A Lack of Horsepower for the CART
It’s
generally accepted today that Ferrari did not create its F637 Indycar and F034
engine with a burning desire to actually race it, (though there are a few
differing theories about this). Rather,
it was a tangible expression of the marque’s resistance to the proposal for new Formula 1 technical regulations being
ventilated in the mid-80s by the FIA. Planned
for the post-turbo era, these would exclude V12 engines. The existence of an Indycar, ready to go,
with the implied threat that this would become the focus at Maranello rather
than Formula 1, was seen as effort and expense well worth expending. In collaboration with the Indycar team, Truesports,
run by Jim Trueman, a familiarisation/feasibility study began in ’85. That autumn, Trueman took his driver, Bobby
Rahal, to Italy and at Fiorano they showed what their car – a March 85C – could
do. Impressed with this, Ferrari
delegated a small team, led by Harvey Postlethwaite, to develop the project. Gustav Brunner, recently into his first stint
at Ferrari, was responsible for the chassis design. A go-ahead for engine design/development was
given early in ’86. This incorporated
some features informed by experience with Ferrari’s Formula 1 turbocharged V6 Tipo
021 – 033 units, and the Tipo 268/282C/308C, Ferrari twin turbocharged V8s,
utilised in the Lancia LC2. In
comparison with then-typical Indycar practice, the F034 was unusual in locating
the exhaust headers within the cylinder head banks. With a cubic capacity of 2648 cc, the 90° V8
gave some 700 bhp at 12,000 rpm. Around
mid-’86, chassis and engine were completed and the car made its initial
runs. By early autumn, progress was good
enough to allow a press presentation of the F034 engine. Meanwhile, commitment to the project was
undermined by two key outcomes which flowed from the consolidation of John
Barnard’s role as Ferrari’s Technical Director following his recruitment in
August: Barnard was not impressed by
Brunner’s capabilities and the quality of his F637 Indycar design; Barnard
became adamant that full corporate focus on the Formula 1 programme would be
required if Ferrari was to regain Grand Prix-winning potential. At the same time, there was a recognition in
the FIA that Ferrari appeared serious about its Indycar plans and thus sought
to placate Enzo, indicating that the new formula would accommodate V12 engines
after all, and this was indeed formally confirmed in March ’87. Thus, the F637’s raison d’etre dissolved and
the car/engine was quietly consigned to an out of the way corner in Maranello.
![](https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjPGtHFf_CmAtBjaItqY9tiKpzbzzQfku0abBNF_QHd7F16JHJaFSX7JarUw-Dw0u96ZNnzb_t31BgDwjpAxNCAnIgynUyLETds3qye580_Tn-O_Shvfukv_8dle0YjTJ8FBouPDbt9mFZWKJfro1IAha7u21xC79CqSrTFBNnJ8TJLkkdjpMT5f2ciXm1P/s320/~cropFerrari%20034%20engine.jpg)
Ferrari
F034 engine. Copyright Ferrari S.p.A.
While
the Ferrari Indycar project was in its death throes in early winter ’86, it was
finally announced that IRI/Finmeccanica would be entrusting the future of Alfa
Romeo to Fiat rather than to rival bidder, Ford. With both Ferrari and Alfa Romeo under the
Fiat umbrella the following year, it is not surprising that the existence of
and the canning of the F637 Indycar project piqued some interest in the offices
on Viale Alfa Romeo, Arese. Some, of
course, didn’t even want to think about single seat racing cars, the demise of
Alfa’s Formula 1 programme only too recent and dismal in terms of the woeful
final two seasons with the 184T and 185T, to say nothing of the ongoing paucity
of results being achieved with the 890T engine in the Osella FA1 chassis. Nevertheless, there were those – perhaps
mainly the younger, less long-served – who couldn’t see why their ‘brand,’ so
historically associated with competition, should not still be participating in a
high level of motorsport. This found
some expression in the beginnings of a new project to create a 4 cylinder
Formula 1 turbo engine for Ligier, but this stumbled and was cancelled in early
’87. There was an element of corporate
politics involved with that, and Fiat’s group perspective was perfectly
rational in compartmentalising effort and budgeting in terms of Formula 1 –
Ferrari, Rallying – Lancia, and Touring Cars – Alfa Romeo. However, for those keen in Arese, this
guideline left a loophole – Indycars involvement would not conflict
competitively with Ferrari and offered marketing opportunities, (in the large
U.S. market), which could be of high sales and profitability importance to Alfa
Romeo’s ongoing financial viability.
![](https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj-X4AxDCb6ExCI4-hn4nNCizeaOhiD7iVcqRvItKgSin8XfAwQtiCgYqgNr3KEdxfQsMAWWDdOK6VCufEhXGl9qVqkzAlGsQjP6gL_bXAZBozrMK8Birz9jmiEQiHsAP6jxIu21y28V8E2DW-DCVjWgTS0n1-n1QC6nxRAOgDEXi4I5bjL2CPvBTi4Bvbk/s320/M191RaceCarsDirect.jpg)
Alfa Romeo M191 V8 engine
– Courtesy Race Cars Direct
A
key player in Alfa’s Indycar adventure became involved in the latter part of
’88. This was Johnny Capels. Capels grew up and started his motor sport
participation in New Mexico. In the late
Sixties he relocated to Indianapolis and ran in USAC events, working firstly
with the Unsers and subsequently Parnelli Jones, before joining forces with
Alex Morales, for whom he operated as lead technician and team manager. Following the death of Morales in’88, Capels
took over the team’s ownership. After an
initially low key approach from Arese, Capels was asked to facilitate the launch
of on-track activities and manage the ’89 race and development programme. An early step was to engage the interest of driver
Roberto Guerrero in the opportunity and have him try the M191-powered March 88C
at Monza. This apparently confirmed the
potential to Capels and Guerrero sufficient for them to start planning for a
race debut at the 73rd running of the Indianapolis 500 on May 28th
‘89. Cesare Fiorio – recently appointed
as the head of Squadra Alfa Corse within the Fiat Group – confirmed this
intention on a visit to the Miami CART race in early November. Given that Alfa Romeo’s Formula 1 programme
had yielded so little over the preceding 10 years, the public commitment to its
Indycar programme was already a PR-risky venture. Yet the vulnerability to a negative outcome
was compounded by the utilisation of the March chassis. March had seen considerable success in CART
in the mid-Eighties, but then lost focus, partly no doubt because of
distractions as the company was converted to a stock market-quoted enterprise
and as a related outcome, joint founder, Robin Herd, was forced to relinquish
his chairmanship. The Indycar models
through the latter half of the decade lost competitiveness. The 88C, especially, was disappointing and a
trend set in whereby teams began to opt instead for Lola chassis. It was considered that the Lola was more
adaptable aerodynamically and easier to set up for differing circuits. March responded by creating a new car for ’89
which was more extensively/deeply revised than was usually involved with a
‘next year’s’ car. The resulting 89C was
designed for improved aerodynamic efficiency, better ride/attitude control and
ease of general set-up/adjustment. A
further ‘improvement’ was the recruitment of Maurice Philippe to lead and
co-ordinate the design and development team – with this came the implied
promise of innovation to come, an expertise Philippe had so clearly
demonstrated with cars such as the Lotus 49 and 72.
March 88C – used to
develop the M191 engine
Modified
88C chassis were provided by March to enable a concerted test and development
programme to be started in early ’89 by Capels’s team. Then, by Spring, two Alfa engine-specific 89Cs
were to be completed. Drivers would be
Guerrero, Bruno Giacomelli and Giorgio Francia at the Monza, Nardo and Mugello
circuits. Engine dyno testing and shop development was undertaken at Abarth’s
Turin base. At this time, when
continuity was all the more desirable, March’s corporate status was once again
in flux, with a reversion to private ownership mooted and a Japanese take-over negotiated. In March ’89, 88Cs were under test with the
M191 engines installed and generating around 685 bhp – some 7% down on the
output of the Chevrolet ‘A’ V8, (and a similar deficit likely in relation to
the Porsche 9M0 unit). Finally, in late
April, the new car, now designated 89CE, made its first on-track appearance at
Mugello. But, as the test programme
intensified, it became apparent that there were driveability problems with the
engines, significant enough to make the planned race debut at the 500
unfeasible. However, at least one
complete car had reached the U.S. by mid-May and this was afforded a shakedown
at Grattan Raceway. Guerrero‘s times
were encouraging, especially after a revised rear wing was tried, and a
decision to debut the car at Detroit, 16th/18th June in was
confirmed. With this target in mind, the
team moved on to Mid-Ohio determined to prove it could optimise the performance of
the car on this relatively convoluted road course. Though track time became limited by rainfall,
considerable learning was derived, and it was mostly in terms of causes for
concern. A combination of poor engine
performance when picking up from low revs and lack of grip left Guerrero
considerably slower than a Lola T89 testing at the circuit at the same time. Team morale was not helped by the news from
Italy that Giacomelli was unable to extract competitive performance from
another 89C at the Fiorano circuit. Back
in the U.S. Guerrero next took to the track at Michigan, hoping no doubt that the
car could do better on an oval. But,
again, disappointment was the order of the day – the 89CE was 4% down on the
previous year’s race pole time.
With
these testing outcomes proving so confidence-sapping, the team members needed
to pull together, yet at this very point continuity took a very hard knock –
Maurice Philippe died by suicide on 5th June. Frank Cuppock was appointed to take technical
lead of the project. Though it seems
apparent that his abilities were not on the same level as his cousin, Gordon’s,
(successful designer at McLaren), his scope for improving the car in quick
order was clearly limited by such an abrupt and major change in role. For his first test session in charge, Cuppock
was at Indianapolis Raceway Park, (at Clermont, to the west of Indianapolis
Motor Speedway), to see the car able to set slightly more competitive lap
times. Here, and at the other venues
visited since the car’s arrival in the U.S., a redeeming feature was engine
durability, with no big failures/blowups experienced.
Finally
race-ready, the Detroit weekend did not get off to a very good start for the
Alex Morales Autosports team. Qualifying
was not problem-strewn but the 89CE just was not fast. Guerrero was unable to get anywhere near
Michael Andretti’s pole time and the three other Marchs present were all
quicker, whether that was Teo Fabi’s Porsche-powered 89P or the Cosworth-engined
examples driven by Kevin Cogan or Steve Saleen.
So Guerrero was down in a disappointing 23rd in the starting
order. But the race sprung a surprise – though
not finishing on the lead lap of winner, Emerson Fittipaldi, Guerrero brought
his 89CE home in 8th place.
Though Fabi’s 89P was the best-placed March, in 4th, it was
generally agreed that Guerrero’s 5 points-earning result was a creditable one
for a car featuring an engine on debut.
Within
5 weeks, Guerrero and the 89CE had run in four more events and inadvertently
proved that the ’89 season was not going to be a glorious one for Alfa Romeo in
CART. In those races, at Portland,
Cleveland, Meadowlands and Toronto, the car finished only once, (in 13th,
at Cleveland), qualified no better than 19th and retired as early as
lap 4, (Toronto). Things were no better
over the remaining six races – only 2 finishes and only 1 championship point
won, (12th at Mid-Ohio).
March 89CA Copyright 2015 Stellantis
The
’90 car was denominated March-Alfa 90CA, the design credited to John Baldwin. March supplied three chassis to Patrick
Racing, (some say four – this being the number that had been agreed
contractually). The team’s engineering expertise
was strengthened by the involvement of Mo Nunn, best known for his founding of
the Ensign Formula One operation in the ‘70s.
With prominent Miller Genuine Draft/High Life sponsorship, Guerrero was
again at the wheel. At launch, the
engine was to ’89 specification, though development work was continuing at pace
back in Arese. Suspension was inboard,
front and rear, actuated by pushrods. Some
comment from observers of the static car questioned the body’s bulk and profile
rear of the cockpit, suggesting that this would compromise the drag and
downforce characteristics. Whether or
not such inferences were valid began to be evaluated in March ’90 at Memphis,
where an initial test session with the first-completed chassis was conducted. Shortly afterwards, at the beginning of
April, a second test took place at Phoenix, a week in advance of the
championship’s opening round at that track.
By this point, engine performance was improved and Guerrero expressed
satisfaction that the 90CA was a definite step up from the 89CA. This seemed to be confirmed by the stopwatch,
since it recorded slightly faster times than a March-Porsche 90P also testing
at Phoenix.
Guerrero
qualified the 90CA 14th for the Autoworks 200 at Phoenix, an
encouraging performance given that his average qualifying result with the 89CE/88C
had been 21st. But in the
race he was in the wall after 145 of the 200 scheduled laps, leaving him
classified down in 16th place.
Things were not much better at the next race, at Long Beach, where
Guerrero qualified 19th and finished in 14th, completing
91 laps of the 95 run. Whatever the
reality of the criticisms of car’s aerodynamics as evaluated at launch, the
main issue at Phoenix and Long Beach appeared to be engine power, especially as
delivered at lower rpm, rendering notably poor pick up characteristics.
All
too soon, the Indianapolis 500 was the next challenge. For this race Guerrero was at least not
carrying all the Alfa Romeo expectation alone, Al Unser being entered in a
second 90CA. The first days of practice
were not inspirational – both cars suffering engine cover fires for
example. In that first week, the fastest
runner was Unser’s son, Al Jr – dad and teammate Guerrero’s speed in comparison
was over 6% down on that mark. The
following week, Guerrero had a substantial accident – into the wall as a result
of a rear wing support strut failure. Though
Roberto was not significantly hurt, the car was damaged beyond repair at the
Speedway. Subsequently after
back-at-base evaluation it was decided that it would not be economic to rebuild
it. A replacement chassis was eventually
entrusted to Guerrero and he managed to lap a little faster in this. Emerson Fittipaldi qualified his Penske PC-19
on pole at a speed of 225.6 mph, whilst both 90CAs managed only a disappointing
212 mph. Of the race’s 33 starters,
Guerrero was in 28th place, Unser 30th. That Unser finished 13th and
Guerrero 23rd therefore doesn’t appear too bad, but Unser completed
only 186 of the 200 laps and Guerrero retired with a rear hub failure with
consequent loss of drive after 118 laps.
At least Unser had the distinction of being the best placed March driver
– both Porsche-powered 90Ps, (Teo Fabi and John Andretti), failing to finish.
There
was no time to mull over the Indianapolis disappointment as the next
championship round – at Milwaukee - followed within 7 days. Guerrero failed to record an official
qualifying time, so was put to the back of the starting grid. From there he was able to achieve very little
– retiring after 88 laps with a suspension failure and classified in 18th
place. Two weeks later it was back to
Detroit, but the relative success of Alfa Romeo’s CART debut there twelve
months previously was not to be repeated – the engine failed at less than half
distance. In addition to the
circumstances of this in its own right, there was a wider significance. Alfa Romeo engineers had been talking up the
quality, reliability and competitiveness of the engine, maintaining that the
continuing run of lack-lustre results was attributable to design and build shortcomings of the March chassis. It is
notable however that Al Unser had been much more forthcoming than Guerrero
about performance limitations imposed by the engine’s characteristics from a
driver’s viewpoint. It was also clear
that an upgrade rumoured to be under development was long overdue.
Lola T9000. © Finarte Auctions S.r.l
The
change of car naturally caused considerable operational disruption – enough to
dictate Patrick Racing’s absence from the late July championship round at
Toronto. It’s instructive to note that
of the twenty seven runners no less than twenty were Lolas. Only two March chassis appeared – the pair of
90Ps for John Andretti and Teo Fabi. If
these statistics alone validated the decision to switch to the Lola chassis,
the next race outcome was even more of a confirmation. At the Marlboro 500, Michigan, though
Guerrero qualified only for the back row, he brought the Lola-Alfa home in 5th.
But the possibility of enhanced glory
was spoilt by the Al Unser’s inability to take the start in the second car in consequence
of a big accident on the first day of practice. Attributed to a front suspension failure, this
occurred on only his 7th lap and left the veteran driver with
several broken bones.
Following
up the much improved result Guerrero had managed in debuting the Alfa-powered
Lola at Michigan, he achieved the team’s best qualifying performance so far, when
he took 11th place on the grid for the Denver street race. His race however was over with 20% left to
run when he suffered a third transmission failure in four successive races. As September came round, the next race venue
was Vancouver. The better characteristics
of the Lola chassis were further demonstrated by Guerrero’s ability to lap
quickly enough for a 10th position start. On race day he managed only 29 laps before retiring
with collision damage. In the middle of
the month, at Mid-Ohio, Guerrero again qualified well – in 15th –
but was an early retirement with a broken clutch. Then, at Road America, speed and reliability
were improved - qualification in 12th and finishing in 8th. With the advent of October, Nazareth saw
another more encouraging result for the Lola-Alfa – Guerrero both qualified and
finished in 9th. But there
was disappointment at the closing round, at Laguna Seca, Guerrero running to
near the race’s conclusion, but being forced to retire the car because of a
fire.
The
latter part of the ’90 season had certainly seen an improvement in Patrick
Racing/Alfa’s fortunes and the year-end tally was 24 points and 16th
place in the PPG Indy Car World Series. An
intriguing ponderable concerns the contribution to the better results possibly
made by an engine upgrade. Whilst it is
not difficult to find critical commentary on the design of the March chassis –
especially rear end aero characteristics – confirmation of the specification
and actual delivery of a long-promised ‘new version’ M191 is elusive. The main items rumoured to feature were 40
valve heads, shorter stroke reciprocals and a revised two unit wastegate
set-up. In regard to that latter configuration
incidentally, there is crossover to the question of March’s culpability on the
rear aero deficiencies – the single wastegate seen on the M191 gave rise to an asymmetrical
body outlet duct which did not help with the profiling of the engine cover’s
lefthand side. An aspect of the Lola
design which made it significantly more successful than March’s was the
attention to detail in the packaging of the exhaust/turbo system, allowing for
a generally lower location of components, with centre-of-gravity, gas blow
directional, and airflow-to-wing advantages.
In
recent months, through contact with various people, including former team
members, I have renewed my efforts to confirm whether or not upgraded engines
were made available to Patrick Racing during the second part of ’90 and ‘91. Although apparent awareness of work having
been carried out at the factory is commonly recollected, I have found no evidence
that relevantly modified engines reached the Patrick Racing workshop. As a power output disadvantage against the
competition had been openly acknowledged since the M191 began track testing in ’89,
it’s difficult to reconcile a situation whereby improvements had been developed
but were not delivered to the race team.
My explanation is that internal pressures at Alfa Romeo forced the Alfa
Corse management to become overly-fearful of implementing anything that might
attract criticism of the brand’s ability to build a reliable product, be it for
the road or the track. In regard to the
latter, a major factor in the failure of the 70s/80s Formula 1 programme was
the durability of both engines and chassis.
Most notably, in the season in which the 183T was at its most
competitive – 1983 - of 30 starts there were 14 technical failure DNFs. There was perhaps near-paranoid sensitivity
around the robustness of engines, historically a strong point for Alfa Romeo. That concern was indeed seen to be justified
when in May ’91 the higher stress running at Indianapolis resulted in many broken
M191s! Along with the limitations
imposed by the conservative approach adopted by the Alfa Corse engine team, it
was also hamstrung by a lack of familiarity with methanol fuel, this having
very significant effects on performance/response at part throttle. Looking for insight on this topic and the ‘secrets’
of the Chevy, Patrick had sent one of his ’89 season 265s for detail study in
Arese, but it is not obvious what was learnt from this and as it might well be
thought a subversive exercise, we don’t have any record of the conclusions. Yes, of course, there was an upturn in performance/reliability
in the latter part of ’90, but this is surely attributable in the main to the
work put in by Mo Nunn. So, another item
to be added to Patrick Racing/Alfa Romeo’s ‘90 misfortune’s list was that Nunn
would be elsewhere for ’91.
Patrick
Racing took to the tracks in ’91 not only Nunnless, but also with a new driver. True, Roberto Guerrero had not fulfilled the
promise perceived by many when he began driving the March-Alfa in ’89 – he had,
after all, been in with a real chance of winning the Indy 500, and indeed the
championship, just two years previously – but the best he could cite for his
‘89/’90 seasons was the 5th place finish at Michigan. In contrast, Danny Sullivan, driving for Penske
Racing, had enjoyed a competitive ’90, with two wins and three additional
podium placings. There was considerable
surprise when it was announced that he was moving to the less fancied Patrick
Racing outfit and the Lola-Alfa for ’91, particularly as he had been the winner
of the final two races of the ’90 season.
Perhaps Sullivan had been presented with a very positive picture
regarding the car and engine with which he would be working, but the reality –
as far as the engine was concerned at least – was rather different. Behind closed doors at Arese, the management
team had just about given up on the Indycar project in terms of anything more
than the impending new season. The Alfa
75, the model with which Alfa Romeo had hoped to achieve a volume sales
breakthrough in the U.S. had already been discontinued after just two years of
marketing as the ‘Milano.’ For ’91, the
new 164 would be marketed in the U.S., but volume expectations were reduced and
the justification for major expenditure to directly influence the American
market could not be argued on a positive cost : benefit ratio basis. Instead, Alfa Romeo was once more returning
to the concept of raising its profile by supporting motorsport participation on
a global basis. Thus, where engineering
resources had been focused on the M191 engine, they were now redirected towards
projects such as the 164-based Procar proposition and the ’92-‘96 155-based
Touring Car programmes primarily for the DTM and BTCC series. No further development work on the M191 was
undertaken and related Alfa Corse operations effectively went into run-down
mode, though Sullivan was impressed on a visit to Arese by what he perceived as
activity apparently not constrained by a lack of budget. That serious money was available for this
‘one last gasp’ season was further indicated by Sullivan’s pay being reported
as around $1.75M, thanks to a significant degree to sponsorship income from Millers
(beer) and Q8 (oil).
Danny Sullivan in the
Lola T91/00. Copyright Lola Cars
The
largely upbeat team mood engendered by the March/April interlude was always
going to challenged by May’s focus shift to the ultra high speed Indianapolis
Motor Speedway. Though those first three
races had seen Sullivan running near the front, the Alfa engine’s power
disadvantage in comparison with that of the Chevy had remained clearly evident. But, more disappointingly, once any tweaks to
tease a little more grunt from the M191 had been enacted, and the units had begun
to run at the sustained higher speeds attainable at Indianapolis, reliability
took a very big hit. That development
had indeed stopped at Alfa Corse is shown by Sullivan’s experience during
practice and preparation for the race – Danny told me, ‘I blew up 13 during the
month of May, and no power, which was worse.’
He does not recall being told by anyone at Patrick Racing that any upgrades
were in preparation. This left Sullivan
struggling to achieve lap speeds above 220 mph, putting him at a deficit of around
2% against the cars vying for the pole. Thus,
his best-likely race expectation was that he’d be four laps down on the winner
and probably good enough only for a finish in the 6th – 10th
bracket. Sullivan was of the opinion
that the main issue was lack of usable torque rather than outright brake
horsepower. In attempting to compensate
for the power issue and increase straightline velocity by running a near
horizontal rear wing angle, a compounding of issues was inadvertently garnered,
since the resulting reduced downforce hurt speed capability in the oval’s four
turns. Given all this, it’s testament to
Sullivan’s skill and persistence that he was able to qualify as high a 9th,
with only Jim Crawford’s Buick-engined Lola faster of the non Chevy-powered cars. For this event Patrick entered a second car,
for Guerrero, but Roberto was nowhere near Sullivan’s pace, qualifying in a
lowly 28th. Ironically
though, Roberto’s race get away was significantly better since Danny’s car was
stationary, under investigation for a lack of fuel pressure. Though quite quickly diagnosed, he was unable
to get going until the rest of the field had already completed the opening
lap. His persistence and expertise in
the traffic nevertheless enabled him to make considerable progress and he was
well into the points by the last quarter of the race. Retirement as a consequence of a failed turbo
was therefore all the more hard to take on lap 174. As partial compensation, Sullivan was
classified in 10th place, whereas Guererro’s race was cut short with 24
laps completed, after tangling with Kevin Cogan’s Lola-Buik. Cogan had pushed Guerrero outwards mid-turn,
resulting in both cars hitting the wall.
A suspension arm detached from Guererro’s Lola was struck by A J Foyt’s car. A J was uninjured, but unable to continue. Guererro suffered a bruised shoulder, but
worst hurt, with several broken bones was the accident’s instigator, Cogan, the
injuries preventing him from competing at the Brickyard in ’92.
Guerrero emerges from
his wrecked
Lola-Alfa at the ‘91 Indianapolis 500
However
downbeat the Patrick personnel may have felt as they packed up at the Speedway,
just seven days later their spirit and optimism had been restored by Sullivan’s
performance in Wisconsin. At the Milwaukee
Mile oval, Danny qualified 4th and finished the race in 5th. And this time he was more in touch with the
four Chevy-engined cars ahead, completing 197 of the 200 laps. A fortnight later, the championship’s sixth
round was hosted at Detroit. Qualifying
here was a step backwards for Sullivan, midfield mediocre pace enabling him to take
no better than 13th. There
was a little progress in the race, with the second 10th place of the
season recorded. But, more positively, with
one third of the season done, all six races had returned points, 36 in total.
At
Portland, the customary monopolisation of the leading grid slots by the usual
Lola-Chevy suspects was considerably disrupted – Fittipaldi and Mears took 1st
and 2nd in their Penske PC-20s, Scott Pruett was 3rd in a
Truesport 91-Judd, Michael Andretti and Al Unser Jr were 4th and 5th,
Sullivan 6th. Danny’s race
was, however, quite soon over, engine failure occurring after just 30 of the
104 laps. The following round at
Cleveland saw Sullivan and the Lola-Alfa less competitive in qualifying, but
yielded a points-paying 9th place finish, with every car ahead being
Chevy-engined. At Meadowlands, Sullivan
was even less successful in qualifying, (14th), but was once again
the highest finishing non-Chevy car, in 6th place.
The
next three races – at Toronto, Michigan and Denver - were especially
disappointing as in each, electrical problems led to retirement. At Vancouver, however, a good qualifying
performance, (taking 9th place), was followed by a solid race, finishing
in the same position. But in the
remainder of September and at the beginning of October, non-finishes occurred
at Mid-Ohio, Road America and Nazareth. At
least at these events (and also at Denver) Sullivan had been able to qualify
within the top twelve, but at the season’s final round at Laguna Seca, he could
do no better than 15th. The
race was somewhat better, a 9th place finish, and 4 more
championship points. Indeed, Danny had
scored points in 10 of the championship’s 17 rounds, for a total of 56 and 11th
place in the drivers’ standings table.
So, a much more productive season, but, once again a relatively
uninspiring 4th place was the highlight result. With that in mind, it is perhaps not
difficult to understand why there was no pause to reconsider the decision,
communicated to Sullivan in August, that Alfa Romeo would not supply engines
for a ’92 championship programme.
Given
that Alfa Romeo embarked on the CART Indycar project with no previous
experience of the category, it might well have been thought realistic to plan and
budget for at least a five year programme.
In Autumn ’91, at the conclusion of the second full year of the
programme, enough progress should have been perceptible and supportive of
ongoing involvement along with a reinvigoration of engine development activity
at the Factory. But the budget situation
was dire and unsalvageable. Whatever had
happened in ’91 on-track, it could not affect the diminished corporate
ambitions regarding road car sales in the American market. Meanwhile, the global sales/marketing results
for Alfa Romeo remained highly problematic, leaving the marque dependant on
further funding from Fiat, (possibly with support from IRI/Finmeccanica), for
any motorsport initiatives. For Fiat, there
was a rationale to seek enhancement of Alfa Romeo’s sporting image, but it was
seen that this should be biased towards its presence in the European markets
and with a direct relevance to its higher volume road car products – hence the focus
on the 155 (and, subsequently, the 156) in Touring Car guise.
Not for the first time,
Alfa Romeo had sought sporting success on a speculative basis, but fallen
short, mainly because of an inability to plan -and provide funding – for the
long term.
Henri Greuter has kindly been in touch with the following observation: "The picture of the all red #21 of which you mention it to be March 88C used to develop the engine: This car isn't an 88C. On the picture is one of the 89CE chassis. The suspension link is the giveaway. On the 88C the diagonal link sat on the bottom of the chassis instead as seen here on the top. This particular image you use is taken from the 89CE press kit that contained a set of colour slides." Many thanks Henri.
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