.  Schurti was an accomplished driver with the Gelo, Martini and Porsche works teams, though with a less high profile than many of the Procar participants.  At Monaco, Stuck was back to his ’79 late season form, finishing ahead of Kelleners, 2^nd and Piquet, 3^rd.  Stuck won again at the Norisring but was down to 7^th at Brands Hatch, with 5 F1 drivers – including winner, Reutemann – ahead of him.  Didier Pironi found himself under a good deal of criticism in regard to collisions at the Hockenheim event, infuriating Stuck in particular, but emerged as the victor, and appeared not too bothered by the controversies!  However, such an incident-packed race once again proved that Procar was a full-bloodied racing series.  The final three races of the ’80 series – and the last Procar events of all time – were dominated by Nelson Piquet, the man who would win the F1 World Championship the following year, being first across the line in each.  This late run of form served to propel Piquet’s points total to 90, putting him well clear of Jones (77 points) and Stuck (71 points) and thus more than enough to secure his standing as the ’80 Procar champion.  His reward from BMW was a 635CSi,while Jones was presented with a BMW 528i, and Stuck received a BMW 323i. 

Race and Championship winner, Nelson Piquet, Imola September ’80.  Courtesy Getty Images

With the conclusion of the Procar series, the M1’s period as a BMW model was coming to an end.  Production was discontinued in ’80, though the last examples were not delivered to their first owners until into ’81.  453 M1s had been built, (some say 457), of which 54 were to Procar or Group 5 specification.  As regards the Group 5 cars, despite the homologation problem, BMW had been at work since ’78 on a suitable engine for the category.  Announced that year, a twin turbo version of the M88 had been developed and this was utilised from ’81.  Designated 88/2, it had a reduced cubic capacity – down to 3,191 cc – enabling M1s to run in the 4.5 litre (naturally aspirated) class.  Subject to boost pressure, the M88/2 could output almost 1,000 bhp.  The key to unlocking the M1’s entry to Group 5 competition was obtained in December ’80 when the FIA issued homologation papers under reference #670 with acknowledgement of completion of the required 400 units.

Part 3, to follow, covers the Group 5 M1s and a survey of M1s marketed for resale in recent years.

The One and Only - Part 1

Autumn ’72, I’m into my second year with the UK BMW importer and still marvelling that in this, my first post-education job, it’s not work at all.  And the prospect of even more enhanced fun is conjured when I’m instructed to prepare for my first trip to the Munich factory.  So, shortly after, I was revelling in my first four days in Bavaria.  There were many things to enjoy about the city, the South German culture and the ambience of the Lerchenauer Str. BMW campus – not least the recently completed, splendid Four Cylinder Tower – but the single experience that most inspired me was being allowed to get close up and personal with the fabulous Turbo which had made its debut appearance at the previous year’s Paris Motor Show.  As a vision of our automotive future, Paul Bracq’s creation even managed to trump the Mercedes C111-II that had so impressed me a couple of years earlier.  There was so much to like about Bruno Sacco’s bodywork design though I thought it could look even more purposeful if its height was reduced and its width increased just a touch.  That was exactly what Bracq did with his styling of the Turbo.  And all the talk around BMW   was about the possibility of such a wonderful car being put into production.

© 2026 Inspiration Grid and  Schiffer Publishing Ltd.

Meanwhile, Niki Lauda was ‘Stateside’ in October for the Canadian and U.S. Grands Prix.  He may well have wished he was elsewhere, as the car at his disposal for those races was a March 721G – not even a fully-blown F1 machine, but one of the marque’s Formula Two cars equipped with the ubiquitous Cosworth DFV engine.  It was, however, more competitive than the 721X – an innovative design by March’s Robin Herd.  Herd’s aim had been to improve the balance/handling of the car by incorporating a transverse gearbox.  However, from its debut in May ’72 at the Spanish Grand Prix, it was evident that the 721X was a very difficult car to drive.  So difficult in fact that after just three races, the team reverted to a conventional format with the 721G.  Lauda’s dismay, was compounded by the fact that he had had to borrow $250,000 to ‘buy’ his ’72 March drive.  Niki’s results for those two Grands Prix? – denied a likely, though lowly 15^th place finish in Canada as he had received help from marshals when stranded, and thus was unclassified (last on the road running) at the Glen.  His morale must have been further undermined by teammate Ronnie Peterson’s performance in his similar 721G – strong showing throughout the weekend and a 4^th place finish in the race.  Any dreams of being a future champion Lauda might be having over the winter would surely be very fleeting and unconvincing.

Courtesy graham64.wordpress.com

What was convincing in late ’72 was a spirit of optimism at the Lamborghini factory in Sant’Agata, where, by then, nearly 800 Miuras had been built and the ‘replacement’ Countach model’s development was progressing well – well enough, indeed, for a prototype to be shown at the following March’s Geneva Motor Show.  Coming up to its 10^th year as a car manufacturer, the business was riding the crest of a sales boom, increasing revenues and praise for the panache and innovative nature of its products.  For Ferruccio Lamborghini himself however, the outlook was very different.  His tractor business became especially problematic, prompting him to sell it out in ‘72 as a pre-emptive measure, fearing that it might become insolvent.  At the same time, he sold a significant chunk of his holdings in Automobili Lamborghini to Georges-Henri Rossetti.  Two years later he relinquished his entire stake in the business, leaving it in the joint ownership of Rossetti and René Leimer.

Courtesy Supercars.net

Late in ’71 Bernie Ecclestone had paid Ron Tauranac £100,000 for Motor Racing Developments/Brabham and was preoccupied with remodelling the business.  At the same time he was developing his interest in a role beyond team ownership and into the realm of the sport’s organisation, governance and commercial evolution; this would lead in ’74 to his involvement in the establishment of the Formula One Constructors Association.

Courtesy Sport Pro History

One more thing happening in autumn ’72 was the growing influence of Jochen Neerpasch on BMW’s plans for development of its motorsport ambition.  After a successful driving career, ’60-’68, Neerpasch was hired by Ford Germany to run its racing division.  His achievements in the role led to his being offered a similar position by Bob Lutz, Sales Director at BMW, which he took up in May ’72.  With the appointment, the company sought to establish an elite brand, BMW Motorsport GmbH, (‘BMW M’) within the marque, its objective being to prove in the Group 4 and 5 racing categories  that anything Porsche could do, BMW could do better!  Initially, Neerpasch focused on establishing a general perception of the company’s excellence in design and engineering for motorsport applications by means of a highly successful engine supply programme for Formula 2.  Alongside, the E9 Coupe was developed for top flight Touring Car racing.  A lightweight version had first been evolved in ’71 in collaboration with Alpina.  Neerpasch added to that by having a 3 litre, 200 bhp version built and homologated for Group 2.  Thus began a run of success for the CSL, starting by winning the ’73 European Touring Car Championship and sustaining success right through to ’79.

Neerpasch, (right) with Martin Braungart, 1972  Courtesy PressClub USA

These people and situations began to be drawn together when Neerpasch, together with Martin Braungart (overall project management) and Paul Rosche (engines) collaborated on a study of two possibilities – 1) BMW’s participation in Formula 1, and, 2) Creation of a coupe designed (rather than adapted to being such a vehicle) as a racing car.  Their findings and outline proposals were first reviewed by the BMW Board in September ’75.  The following month,  a go-ahead was given not only to the start of work on an engine for Formula 1, but also for the coupe, specifically a mid-engine type with 8 cylinder power.  The proposed configuration of the coupe was not something with which BMW had had previous experience, so Neerpasch requested and received permission to negotiate with Lamborghini for the Bolognese manufacturer to engineer and build the cars.  As a result, Lamborghini contracted in Spring ‘76 to handle all aspects with the exception of the engine.  Central to the agreement was the obligation for 2,000 cars to be made at Sant’Agata over a four year period.  As regards the body, it’s styling was entrusted to Italdesign, the carrozzeria founded by Giorgetto Giugiaro after he had stopped working with Ghia.  The brief from BMW was for a car with functional and production practicality but with the ‘spirit’ of Bracq’s Turbo preserved.  There was enough interpretive room to allow Giugiaro to incorporate the wedge element themes he had been evolving in ’74, ‘75 and early ’76 with the Lotus Esprit, Alfasud Sprint, Alfetta GT, VW Scirocco and  Maserati Medici II.  Back at Munich, the M team was consolidated with the appointment of additional senior personnel, Rainer Bratenstein (Engineer, Development), Hans Erdmann Schönbeck (Sales Strategy) and Dr. Karlheinz Radermacher (Board member responsible for Research & Development).  So far, so good.

Giorgetto Giugiaro  Courtesy Mahan 

But, as the early months of ’76 came and went, the outlook deteriorated.  Judging by the speed of early progress on the F1 engine project, it became clear that it would require significantly more time than originally anticipated, and a strategic rethink was necessary.  Accordingly, it was decided to suspend work and focus on the coupe.  Indeed, this too had become a source of concern, not only because a growing number of the project team members were feeling discomfort with the scale and scope of the programme – was a sales volume of 2000 really feasible, and how did the costs/benefits ratio look with the creation of a new engine involved?  Regarding this second consideration, there was a practical solution readily to hand – utilisation of the existing 6 cylinder in line engine. 

This reappraisal of the project, whilst fully justified from a BMW viewpoint, was bad news for Lamborghini. Whilst the company’s financial status, as mentioned above, had been secure during the early years, a much less lucrative era had set in following the first fuel price crisis in ’73. For Lamborghini, the situation was especially difficult given that its products were relatively expensive and its engines large and highly fuel-consumptive. With the volume of sales of its own products thus likely to contract, the anticipated revenue from building 2,000 M1s had become an essential support of the Italian firm’s ongoing financial health rather than a nice bonus. In Sant’Agata, it was thus a severe shock when BMW advised that it was withdrawing from the contract for 2,000 units. In its place a revised agreement was proposed based on some fundamental changes to the vehicle’s specifications and a lower volume of just 800. Lamborghini had no option but to accept this and duly agreed to a new contract in mid-October ’76.

Central to the revised specification of the M1 was the substitution of a purpose-developed version of the existing 6 cylinder twin cam M49, a unit of 3.2 litre capacity which had been powering the works CSL race cars. Designated M88, this became highly regarded as an emblem of the M Division’s engineering excellence with subsequent utilisation in the models considered by many as iconic, E24 M635CSi (E24) and M5 (E28). Paul Rosche sought and achieved a quantum leap in the engine’s performance potential by again incorporating a twin cam head, this time with 24 valves. BMW had begun to make 6 cylinder engines in the Thirties. By the Sixties, it had become recognised for particular expertise with this power unit type, acquiring a good reputation for efficiency, reliability and smooth power delivery characteristics. As that decade came to an end, a version of the engine, designated M30, became an important element in the company’s evolution beyond the ‘Neue Klasse’ (1.5-2.0 litre) models through which its fortunes were very successfully revived. The M30 was produced in 2.5, 2.8 and 3.0 litre capacities and powered the marque’s reputation-enhancing models – 2.5, 2.8 and 3.0 ‘E3’ saloons and the ‘E9’ coupes. The fastest 3 litre versions of these models were rated at just under 200 bhp, while the further developed ‘3.5’ for the racing CSLs was considerably more powerful. The M88 as specified for the M1 generated just under 280 bhp – enough to address any possible assertions that the M1 would fail to fulfil the original objective of being a ‘junior supercar.’ That classification was conventionally assigned only to cars with an eight cylinder engine – as had been BMW’s original intention. However, the performance of the M88 was sufficient to render the six versus eight issue purely academic. After all, the M88 would make the M1 a 280 bhp/243 lb/ft torque machine, while the Ferrari 308 GTB, even in Quattrovalvole form, deployed just 240 bhp and the Lamborghini Urraco P300 harnessed not much more at 247 bhp.

M88 engine.  Cortesy Rikojanuary (Facebook)

Paul Rosche.  Courtesy BMW

Part 2, to follow, covers the M1's development period, finalisation and start of production.